Setting the bar
I knew I would be told I was setting too high a standard by talking of reliable knowledge (and meaning by it actually reliable knowledge, rather than credible or rationally defensible or arguable beliefs or guesses or intuitions). I knew that so well that when making a couple of notes on belief and reliable knowledge this morning, that was one of the notes I made – the prediction that I would be told that. But the high standard is exactly the point. Why would we want to set a lower standard? Why would we accept a lower standard? I can see why people want to set a lower standard for their own beliefs, and perhaps for their chosen group’s beliefs; but why everyone is supposed to accept a lower standard for certain kinds of beliefs (and not others) in general, I find more puzzling. Especially because the claims we are supposed to accept a lower standard for – a lower standard for defining what reliable knowledge is, remember – are so very large and detailed (albeit conflicting) and unlikely. It is not obvious that the larger and wilder the claim is, the lower the standard for defining reliable knowledge should be. On the contrary. The larger and wilder the claim is, the more we want to know how the person making the claim knows – except, apparently, when it comes to whether ‘God’ exists and whether it is good and what it wants us to do to be good. But that’s just the kind of claim we need reliable knowledge of, and if we don’t have it, we need to be very damn cautious about heeding claims on the subject.
Notice I’m not saying this rules out belief; it obviously doesn’t. But belief isn’t knowledge, and shouldn’t be treated like knowledge. I maintain that it’s not setting too high a standard for reliable knowledge to say that it should be genuinely reliable knowledge. Otherwise it’s not reliable knowledge, and we should talk about something else; but what I’m talking about here is reliable knowledge, so I’m going to define it accordingly, not in some more relaxed way. That’s why I brought it up in the first place. I wanted to point out that we don’t actually have any reliable knowledge on this subject. (Reliable knowledge is a very scarce commodity. Very scarce indeed. But that’s why it’s as well to be modest when making assertions from incomplete knowledge. Assertions about God and what God wants us to do to be good are not always notably modest.)
Quite aside from the issue of religion, I think there’s a potential conflict between your definition of reliable knowledge and the traditional definition of knowledge as “true, justified belief”. In the other thread, you wrote that “I take reliable knowledge to be unmistakable, undeniable (by people with intact faculties), beyond dispute, not contested, universal.” I’m concerned that any item of knowledge corresponding to that (and I agree there are some, though dreadfully few) cannot be said to be justified, or even justifiable. Because justification necessarily implies that it is possible to contest the (contingent) belief in question, to conceive its falsehood, and to marshall arguments for its acceptance.
Why are you concerned? Why does it matter (for the purposes of this discussion)?
Volokh Conspiracy post on this in actual effect at http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_05_20-2007_05_26.shtml#1180157959
“Because individual citizens do not pay any cost for clinging to false beliefs about politics, they are likely to embrace emotionally satisfying falsehoods rather than search assiduously for the truth.”
“Muslims are far from unique in refusing to give a fair shake to evidence that undercuts their political or religious views. Numerous studies show that this is a trait that cuts across ethnic, religious, and ideological lines (I cite some in my article linked above). “
I strongly disagree that reliable knowledge is a scarce commodity. Knowledge is reliable as a SUBJECTIVE assessment, based on the context of its presentation. Most of what people use as knowledge is very reliable WITHIN A LIMITED CONTEXT.
For instance, there is the very important but un-noticed discipline of reporting ore reserves by mining companies. How we report reserves is critical to people in many walks of life – mom’n’pop investors, retirement fund managers, environmental regulators and managers of the companies involved. A warped presentation of knowledge can harm many lives via job losses and the destruction of hard-won retirement savings.
I was privileged a few minutes ago to hear a presentation on the JORC code by which Australia and many other countries regulate the communication of this knowledge. The principles are transparency, materiality and competence. These principles are explained for practitioners, then left to their responsible implementation.
These guidelines create a communicable context, boundaries in which receivers of the communicated knowledge may understand the knowledge to be reliable.
People do not need to test the boundaries of reliable knowledge for most things because they are operationally able to assess and use them – in context.
Extending the knowledge artificially beyond its context may take the form of an argument to extremes or a slippery slope argument. Perhaps it is reasonable to reject the reliability of most knowledge shorn of context – or ‘knowledge’ – but I think it is a sophistry.
Of course, religious truth claims operate outside the context of factual verifiability. They are usually assessed in an incomplete context – mostly on ‘authority’ and ‘self-interest’ via the desire for social acceptance.
Speaking of which, we saw “The Crucible” two nights ago. That is one powerfully relevant play. Then Dawkins on TV last night, on ‘religion is child abuse’.
If religion claims to be outside factual verifiability, but also claims to be “true” – and they do – even when they disagree with each other – then ….
How are we supposed to test for acceptance of those supposed truths?
G Tingey, up to you matey. I am not selling.
The tests usually offered are either reading the releveant scriptures (ie appeal to authority) or emotional acceptance (ie evidence-free). The one not overtly stated, but heavily relied on is what Cialdini referred to as Social Proof (the example of others).
The babes are awesome, too. Quite an incentive to set aside the absence of physical evidence.
“But belief isn’t knowledge, and shouldn’t be treated like knowledge.”
It seems to me that the only belief that is not knowledge is belief that is completely unjustified, and such beliefs may be even less common than ‘reliable knowledge’
If knowledge is true justified belief and, pace Gettier, we accept a deflationary theory of truth such that ‘truth’ is what ‘is’, (and these are big ifs, I know) then knowledge is justified belief that some thing or relationship ‘is’. So ‘reliable knowledge’ is reliable justified belief… but I think reliability is part of the justification, so ‘reliable knowledge’ is really just well justified belief and, presumably, ‘unreliable knowledge’ is less well justified belief. Therefore there is a spectrum of ‘knowledge’ from barely justified at all to almost certain. I am not at all sure how one could draw a line and say “This side reliable, that side unreliable.” It seems to me that every somewhat justified belief should be judged on that justification, and that any attempt to set rules as to which justified beliefs count as ‘knowledge’ and which do not is doomed to Gettier type problems. In my opinion we should jettison the concept of truth except as unknoweable reality, and chuck out the idea of knowledge along with it. Beliefs are either unjustified, or justified to a greater or lesser degree; that is all.
Dave’s comment gets at why I’m talking about reliable knowledge as opposed to justified true belief. It’s because beliefs about ‘God’ differ. If God exists and is good and wants us to be good, then we could predict God would provide us all with reliable knowledge of all that such that we would not make stupid mistakes; that would mean beliefs about God would not differ, just as beliefs about what fire, sharp blades, clubs, falls from great heights do to the human body don’t differ (apart from the odd maniac or zealot who decides to test them, with no miraculous results on record). If all that were true of God, God would want us to be in no doubt of the matter; no more doubt than we are about the consequences of jumping from great heights.
That’s why ‘I would still balk at it being wholly, utterly indisputable’ isn’t really the issue (I would balk at that too, if only in deference to Hume); the issue is that we can’t (in general – there will always be exceptions) force ourselves to doubt it. I’m pretty sure of that. Stand holding a heavyish object in midair and try to persuade yourself to doubt what will happen if you open your hand. I don’t think it’s possible to doubt that (given the necessary stipulations – sanity etc). It’s like those cognitive tests that psychologists have given to infants. Even infants develop causal expectations such that they show obvious surprise when the expectation is violated.
God could have made our knowledge of God like that. That would be reliable (the way I’m using it for this purpose at least). God didn’t do that. We don’t have that. We don’t even have anything like that, we don’t have anything half way to that. I think that matters. If God really wanted us to be good in a special goddy way (punishing homosexuality, subordinating and punishing women, treating embryos like minor deities) then God would have told us what we need to know in that kind of reliable way. The fact that God didn’t do that should tell us something – for instance that we have to do the work ourselves.
ChrisPer,
I don’t think I disagree with your point, but –
“Knowledge is reliable as a SUBJECTIVE assessment, based on the context of its presentation. Most of what people use as knowledge is very reliable WITHIN A LIMITED CONTEXT.”
But if God exists and 2-3, we would expect reliable knowledge about that to be objective and context-independent, wouldn’t we? (At least, if we add 5) God is omnipotent.)
Ah, but you haven’t read your Romans chapter 1 lately, have you, folks? God gave us knowledge of his noble self that is completely clear and indubitable, but we have deliberately ignored it because we prefer to wallow in our filthy sensual pleasures, or something like that. Makes perfect sense — every atheist I see sure is wallowing!
That Saul/Paul was a real piece of work.
Well Jesus says something equally sinister – perhaps more than once; I forget. The bit about hiding the truth from people who aren’t the kind of people who get the truth, and revealing it only to the right sort. Sheep and goats stuff. Saved and damned stuff. Nasty.
Well, you try leading an unpopular opinion in a society where people get killed routinely for disagreeing, and decide if its ‘nasty’ to decide that some people just don’t, and won’t, get it. That’s the plain meaning of the sheep and goats stuff.
Yes OB, the ‘reliable knowledge’ of God’s existence would be context-independent – if we had it.
You extended the 4-step to 5: God is omnipotent.
I would suggest another:
5. ‘All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.’ (or perhaps ‘All humans are bad compared with what they ought to be’).
The fundamental relationship between God and men is defined from a start in which every person, murderer, preacher, virgin, saint or queer is equally unfit for God. Even the unborn inherit this from the nature of humanity.
Without this premise there would be no need for redemption and the atoning death of Jesus, ie no Christianity.
And certainly no pressure to convert for the abstract good of the one saved. (The ancillary benefits though are huge).
‘5. All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.’
God is into S&M isn’t he? This is the only rational explanation.
How do we know 5, by the way?
Cos it is written, that’s how.
Don’t be silly – you don’t know it, its a basic assumption necessary for christianity to be meaningful.
Olivia is breaking out a list of supporting elements as the ‘theist four-step’ and I am pointing out that there is at least one other needed to get to the God of the Bible.
G Tingey, you’re quiet. is everything ok ?
Not Olivia, not Olivia, not Olivia
But yeh, I realized later I should have included omnipotence and omniscience. Except in a way those two aren’t quite as inextricable. They are logically, but they’re not quite as tightly knitted into what people believe when they believe the 4-step. (At least I think so, but maybe I’m just excusing the omission.)
Damn, Ophelia, it takes an idiot to keep getting someone’s name wrong. I apologise.