Metametameta discussion of science ‘n’ religion
Meta times 3 because commenting on Thomas Dixon’s comments on Eric MacDonald’s review of Dixon’s book. Dixon says, in reply to Eric’s reply to him, that it is becoming clear how their approaches differ.
I think the bottom line is that I’m not happy to generalise about ‘religion’ in the way that you want to, nor to treat all ‘religion’ as if it were at one, extreme end of the spectrum in terms of scriptural literalism and authoritarianism; nor to suppose that there is just one ‘paradigmatic’ singular relationship between religion and science.
The trouble with that is, for some purposes it is necessary to generalize about religion in that way. Granted, religions differ, and the word can refer to different things – but when the subject under discussion is science and religion and whether there is or is not a conflict between them, then it becomes necessary to focus on the areas where there is conflict or potential for conflict. Otherwise the real issues are simply evaded, and what’s the point of that? Apart from a public relations exercise, that is.
Believers and fans of religion like to do that, of course. There is no conflict between science and, say, liking to get together with people to sing churchy music once a week. Indeed not. But there is conflict with religion understood in other ways, and that’s what should be addressed, not the parts that pretty much everyone agrees are not in conflict. Religion-as-ritual is not the issue, so discussions of Science&Religion really aren’t about religion defined that way. The site of the conflict is epistemology, so that’s the place to discuss it.
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Yes, meta indeed. As I tried to point out in my comment, the real conflict between science and religion is a political one. The academic ‘field’ of “science and religion” is not a field at all. There are no such thing as “science and religion” scholars, only philosophers of science or theologians who study the historical development of science and its conflicts with religion. Both do so (I assume) within their own traditions, but the philosophy of science and theology do not overlap or cooperate.
The origin of the conflict thesis is the scientist and historian John William Draper and the historian Andrew Dickson White. Both were writing from the perspective of their scientific tradition, and both perceived a conflict between science and religion.
Not surprising then, that from the theological side an alternative thesis has been created called the ‘complexity thesis’ which is supported by theologians.
Thomas Dixon, a theologian cum historian and philosopher of science comes down on the theological side (but assures us that he is writing as an impartial historian and agnostic). And so, we must assume Thomas Dixon is not speaking as a theologian, but completely impartially, as historian. But Eric MacDonald’s criticism of Dixon’s book, is pointing out the problematic nature of any such ‘field’ as science and religion, and the complete lack of treating the conflict from an epistemological perspective.
But the problem as I see it is, that most scientists won’t play along with the theologians, and pretend that science and religion are compatible. Most seem uninterested in working with theologians, and why would they? Science is very much an epistemological field that methodological goes about its business unmolested by interference from speculative and emotional appeals to revelation. I can’t speak for theology, as I have no idea what methodology or criteria for knowledge that they pretend to practice, but it certainly isn’t one that I recognise as based in reason.
And so, I suggest that the real conflict arises because religion and science are separate endeavours with different goals. Religion has political ambitions which is why it conflicts with science, and science is forced to constantly defend itself from interference. Science has also grown in power because it is a successful epistemological methodology, and naturally it now has greater political power than ever before. Hence the clash is an obvious one, and the complexity thesis is simply another political attack against science.
The thing is that even the most liberal and progressive religion must admit that in the end they rely on the same authority as the extremists. They use the same scriptures and the same claims of personal experience with their God to support their theology. Any insight in the human condition that they claim above and beyond that of secular institutions must come from there. Where else would it come from?
So to show that even liberal and progressive religious institutions have an added value above and beyond that of secular institutions, to show that they are worth the effort of harmonizing, you have to evaluate how reliable religious sources of authority are. And you can’t do that without explaining how it can be that those who rely on those sources *more* (because they reject most secular sources of authority) come to such vastly different conclusions that Dixon calls them “extremists”.
I’ll second Deen and add that it’s even more difficult then that because there’s a real question as to what distinguishes the more liberal or acceptable parts of religion from the less acceptable. No matter how you cut it, religion itself doesn’t do the job. What they need is to appeal to secular arguments to make that distinction and then we’re back in the position the Euthyphro left us, why appeal to god?
If there is no paradigmatic relationship between any religion and science, that is a general statement about religion.
I hesitate to call it a generalisation…
Ah, but that ain’t the way it works. The way it works is that it is assumed that religion – no, faith – adds value, and it’s the responsibility of you damned atheists to show that you’re not taking that away and leaving us with a life without meaning. The faithful do not feel compelled to defend truth claims; to them, it is not about truth claims.
And, truth of tell, for those of us raised to believe, that sense of lost meaning, and how we dealt with it, is a big part of our deconversion stories.
@Ken Pidcock: it may not be about truth-claims for the religious, but “religion gives us meaning like nothing else can” is still a truth-claim. One that is falsified by those same deconversion stories, by the way.
I think in the end it boils down to the following question: if there is a scientific statement that conflicts your religion/faith, which one do you choose? Do you adjust your faith, or do you deny the science?
@Szf: unfortunately there is a third option: ignore or even deny the conflict.
Anecdotes are not data ;)
Seriously, that does not falsify the claim any more than a conversion of an atheist to religion proves the claim. Internal benefits from religion are perpetually subjective, just as internal benefits from a hobby. Some of the things I do for entertainment certainly would leave others scratching their heads.
Heh, so ironically enough, this sort of ties back in and comes at from the other direction your post a few days ago about “The F-Word”. If one wants to adhere to an obstinately broad definition of religion, it is not necessarily the case that “religion” and science inherently contradict. I think it’s rather stubborn and pedantic to insist on that, given that virtually everything that anyone has ever reasonably referred to as a “religion” has entailed some aspects which, if not directly contradicting factual scientific claims, are at least epistemologically incompatible.
But “faith”? No debate there. Faith and science are inherently incompatible, there is an inherent conflict. They are two mutually exclusive and opposing epistemologies. There can be no debate there.
@jay #10: I’m going to have to disagree on this point, that in this particular case all you really need to prove the point are a few (or, technically speaking, just one) anecdotes. The proposition being examined is whether “religion gives us meaning like nothing else can.” If just a few people find a different way of getting “meaning”, the proposition is disproven.