Metaphysical naturalism
Mark Vernon takes issue with Anthony Grayling on the question of the latter’s challenge to Madeleine Bunting ‘to name one – even one small – contribution to science made by Christianity in its two thousand years’.
After all, there are a number of essentially theological ideas that underpin modern science, such as the notion that the universe is coherent, intelligible and so on.
But are those ideas essentially theological? Are they theological at all? (Does ‘essentially’ there mean – necessarily, or of its essence, or something like ‘perhaps not obviously but down deep beyond appearances’? It could be just a no true Scotsman move.)
I don’t think the ‘notion’ that the universe is coherent, intelligible and so on is an essentially theological idea, and I tend to suspect that claims that it is are part of the usual pattern of giving theism, or particular religions, credit for pretty much every idea anyone’s ever had, including some pretty obviously secular ones. We’re told that Christianity invented the idea of equality, anti-slavery, science, the worth of the individual, human dignity, secularism – you name it. But the notion that the universe is coherent and intelligible doesn’t depend on also thinking there is a god; the two can be separate thoughts; one can have one without the other; in fact, lots of people do have one without the other (some of them are called ‘scientists’). Why would it depend on thinking there is a god? Because the universe couldn’t or wouldn’t be coherent and intelligible unless a god had made it that way? That must be the thought, but it doesn’t seem like a very compelling thought to me. It’s the regress problem again, for one thing. If you think the universe couldn’t or wouldn’t be coherent and intelligible unless a god had made it that way, then why not also think a god couldn’t be a coherent-universe-maker unless a bigger god had made it that way, and so on? And for another thing, it adds a kind of person to the puzzle, instead of just stopping with a coherent universe, for reasons which are not self-explanatory, at least not to me. So why couldn’t people just look around them and see a lot of coherence and intelligibility and come up with the notion that the universe is coherent and intelligible, and leave it at that? They could; lots did; so in what way is that notion essentially theological?
I said at Comment is free that the coherent-universe notion could be a metaphysical belief (as opposed to a theological one) but also that it could equally well be a working assumption, which is what most scientists take it to be.
I don’t like this habit of labeling all or most human ideas religious or theological. It really is possible to think thoughts that are not essentially somewhere down at the bottom theological.
I think the force of the infinite regress problem you raise here is overestimated. Because we are dealing with some kind of ultimate brute fact on either the theist or the atheist version. I would argue that if the contingent fact of the universe being intelligible or coherent is regarded as something needing explanation, then the theist hypothesis may well be superior. If I were an atheist raising objections, I would probably call into question whether the intelligibility of the universe is a contingent feature (perhaps it is an essential, necessary feature of every universe, godless or not, that it is coherent or intelligible. Perhaps a non-coherent, non-lawful, non-intelligible universe is simply inconceivable) or whether the universe is ultimately that intelligible at all.
As to the broader question: it’s probably conceivable that something like the idea of the intelligibility or coherence of the universe could have arisen in a possible universe without theology (supposing that such a possible universe is conceivable – which I actually doubt :-)). But at the same time, it’s an idea that intuitively sits well with theology. Also, it’s simply a fact of history that theology did play an enormous role in for example the transmission of Platonic philosophy, Aristotelian logic, the development of logic in medieval times, etcetera.
I think that on your definition of theology, it would be extremely difficult to pinpoint any contribution of Christianity to science because the only necessarily theological/Christian aspect of the whole enterprise has to do with the existence of God, which is a philosophical and not a scientific idea.
I would submit my own answer to Anthony Grayling’s challenge – which would be the hermeneutic method used in linguistics, history, art studies, etc.; basically the humanities counterpart to the deductive-nomological methodology. Developed at first as a textual-critical method in protestant theology. Connection with Christianity very close indeed, as it arose primarily as a counterreaction to literalist interpretations of a sacred text (the Bible). It is doubtful in my mind that the method could have arisen without the existence of an exegetical tradition working with a single, sacred text.
The obvious retort would be that ‘science’ in Grayling’s usage would refer to natural science. But in this particular case, I’m happy to settle for a clear theological contribution to scholarly culture in general.
Final remark: Apparently Madeleine Bunting’s statement which Grayling reacted to was that Christianity ‘fostered learning and science’ for hundreds of years. Which is pretty much indisputable – it did. It may have done so poorly, and perhaps in our non-Christian alternative universe things would have gone better, quite possibly: but in the circumstances that were given, learning and science were confined to monasteries for centuries. Madeleine Bunting may be wrong on a lot of things – but she’s not on this one.
I’m afraid I lost my cool (again) …
Here’s what I’ve already posted to the Grauniad’s comment-is-free replies page:
Just because some of the scientists lited happened to be “christians” does not mean a thing – with the possible exception of Gregor Memdel.
For all the others, their science was separate from their private religious beliefs.
However, when we come to religious christianity and science and discovery, we see a very different picture:
That of the church(es) doing their deliberate damndest (pun intended) to deny, cover-up and hinder the work of advancing knowledge.
The use of Zero and its disicussion was not even allowed in Europe until a pope changed his mind in the late 12/13th century, because “nothing” would be abhorrent to god.
Bruno was burnt for suggesting that there might be life elsewhere, we all know what happened to Galilei, and the number of medical advances which the church has tried to stop (dissections, medicine itself, anaesthetics, etc is very long.
Quiote frankly, Mr. Vernon, you are a mealy-mouthed hypocrite.
But, then you’re a christian, worshipping the result of the umarried mother mary’s sex act, aren’t you?
Why should we expect anything better from people with imaginary friends?
^^^^^^
Rant over – I notice that Ophelia has also had a go at Mr Mealy….
No, I didn’t have a go; I asked some questions, and I didn’t bother with the random abuse. It’s not so eloquent that it needs to be re-posted here – in fact it’s not so eloquent that it needs to be posted anywhere.
Merlijn, that’s all pretty much what I’m saying. From the angle that it’s more plausible than not, while mine is the reverse, but it’s much the same thing. It’s intuitive, it’s a fact, etc.
But I notice that you don’t affirm that the notion in question is essentially theological.
The bit about Christianity fostering learning in monasteries – I don’t think that’s a fair claim, because Christianity first demolished secular learning, then gave a little of it back via monasteries. Monasteries were what was left over after the demolition, not a free gift of something extra. There was a lot of secular learning and inquiry going on before Christianity became synonymous with the state, and the Academy was closed down. If that had been allowed to continue unimpeded, there would have been no need for monasteries to foster anything.
But I notice that you don’t affirm that the notion in question is essentially theological.
That’s right. I think notions that are essentially Christian or theological are restricted to philosophy. Where they are valuable, mind you. Even if they may be wrong (wrong philosophical notions are worthwhile in their own way, too). So in that sense, asking for an essentially theological contribution to natural science would be asking for something close to a priori impossible.
As for state-supported Christianity setting a stop to secular, classical learning – I agree and yet I don’t. In many ways, Constantine’s conversion was one of the most singularly worst ideas in history. The old Roman/Greek cult sat (generally) quite well with philosophy and learning exactly because it was mythology and regarded as such even back then. Christianity is not philosophically neutral: it incorporates some very specific philosophical notions which made it a direct competitor to non-Christian contemporary systems (mainly Neoplatonism). So the moment it gained secular power, all avenues for learning except within the Christian tradition (and even there, difficultly) were closed off.
What I am not so sure about is whether things would have gone radically differently without Christianity becoming a state religion. Because the moment when Constantine adopted Christianity, or when Theodosius made it a state religion and started persecuting pagans in earnest in the 390s, the Empire was on its last legs. I think it was pretty much doomed from the mid-200s when the barbarians outside the borders learned a little too much about organization, united into confederations such as the Saxons and the Francs, and started gnawing away. And I’m not sure if the fate of classical culture would have been much different, had the Ostrogoths been pagans plundering a pagan Rome.
Suppose Justinian would not have shut down the Academy in the mid-500s. Perhaps some kind of continuation of the tradition would spread around the Eastern Mediterranean – but there, the situation of philosophy and learning was perhaps not so dire in the first place. But Italy, Gaul, Western Europe were pretty much condemned to the dark ages they received regardless, I think.
Mr Tingey
I know Mark Vernon, and he’s a nice enough guy. And he’s not a Christian; he’s an agnostic (or at least he was the last time I crossed paths with him).
That the universe is coherent as a whole is not yet established. For sure, we seek coherence in our theories about the universe, but these theories so far have explained only relatively localized phenomena. That we expect ideally that everything existing will turn out to be explainable in a total theory reflects a habit of our thinking which guides scientific inquiry. As Kant pointed out, this expectation of explainability can become personified in the “theological idea” of a supreme being as the principle of order and ground of reality. The possibility of hypostatizing this expectation of coherence does not mean such a supreme being exists, nor that belief in such a being is required for expecting the universe to be coherent. The expectation of coherence as a habit of thinking, if one looks at it today, undoubtedly reflects our evolution. That what we encounter is coherent could also be explained by the fact that our ability to understand reality evolved in interaction with the reality that we understand.
Agreed on the first part of your comment, Angelo – in that coherence and intellibility of the universe do not necessarily imply the existence of a supreme being. But I’m not so sure about the second part. It is of course true that our perceptual and cognitive abilities evolved in interaction with reality – but I do not see how this implies that reality should be regarded as intelligible and coherent. Our cognitive abilities were adapted to the need for personal survival – avoiding predators, picking fruits, killing stuff – but not in order to do science. I’m not sure it is inconceivable that a much less “intelligible”, hideously complex, jerry-rigged universe would have remained opaque to us and would have prevented us from ever making any serious headway in science. In other words, the question of whether intelligibility, coherence and the like are “real” properties of the universe or just of our perception of it; and if the first is correct, if they are contingent properties calling our for an explanation or necessary properties of _any_ conceivable reality (making the theistic explanation irrelevant; cannot be resolved with recourse to evolution, I think. If we’re going for a “coherence/intelligibility is in the eye of the beholder”-alternative, I guess it could be _explained_ with recourse to evolution, but it would first need to be supported on independent grounds.
‘the contingent fact of the universe being intelligible or coherent is regarded as something needing explanation, then the theist hypothesis may well be superior’
I don’t think this thought is coherent.:)
The infinite regress to me seems an almost insurmountable hurdle for the purposes of this discussion.
And I think Angelo’s comment above is pretty much spot on.I find this an odd statement:
‘Our cognitive abilities were adapted to the need for personal survival – avoiding predators, picking fruits, killing stuff – but not in order to do science’
Ahh but all of these things ARE science in one form or another especially is observation, testing,and communicating a given method of success in any of the above.
Our cognitive abilities have given us the ability to discern a methodology to try various survival methods. It may not be labs and beakers but it is scientific style thinking.
We have those abilities we have for their survival value. We have followed our curiosity and developed (for example) instruments that can detect things we can’t see. We have a tendency to accumulate knowledge and the ability to learn from experience and pass all that on to subsequent generations. Gradually, some of our earlier bad guesses are being shown up for what they are and because they had a big comfort value, this process is frightening and angering many to whom that comfort was important, as well as many who cynically exploit those who still believe those old guesses.
G.T. I know I have said this before but is it not reasonable to asume that the father of Jesus was Mary,s husband Joseph,I also think O.B. ignores the condition of the non christian world,it is at least reasonable to argue that christianity has fostered a climate in which advancement takes place.
Insofar as Xianity was the central pillar holding up the entire intellectual culture of Europe until not very long ago, and Europe is where ‘modern’ science came from, Richard’s point is indisputable. But so what? If all Xians wanted was gratitude that would be fine. But it isn’t, is it? They want a veto.
Erm, I don’t believe that Vernon can be an agnostic, and then come up with the “defence” of christianity that he did … though it is just possible I suppose.
As I said, it was a rant, but even semi-seriously, why should we expect anything even vaguely rational from (any) people with imaginary friends?
Furthermore, if these people, and their muslim accomplices in thoughtcrime will insist on inflicting their mindrotting nosense on us, then perhaps a few metaphorical rotten tomatoes, and a load of sarcastic abuse might (just might) convince at least some of them, that it isn’t worth it. After all, look at the creeping and crawling and deference given to cardinal O’Conman in a separate dispute that is current – see other comments here ( passim ad nauseam as Private Eye would say )
Oh, and just because Yeshua ben Joseph was called that, no it doesn’t mean Joseph was his father.
I’m inclined to the Robert Graves’ theory, that Joseph was the “front-man” and Yeshua’s real father was someone else entirely – there are several “suspects”.
Not that it matters, except to theologians.
More seriously (?)
Philosophy/theology .. comes back to something like the criticisms of “the God Delusion”, saying “bur Dawkins didn’t deal with the important theological issues!”
Which are, in actual fact, irrelevant, because we are talking about the real world and real events, and testable propositions and metaphysical naturalism (T here MUST be a better phrase than that, surely? )
Lastly (this time) – thanks, Dave, you have hit it spot on.
The bastards want a veto, and so do the muslims, and the different christian sects want different vetoes, and …..
Do we really want to revisit the 16-17th century wars of religion?
Mark Vernon writes of Einstein:
>Well, he did once say: “In view of such harmony in the cosmos which I, with my limited human understanding, am able to recognise, there are yet people who say there is no God. But what really makes me angry is that they quote me for the support of such views.”< How authentic is this quotation? I know there are many quotes allegedly by Einstein for which no source can be found and which are almost certainly spurious, so, not recognizing this one, I’ve been checking it out. This one does have a source, it is quoted by the anti-Nazi German diplomat Prince Hubertus of Lowenstein in his book *Towards the Farther Shore* (p. 156). [Cited in R. Clark, *Einstein: The Life and Times*, p. 516] But I would still not accept this as authentic unless I had something more than a second-hand quotation. I don’t, of course, have access to Hubertus’s book. What I would like to know is the context in which the quotation appears. Did Hubertus quote this from memory some time after meeting Einstein? If so, it is not reliable enough for us to be sure that it gives us a precise version of what he actually said. Second-hand reports may be inaccurately remembered, or coloured by the prejudices of the person recalling the words. Authentic quotations from Einstein:
“I believe in Spinoza’s God, Who reveals Himself in the lawful harmony of the world, not in a God Who concerns Himself with the fate and the doings of mankind.” [Einstein to Rabbi Herbert Goldstein, published in New York Times, 25 April 1929.]
“I do not believe in a personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it clearly. If something is in me which can be called religious then it is the unbounded admiration for the structure of the world so far as our science can reveal it.”
[Albert Einstein, letter March 24, 1954; *Albert Einstein the Human Side*, H. Dukas and B. Hoffman, (eds.), 1981, p. 43.]
“…it seems to be our lot to be answerable for the soap bubbles we blow. This may well have been contrived by the same ‘non-dice-playing God’ who has caused so much bitter resentment against me, not only among quantum theoreticians but also among the faithful of the Church of the Atheists.” [Letter to Max Born, 12 October 1953.]
Max Born comments on this:
“[Einstein] had no belief in the Church, but did not think that religious faith was a sign of stupidity, nor unbelief a sign of intelligence.”
[M. Born, *The Born-Einstein Letters 1916-1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times*, 1971, pp. 195-199.]
“But are those ideas essentially theological?”
No. They are essentially cognitive.
Theologians and religiose scientists use the same basic neural machinery as atheists. The brain is structured to look for pattern and coherence. It is therefore no surprise that both theology and science look for coherence any more than that both wine and water assume a wine glass shape when you pour them into a wine glass.
On paper the idea that the brain has been made to be as it is by The Lord has equal explanatory power to the idea that it has simply evolved to be reasonably effective at coping with the local universe. Until you ask why God made the optic nerves go to the back…
Doesn’t Dawkins deal fairly thoroughly with this at the beginning of TGD? Including Einstein’s pariah status among certain believers because he so clearly did not believe in any god in the sense that they did. Well, if Allen has gotten involved, I probably don’t need to say any more…
Dave, someone warned me here a few months ago never to call anything “indisputable” (it may have been “unarguable”). If I take a child, powerless to resist my will, and sequester it away from all knowledge except a few nuggets I have chosen to dole out, have I helped or hindered that child’s education? It would know nothing without what I taught it, but it would know a lot more than it does if I hadn’t cut off access to knowledge I had not already sanctioned. It’s an admittedly crude analogy, but is this a million miles away from what went on in Europe when the church had real power?
And to both Richard and Tingey, the historical existence of Jesus is so far from being an established fact that I would save detailed analysis of his ancestry till the answer to the more salient question is a little clearer (which is not, I suspect, likely any time soon).
I know the NSS and others go on about “the god who wasn’t there”, and it is a possible position.
I prefer to think, on the basis of the evidence and probabilities, that there really was an historical Brian oops, sorry, Yesua ben Joseph, who was an Essene-influenced rabbi and teacher.
He was procreated in the usual way, he was proably “taken in” so to speak, by the Roman and Pharisaical authorites, with all that that implied for personal well-being.
Death? Removal from cross (if actually crucufied – normal Roman method of torture and/or execution, after all) – lived on …
Who knows? Does it matter?
Given the historical testimony of people after his “ministry”, like Josephus, who seemed to be in no doubt as to Yeshua’s reality (see his “Jewish War” and other works ) it is, as I said, safer to assume that he was a real, “normal” person.
It’s no skin off my nose if he existed, so don’t take this as any great campaign to convince you he didn’t, but I’ll mention just three things relevant to your comment: a) the Josephus reference seems to have been conceded by almost all scholars worth their salt to be a later interpolation; b) the resemblances between the story and earlier myths may not prove anything, but certainly suggest a hell of a lot and; c) in the Brian Flemming movie, he does an amusing timeline thing with the forty-year gap between the supposed earthly existence and the earliest gospel accounts: he labels it “Everyone Forgot.”
Stewart, there really is no point picking a fight over what happened hundreds of years ago. It is simple historical fact that Xian belief-structures existed, and within them, at the same time, rationalist science in the modern sense was ‘born’. It is implausibly counterfactual to argue that, particularly after the 16th century, some all-powerful entity called ‘the church’ somehow actively prevented latent knowledge – of even greater potency and vastness than that which did emerge – from coming forth. Neither praise nor blame attaches to Xianity for this, except insofar as such religious doctrines were, in a very real sense, absolutely part and parcel of a wider social and cultural reality.
Consider, for example, how many of France’s celebrated Enlightenment intellectuals – some of them atheists – were also clerks in holy orders: Raynal, Condillac, Mably, Sieyes, deriving their income from the despised church [and from the peasants it oppressed] just as others – Helvetius, Lavoisier – were tax-farmers, living comfortably from revenues secured from the population at the barrel of a gun.
It’s all very complicated…
Bringing things back to that matter of the debate, I notice that Vernon was astute enough to (essentially) anticipate OB’s objection (though he frames it as Grayling’s imagined response). His riposte – ‘to [argue this point, one] would have to rewrite history as it, in fact, happened’ – is rather weak, but we needn’t rail at him for failing to identify this case.
That having been said, his case seems to me to hold water – in that the religious beliefs of various scientists contributed to their motivations in making their discoveries. This is a repudiation of what we could call a ‘hard’ interpretation of Grayling’s claim (which I will frame as ‘Christianity in no way has contributed to any major scentific developments’).
However, one would have to be extremely uncharitable to interpret Grayling as meaning this – though I suppose it is possible that he did, I am more inclined to suspect that this is a straw man. A more charitable interpretation – a ‘weak’ form of his argument – might be that ‘neither Christianity nor the Church have been necessary parts of the development of science.’ This could still be opposed, but Vernon’s historical examples would not suffice (as he imlicitly admits).
Prompted by a more knowledgeable friend and colleague in the same profession as A. C. Grayling, I have been checking out information relating to the following by Grayling:
> Such was the beginning of Christianity. By the accident of its being the myth chosen by Constantine for his purposes, it plunged Europe into the dark ages for the next thousand years – scarcely any literature or philosophy, and the forgetting of the arts and crafts of classical civilisation (quite literally a return to daub and wattle because the engineering required for towers and domes was lost), before a struggle to escape the church’s narrow ignorance and oppression saw the rebirth of classical learning, and its ethos of inquiry and autonomy, in the Renaissance.<
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ac_grayling/2007/01/bunting_on_science_and_history.html
It seems that Grayling’s historical knowledge is out of date:
“When the term ‘Dark Ages’ is used by historians today, it is intended to be neutral, namely to express the idea that the events of the period often seem ‘dark’ to us, due to the paucity of historical records compared with later times. The darkness is ours, not theirs…[…] Secondly, the explosion of new knowledge and insight into the history and culture of the Early Middle Ages which 20th-century scholarship has achieved means that these centuries are no longer dark even in the sense of ‘unknown to us’. Consequently, many academic writers prefer not to use the phrase at all.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_Ages
The Dynamic Middle Ages – Debunking the myth of the so called “Dark Ages”:
“The great problem in studying the Middle Ages is that prior to the 9th century, sources are very few. This is not because the people living in that age were stupid or illiterate; it’s due to that people mostly wrote on papyri, which unfortunately haven’t survived.”
http://www.allempires.com/article/index.php?q=dynamic_middle_ages
When considering a period when pretty much everyone was a believer I don’t see how you can easily tell which bits of metaphysics or epistemology were unambiguously theological just by looking at who said them. Can we safely say that the bits that seem to remain coherent when magic is taken out of the equation were not actually theological even if they people who proposed them thought they were? This seems right to me, but feels uncomfortably like telling people “this is what you really thought even if you thought you thought something else”, which is sort of doing a Nick Cohen on dead people.
I’m paraphrasing another source here …
Augustine: “There is another form of temptation, even more fraught with danger. This is the disease of curiosity . . . It is this which drives us to try and discover the secrets of nature, those secrets which are beyond our understanding, which can avail us nothing and which man should not wish to learn.”
1100 years after Thales predicted an eclipse in 585BCE, and after 1000 years of advanced astronomy, the last recorded astronomical observation was by the Athenian philosopher Proclus in 475 until Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus in 1543. It is also worth noting that Kpernick did not publish in his own lifetime.
Even after classical learning filtered back into Europe preserved and enhanced by some of the Arabs (Averrohes, for instance was persecuted by his own side …), Aristotle was banned by the University of Paris in 1215 and Aquinas likewise after his death.
So much for fostering learning.
Only the bits that suited the churche’s power programme, in fact.
To say that Christian region had nothing to do with some aspects of our cultural/intellectual advancement is in my opinion an overstatement from the wrong perspective.
Christian religion is intrinsically incoherent and its apologetics circular therefore any attempt by an earnest and intellectually honest person to find an answer must explore extra biblical ideas and court heresy to make any body of knowledge coherent and useful. Thus from the chaos science and technology rise.
If the parent religion of a culture were somewhat coherent and useful in daily life it would take much effort and an intellectual capacity beyond most people to escape its grasp.
In short stupid religion is helpful to science and development because of its fractious nature. Smart religion is dangerous because its coherence makes moving out of way a much more daunting task.
MB
To say that Christian region had nothing to do with some aspects of our cultural/intellectual advancement is in my opinion an overstatement from the wrong perspective.
Christian religion is intrinsically incoherent and its apologetics circular therefore any attempt by an earnest and intellectually honest person to find an answer must explore extra biblical ideas and court heresy to make any body of knowledge coherent and useful. Thus from the chaos science and technology rise.
If the parent religion of a culture were somewhat coherent and useful in daily life it would take much effort and an intellectual capacity beyond most people to escape its grasp.
In short stupid religion is helpful to science and development because of its fractious nature. Smart religion is dangerous because its coherence makes moving out of way a much more daunting task.
MB
JimC,
I think the competing hypotheses are basically the following:
1) The universe is coherent/intelligible/reasonable, and this feature is contingent: it could have been otherwise, there are “possible universes” without this intellibility, so it makes sense to ask why the universe is intelligible.
2) The universe is coherent/intelligible/reasonable, but this is a necessary feature of any possible universe. An unintelligible universe is inconceivable. It therefore makes no sense to ask why the universe is intelligible.
3) The universe is not in and of itself coherent/intelligible/reasonable, it is just that humans with their cognitive faculties impose order and regularity on the universe – order and regularity which aren’t “out there”.
Now, if we grant point 1), it seems to me that supposing the existence of a primordial Mind may explain the coherence/intelligibility of the universe better than presupposing some kind of ultimate non-mental fact or event. This quite independently of the infinite regress objection.
The infinite regress objection can be both levelled against the theist and the atheist picture of the universe. If it makes sense to ask how, if God exists, he came into existence, it also makes sense to ask the same of whatever brute fact the atheist picture ends up with (the Big Bang, the multiverse, the quantum vacuum). The atheist might respond that the objection makes no sense: that perhaps the current ultimate brute facts of science will be explained by other brute facts – but that at the moment, we cannot know. But no science or philosophy can explain existence itself as arising from ultimate non-existence. If all other brute facts and ultimates are explained, we still end up with that one. So the whole infinite regress objection seems to me to be predicated on the question “Why does anything exist at all” being a sensible (if possibly unanswerable) one.
Regardless of this, if 1) above is correct, it seems to me the theistic explanation is the simpler and more comprehensive one. There’s an objection, though – one I think OB might come up with. It would be possible to argue that the ultimate brute facts of science (say the multiverse, or the quantum vacuum) and its contingent properties (intelligibility and the like) are known more certainly than the existence of God is, and that the acceptance of a few material brute facts and unexplained contingent properties is preferable to the acceptance of a simpler, but much less certainly known one (God).
In any event, regarding infinite regress. Classical theism has dealt with the issue by assuming God is a necessary being, meaning that his existence is not just a contingent fact, but a necessary feature of all possible worlds. By definition, God is not an entity that exists, but at the same time could well not exist (just like you or I could). I think the solution works, on a few conditions:
1a) It must be argued that God is a necessary being just like bachelors are unmarried males. We can’t just throw in a necessarily existing God just to solve infinite regress: we must argue that a contingently existing God (as some theologians, Swinburne for example) presuppose is somehow internally contradictory.
1b) In arguing this, the theist needs to argue that necessary existence/existence in all possible worlds is a sensible claim (which has been disputed). Ultimately, we need to go into something like a necessary being as the condition for the existence of any contingent being.
2) We can’t, like St. Anselm appears to have tried, to use the necessary existence of God as in itself an a priori proof of his existence. The starting ground must be that God is necessary OR inconceivable: and the theist must argue on independent grounds that the former is true. In other words, independent arguments for God’s existence must be furnished.
Given that, I would find the argument convincing. But it also moves very deeply into rather spooky territory. There will always be possibilities for the atheist to dispute some presuppositions, for example 1b).
BUT, the above goes kind of into why I find the intelligibility/coherence argument not entirely convincing as an argument _for_ the existence of God. Because the argument presupposes that intelligibility/coherence/regularity and all are contingent of the universe, which may well not exist in some possible universe. I’m not so sure here. Are there possible universes were for example mathematics or the ultimate principles of logic do not apply?
Anyway, moving on to evolution. I think that referring to our cognitive abilities as having evolved in interaction with the universe is only valid in case of 1) or 2) above, which suppose the universe in itself to be coherent, orderly etc. If we suppose so, it would be a matter of course that our cognitive abilities would succesfully evolve as order- and coherence-imposing abilities. But if we suppose 3), that intelligibility, order, coherence etc. are _only_ features of human cognition but not of reality, it is not clear to me that they would have succesfully evolved beyond a certain point at all.
For example, the atomic theory was a brilliant Greek philosophical idea which two millenia after its inception turned out to be remarkably close to what reality actually is right. On 1) and 2), there would be nothing miraculous about this. The idea to reduce the manifold, diverse, phenomenal world to the interaction of very simple ultimate particles would have a “big chance” to be right, because it corresponds to principles of order, of diversity ultimately arising from simple principles, etc. that are features of the universe itself. But I do believe that the relative simplicity of for instance the periodic table which underlies the complexity of the phenomenal world, all those textures, structures, etc. to be “real” and to be “out there”. The same would go for the symmetry of the system of ultimate elementary particles, where particles can be more or less succesfully predicted to exists in “gaps” in the system. This too I think is a feature of the world, not just of our cognition.
And I do think the success of our (evolved) perceptual and cognitive abilities is testimony to the “intelligibility” that is a feature of the universe itself. But I put the question in wrong terms when referring to our perceptual abilities having evolved to gather and hunt. Because in a world that is not somehow orderly, regular, intelligible, I’m not sure something like “perception” could ever arise.
Supposing such a world is even possible. Which I’m not sure of. So, of the alternatives I mentioned at the beginning, I would tend to come down on the side of 2).
Well-made points and a clearly-stated case (as usual) Merlijn! Can I raise one query, though? Your breakdown of the hypotheses as a restatement of the ideas being bandied about is succinct, but I’m not sure it is exhaustive. You are missing the obvious fourth claim, which is that ‘The universe is not in and of itself coherent/intelligible/reasonable, it is just that God makes it appear so’ (or some variant thereof).
To me, this is a more coherent place on which to rest an argument for the necessity of God. I’m not so sure about the feasibility of incoherent Godless universes – that seems to rest upon the possibility of matter and energy without physics. Would that not make them supernatural?
It is easy to imaging incoherent universes where God makes things work. If anything, that is the dominant model of religious universes (look at the ways the ancients believed that Gods interacted with the world…). I would argue that it is only in an incoherent universe that God is a necessary condition.
Ultimately, I’d go with your no. 2. But I think only your number 2 and my number 4 are really valid (your number 3 is valid, but since my number 4 implicates God in your number 3 it becomes redundant).
Look, it’s a bad day at work so pardon my incoherence. I hope you get the idea and will respond. Cheers!
PS Note that ‘God’ here is meant as shorthand for ‘supernatural agency’ or some such doofus, not as Jehovah (before anyone points out that even a universe as incoherent as my post would not necessitate Him).
Merlijn,
But even if it does make sense to ask (questions like) why the universe is coherent and so on, does it make sense to expect an answer? Are you including the second in the first? Is that what you mean by its making sense to ask a question? – that it doesn’t make sense to ask a ‘why’ question if you don’t expect an answer or think it can be answered?
If so, I disagree. I think we can perfectly well and perfectly sensibly ask an infinite number of why questions even while knowing or suspecting or thinking that there is no answer, or that there is an answer but no human has the faintest idea what it is. We can ask why things are the way they are on planets in galaxies at the far side of the universe that no human knows exist.
“it seems to me that supposing the existence of a primordial Mind may explain the coherence/intelligibility of the universe better than presupposing some kind of ultimate non-mental fact or event.”
Locke’s Mind First, in short.
You always come back to that point (that’s not a criticism! I’m just indicating recognition). Well, sure, it may, but anything may. And I for one can’t help thinking (not that I try very hard, I suppose) that ‘may’ and ‘explain’ and ‘better’ are simply ways of saying you find that idea more attractive, persuasive, familiar, etc, and therefore convincing. Which is indisputable, in a way, but I’m not sure it’s a good reason to counter people who don’t find it all those things. In other words you seem to be pointing at a basic preference more than an argument. (So am I, you could say. True enough. Except I think the more the preference matches up with the familiar theistic parental presence somewhere in the universe, the more, how shall I say, preferential it is. In other words I suspect a bias in preferring a Mind.)
“Cardinal disappointed by UK adoption law. NOT AS DISSAPOINTED BY THE CHILDREN ABUSED BY FR MICHAEL HILL, appointed by the cardinal to Gatwick Airport, despite him being a KNOWN PAEDOPHILE))) Tuesday, 30 January 2007 The leader of the Catholic Church in England and Wales, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, has said he is very disappointed by the decision of the British government in the controversy over adoption by same sex couples.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair has said faith-based agencies will not be exempt from new legislation which could require them to place children with such couples.The Catholic Church has opposed the measures, saying its adoption and fostering agencies would be at risk of closure if the plan went ahead. However, Downing Street has said the new rules will not come fully into force in Britain until the end of next year. The legislation is already in force in Northern Ireland. In a BBC radio interview, Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor said the British government was redefining marriage. religious, OUT OF SCHOOLS, OUT OF ADOPTION, and OUT OF ANYTHING WHERE THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM CLERICAL PREDATION IS PARAMOUNT.” I saw this comment on the website. Not bad eh?
I agree Marie the r.c.c have got a real cheek,Stewart like G.T. I think it can be asumed that Jesus is a fact as a historical character,how he is veiwed is the matter of dispute.
Merlijin,
‘it seems to me that supposing the existence of a primordial Mind may explain the coherence/intelligibility of the universe better than presupposing some kind of ultimate non-mental fact or event. This quite independently of the infinite regress objection.’
I don’t see it. I understand your point but supposing the existence of a mind is all together different from thinking something simple started it all. Presupposing a thinking intelligent mind does place the infinite regress on the table.
Presupposing a simple natural process doesn’t to the same degree.
‘ the acceptance of a few material brute facts and unexplained contingent properties is preferable to the acceptance of a simpler, but much less certainly known one (God).’
I don’t see God as a much simpler answer at all as if the being exists you still haven’t satisfied his existence yet.
JimC: If I read you correctly, you would regard a primordial mind as less simple, and more open to the infinite regress objection, as a simple material brute fact. But I doubt that 1) the emergence of a complex existent out of total non-existence is more open to objection than the emergence of something simple; I’d argue that both are pretty much totally out of our cognizance, and 2) that the complexity of a disembodied mind can in any way be specified. Brains are very complex, but minds? How do we measure the complexity of a spiritual being?
OB: I think it’s a difficult question on exactly what criteria the two competing metaphysics should be evaluated, if both are not in conflict with known facts; if both are internally consistent, etc. I guess this relates to the “openness” of the subject in that I think a resolution of say the mind-matter issue to a satisfying consensus is impossible (which does not mean that truth doesn’t matter here, or that there are thinkable manifestly untrue solutions). Even a preference to simplicity, symmetry etc. seems to me based on an aesthetic preference (then again, maybe aesthetics are somehow built into the structure of the universe – which brings us back to the beginning of the question).
Could be I’m biased to a parental presence in the universe. Then again, I could retort that philosophical materialists are biased by the success of natural science ;-)
I am however firmly convinced of the necessity of asking philosophically unanswerable “why?” questions. I was probably too hasty to state that a question makes no sense. They may tell us something about the limits of our own understanding. Or indeed about the purposes, desires, fears of human beings themselves. Or in trying to answer them, we might sharpen our ideas about existence vs. not-existence, necessity and contingency, etc. And ultimately one cannot state a question is unanswerable unless it is asked.
Outeast: I agree that your picture of an incoherent universe where God in a way constantly imposes regularity is one I missed – and that it is common in theological worldviews. It is somewhat similar to Thomas’ view of the cosmological argument ‘in esse’ where God is a constantly ‘active’ condition underlying existence – except that it is here regularity, reasonableness, and so on which are upheld by an (immanent?) Deity.
I guess that I am wavering somewhat between a theistic version of 2) in which regularity, order, etc. are necessary properties of the universe, but God is a necessary existent underlying all contingent existence, and your 4) which seems to fit very well with some kind of Platonic idea of ideal structures (mathematics, logic, etc.) as the omnipresent ‘mind’ of God. It seems to me that 2) is perhaps closer to some kind of Deism, whereas 4) posits a subtly more active deity – Theistic rationalism?
I think that both the alternatives pinpoint where I think 1) goes wrong: it regards the order, regularity, coherence of the universe as somehow isolable: it assumes, for the sake of the argument, a contingent God whereas the God of deism/classical theism is not.
Addendum @ Outeast: It seems to me that “process theology” combines 2) and 4). It’s Platonic in that it distinguishes a realm of forms, patterns, qualia and the like – but crucially, this one exists only as potentiality, which may be ‘actualized’ in the phenomenal world. This is the same move that Peirce makes: ascribing reality to both a potential, abstract realm and an actual, concrete realm. God as a necessary existent – a ‘condition underlying all potential existence’ is ascribed to this realm of abstract forms. But it is only his existence which is regarded as necessary. At the same time, he is actualized in the phenomenal world as some kind of immanent, creative principle (and this actual existence is contingent: the universe, and thereby he, might have been differently). This second kind of existence can perhaps be identified with the way in which abstract principles of mathematics, logic, coherence, structure etc. find their actuality in the universe as it is.
And before anyone goes any further with “promordial mind” waffle.
And let’s face it, that’s what it is, complete hand-waving waffle and bullshit of standard priestly issue, I strongly suggest that everyone read the article by Steven Pinker, which Ophelia (or someone) has put on the front page of B&W.
Mind? What mind, where?
Answer that one first, before we get any of this pseudo-meatphysical cods, thank you very much.
And a big thank-you to whoever did put that article up.
{ I know it’s probably redunant/overkill, but here’s the direct link …
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1580394,00.html
}
I want to think about this and reply; unfortunately, I’ll not be able to do so till next week (well, to reply anyway). Dunno if the thread’ll still be live though…
Or someone? Do you think I have a horde of secretaries and assistants, GT? Of course I put it up, I put everything up. If it’s here, I put it here.
I’ll move the thread to this month, outeast, since it’s still live.
Is this just one of those contingent vs necessary fact arguments? In a world where most people were religious there was some causal role played by those religions in development X – the question is whether X would have happened anyway, for instance, if Watson & Crick hadn’t found the structure of DNA (say they were killed in a freak accident) it would have happened at around the same time anyway, and the world would be much the same as it is now.
Even if Christianity was necessary, I still don’t think we should embrace it – maybe the Holocaust was causally necessary for some now widely accepted liberal proposition – doesn’t mean I want to embrace killing off Jews.
GT:
And let’s face it, that’s what it is, complete hand-waving waffle and bullshit of standard priestly issue, I strongly suggest that everyone read the article by Steven Pinker, which Ophelia (or someone) has put on the front page of B&W
Kindly explain to me how Steven Pinker’s article turns the “primordial Mind” I proposed into “hand-waving waffle and bullshit of standard priestly issue”? As I read Pinker’s article he details the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard’ problems of consciousness, is candid about the unsolved status of particularly the ‘hard’ ones, and is optimistic that it one day may be solved along physicalist lines (I am less optimistic). The question on whether mind (with intentionality/”aboutness”, lack of spatial extension, etc.) can be reduced to brain activity, is dependent on brain activity but is irreducible to it, or is some kind of fundamental property of the universe is still wide open – and Pinker represents one particular side of the debate. Searle, Nagel, McGinn, David Chalmers etc. represent others (a nice webpage on the issues can be found here.
Merlijn, and anyone else of this persuasion ….
Wake Up !
The title of this discussion-thread is: “Metaphysical Naturalism”
Which is the philosophical basis of science, and “rationality” come to that.
Pinker is examining the problem(s) using that tool-set.
Incidentally, and again, can we PLEASE find a snappier title – I’m going to refer to it is MN for short, hereafter.
That is what we are discussing.
And you want to abandon that to talk about some Om/Ur/Over-MIND …
Any mind has (as far as we know, and always has so far, and we expect it to continue thus – etc – standard scientific MN logic and mode of inquiry ) … got to have a physical basis in matter, and so organised that “thoughts” take place.
Where/how is this Übergeist going to be located and detected?
In other words, it is a completely circular argument, because you have just re-defined “god”.
Which/who, as well all know … ( all together now )
Is NOT detectable.
Wasn’t that a long-winded way of saying what I did to start with – that this Übergeist is hand-waving empty waffling codswallop.
And the next Nobel Prize will go to… whoever can come up with a wavelength converter that can bridge the gap between the ones Merlijn and Tingey are on.
Metaphysical naturalism as the “philosophical basis of science”? Since when does science have an overt metaphysical philosophical basis? Science/rational inquiry have a methodology, and an epistemology in that some epistemological viewpoints (critical realism) are manifestly more appropriate than others (relativism). But a metaphysical philosophical basis? The beauty of science is exactly in that it is basically neutral except to the most essential, commonsensical metaphysical standpoints.
Your argument that a mind (fundamental or not) has to be located and detectable is an interesting mistake. It’s very easy to metaphorize mind as something spatial, something extended – as consisting of “mind-stuff” – but it’s exactly that locality that is disputed, if I understand correctly, in the various forms of dualism.
I think that Dawkins has had a stab at the MN bit as a (the?) basis for science.
Natural events have natural causes, no ghosts/spirits/miracles are allowed or expected to occur/happen, and are explicitly ruled out of any explanations.
The physical sciences then proceed on this assumption-set, using the tripod of theory to-and-from experiment to-and-from observation/measurement and so on in a continuous back-and-forth basket-weave of inquiring into “the knowledge of causes and the secret motions of things”.
No, I was saying that all “minds” so far known of have physical locations, inside brians – even if we do not know their workings – this is the “Hard Problem” that Pinker refers to. And that, given MN, there is no reason to expect otherwise.
The thoughts of any mind will require a physical stucture to support it and its operation.
And you are still handwaving more bunkum.
Further remarks @GT:
You really have to specify, if mind has a physical basis in matter as you states or if consciousness is “the activity if the brain” as Pinker states, whether you mean that 1) Mental qualities, experiences etc. can be wholly restated in terms of physics (biochemistry etc.), 2) Mental qualities are based on physics but cannot be wholly restated in terms of them: ontologically, from a 3rd person perspective, pain is the firing of such-and-such neurons but the subjective phenomenal quality of pain is not exhausted in this definition.
Because on the latter, physicalism probably remains an arguable philosophical position, but cannot be stated on scientific terms. It is only on the former that it can.
And on the former, we run into the following problems:
1) There’s an argument that we can know everything there is to know about the objective, 3rd person, working of the brain, neurology etc. but we still would not have a subjective, 1st person perspective on the result of those workings. In, I think, Chalmers’ version of the argument a colourblind neurologist, with monochrome vision, would exhaustively study everything there is to know about visual perception. She still would not know what it is like to see colour. In Nagel’s version an exhaustive description of everything there is to know about the brain of the bat still would not grant us access to the subjective experience of flapping around and locating one’s way with echolocation etc. If this is correct, there is a part of mentality – namely, subjective phenomenal experience – that cannot be restated on objective physical terms.
One way to restate it is that the subjective side of a conscious entity is the “thing-in-itself”, the intrinsic side of the entity, which is wholly obscured if we only look at the objective, relational side. Physics ultimately tells us about the relationships between things rather about the intrinsic nature of things.
Incidentally, we should probably distinguish “consciousness” and “mind”. It appears to be possible to experience without being conscious of that experience (blindsight). More primitive creatures may well have some modicum of phenomenal experience without actually having consciousness.
2) It’s doubtful whether the “directedness” or “aboutness” of conscious experience (intentionality) can be restated on physical terms. A painting of my mother is not objectively, physically, a painting of my mother: it is a complex heap of chemicals. The “aboutness” only arises in conscious experience of the painting. Related to the former.
3) From a holistic point of view, conscious experiences may well be unique. If I think of ice-cream, and OB thinks of ice-cream, the thoughts are unlikely to be wholly identical: we may have different “stereotypes” of ice-cream, different background experiences colouring that stereotype, we may represent colour, taste, texture differently in our thoughts and it is unknowable whether our direct experience of colour, taste, texture are identical. If this is correct, correlating a holistic neurological state (which is hideously complex) and a mental state could remain impossible as it would be unrepeatable. The solution would be to somehow specify smaller building-blocks, “atoms” of experience, which could be experimentally verified. I’m sceptical. (Language obviously doesn’t do as a lot of phenomenal experience is non-linguistic).
4) And finally, there’s the rationality problem. There is a normative element in rational thought/behaviour: it specifies how we must think. It’s an ought, not an is. The same goes for language and morality. You’re free to put articles behind the head nouns in English – but if you do, you no longer speak English; and if you want to be easily understood, you shouldn’t. Now the physical world is non-normative by definition. Particles may zig, and not zag; but to research them, we keep in mind the possibility that they zag, and that if they do, a theory may be falsified. The same kind of contingency is absent in normative realms. And it can be (in my opinion, succesfully) argued that this essential normativity cannot be restated on physical terms (the argument is old, but Nagel is one of the clearest recent proponents).
Taken this, would you still hold that “Any mind has (…) got to have a physical basis in matter, and so organised that “thoughts” take place.”? It may well be so, mind you. But it is a philosophical proposition – not one which should be confused with science – and not the only arguable one in the field.
And are you sure Dawkins didn’t mean methodological naturalism? If he meant metaphysical naturalism, he’s wrong. Simply as that.
But note that in your description, you’re talking method. You’re talking “ought”, not “is”. You state that Natural events have natural causes, no ghosts/spirits/miracles are allowed or expected to occur/happen, and are explicitly ruled out of any explanations.. This relates to method, not to metaphysics. It’s a different thing to state that “ghost/spirits/miracles do not happen“.
Stewart – try
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Babel_Fish_diagram.jpg
sadly, I believe it to be fantasy though…
I incline to view (2) oddly enough, with a caveat ….
Mental qualities are based on physics but cannot be wholly restated in terms of them – at the moment, because we do not presently have sufficent detailed knowledge – but as far as we know, that is the case.
Are you trying to say that “mind” does NOT have to be a product of (sufficiently organised, arranged, interconnected) matter?
If so, please produce supporting evidence.
It’s trivially true that mental qualities cannot be at the moment restated in terms of physical ones. But you seem to believe that one day, they may be (if neuroscience is advanced enough, say). I don’t think this escapes the objections mentioned, because they assert an unbridgable logical gap between the two realms.
I do not see why mind has to be a product of matter except in an aprioristic fashion on the basis of a materialist metaphysic. Which is fair enough, if one is frank about the metaphysic. My own preference would be to draw a distinction between “subjective” phenomenal consciousness and “objective” ideal structures (logic, mathematics) which are not material but not quite mental in a 1st person perspective either. So I’d tend to draw a three-way distinction here: matter, subjective mind and some kind of Platonic realm. As for the first two, I believe human consciousness is dependent on the structure of the brain – but that structure is not necessarily physical. I’m sympathetic to (but not yet utterly convinced of) some kind of dual-aspect neutral monism: ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ as two opposite sides of the same coin.
As for God, the two solutions I see are one involving some kind of idealism: mind, and indeed conscious mind, is indeed primary and independent of matter; or some kind of more complex system in which God as _existent_ would be identifiable with the “third” Platonic world of forms (potential, rather than actual) but as _actual_ be immanent in the material/mental universe: God would be some kind of “universal mind”, but quite dependent on the minds of us, and hermit crabs, and what rudimentary phenomenal experience bacteria might have.
The structure of the brain is not necessarily physical? Does that make sense? Can the structure of a physical object be not physical? Isn’t the structure of a physical object physical by definition?
I must confess that while I agree with Chalmers and Nagel that we can never know what it is like to be a bat (so to speak) I don’t really understand how it undermines a physical basis of the mind, just as it doesn’t undermine a mental basis of the mind (i.e. that I can’t know with my mind what it is like to be a bat – to have a bat’s mind – because then I’d be a bat and not me doesn’t tell us that therefore a bat’s mind is not mindstuff).
As to intentionality, I think Stevan Harnad’s stuff about physical instantiation of symbols covers it pretty well.
PM: I agree. I don’t think Chalmers’ and Nagel’s points in any way entail the falsity of materialism (at least Nagel happily remains a materialist, and so does McGinn who also asserts the unbridgeability of the two categories). What I think it does undermine is a scientific-reductionist view of the mind: the idea that science will one day be able to exhaustively prove and explain how consciousness arises from matter. But there are many other kinds of materialisms, and one of them may well be true (I actually don’t think materialism is true, but I am very much aware of the possibility I am mistaken).
OB: But if some kind of “dual aspect neutral monism”, or perhaps what Chalmers calls “type F monism” (which regards the physical as the extrinsic, relational pole and the mental as the intrinsic, ‘for-itself’ pole of the same kind of ultimate ‘thing’) holds true, then there are no purely physical objects. The whole dichotomy of physical/mental would be eroded.
Merlijn, I’m not sure that the argument doesn’t equally apply to any other account of mind – in which case it doesn’t undermine materialism any more than it undermines any other account of mind – I suppose one might retreat into a kind of know-nothing mysteriousness but I don’t see prima facie why an account of mind requires that mind must be experienced in the first person to be understood.
As to the truth of materialism – I’ve actually never quite figured out how say Chalmers property dualism differs in any meaningful way from materialism.
I have followed this debate with great interest, and I admire the tenor and rationality of Merlijn’s arguments. I have wanted to interject at many points, but the cat always steps on the keyoard before I finish my post (we have a young brown Burmese boy called Rastaban who disproves with alarming frequency the notion that cats are either careful or elegant).
My contribution, if it can be so described, would be to suggest that abstracta, or Platonic forms are, to the empirical and scientific universe of concreta, an irrelevance. It is wholly reasonable to state that science cannot enlighten metaphysics, but to suggest that metaphysics can inform science is equally absurd. There is a category error here. Science and common sense are inescapably phenomenological and empirical in that light. Metaphysics is speculation beyond methodological nuturalism, and however interesting it may be it is a category error to believe that it is relevant to what we natural beings can understand.
GT: I’ve been arguing exactly that there is no room for the ghost in the machine. And so much the worse for the machine. As the existence of the “ghost” (phenomenal experience) is an obvious fact that the machine, qua machine, cannot accomodate. So hence non-reductive materialism/property dualism, etc.: the ghost arises out of the machine, but its ghost-like properties cannot be explained in terms of machine-like properties. But this is not the only conceivable solution. As it is, the idea of physics as relational, extrinsic properties/phenomenal experience as the “intrinsic” side of the same kind of neutral substance has been associated particularly with one of your intellectual heroes – Bertrand Russell. Surely you’re not saying that Russel was wrong? ;-) The position has quite recently been defended by Galen Strawson in Journal of Consciousness Studies 10-11, 2006 (I serendipitously found it when writing the previous reply. Knew that Strawson regarded phenomenal experience as fundamental but did not know he was thinking in exactly those terms. The whole journal issue is dedicated to discussing Strawson’s paper – haven’t had time to read anything but the lead paper yet).
I must say I kinda like Teilhard. I think his vitalism should be excused as it was the common position held in Europe during those times. Whatever one may think of the scholarly merits of a highly speculative work such as the Phenomenon of Man, I think its general influence on far-future speculation, trains of thought such as transhumanism and even science-fiction shouldn’t be underestimated. He definitely has his place in the history of ideas.
PM: I agree about property dualism/non-reductive materialism in that the former is usually entailed by the latter. Though I guess it would be possible for a non-reductive idealist to be a property dualist. Don’t know of anyone holding that position though.
MikeS: Agreed in the sense that for example realism vs. nominalism has little bearing on actual scientific work – but I would argue that metaphysics and science can inform one another without either of them actually being able to decide on the questions posed by the other. I think the mind-matter issue will remain with us forever, but that does not mean neuroscience is irrelevant to it. At the same time, I think that one’s attitude to the question may influence one’s program – what results one ultimately expects, etc. My attitude to reductionism, for example, is a bit problematic in that I oppose reductionism as a metaphysical belief, but I think that trying to reduce mind to matter is nonetheless a very fruitful course of action. It will not resolve the issue, I believe, but provide us with a wealth of knowledge on neurology, the brain, possible interactions between the brain and consciousness, nonetheless. So I think the “mysterians” on consciousness may have it (partly) right but it would be a shame if their attitude were to be interpreted as implying the futility of neurology, cognitive science, etc. So while I agree with you on neither of the two fields being able to solve the problems posed by the other, I think they do meet in various ways on their ragged edges.
But your arguments look as if you are arguing for a ghost, to me ….
Something obviously wrong here in the communications …
Which reminds me of a physics problem, that might be relevant …
The dual-slit paradox.
We KNOW that if you fire simgle photond through a double-slit, very carefully, one at a time, for about 500 shots, it looks random, but. by the time you get to 2-5000 shots, the wave-pattern has appeared.
Theory and maths state (and experimental evidence so far concurs) that there is/are no hidden variables.
So what’s going on?
My bet/hunch is that there IS a deeper level of order, or we would not see what us seen, but no-one (yet – with the possible and dubious work of David Bohm) seems to have any idea as to what/where/whic – if you see what I mean.
The double-slit experiment freaked me out when I first read about it. As I think it well should, because there’s this deep intuition that a photon must be “out there” somewhere, even if we cannot specify exactly where. I.e. we may specify probabilities for the particle being measured at a certain place – but there’s still this thought that it is somewhere even if we’re not looking: to be physical in any meaningful sense of the term is to be concrete, to have a location in space and time. To me, it seems that the double-slit experiment demonstrates that it is not so. I am wondering whether Peirce’s realism concerning potentialities may help make sense of the matter: i.e. the photon, or better the mathematics that describe the probabilities of the photon being at any certain time, is an abstract object, and nonetheless as real as can be, with the particle only becoming concrete and actual with decoherence or whatever. But I’m not a physicist, I’m way out of my depth on the subject concerned – so I should be extremely circumspect here.
But R. Feynman would disagree with you!
He said that the photon is “there” (even if you can’t specify its position/momentum exactly) …..
And photons are anything but “abstract” objects – the physical energy-transfer from photon(s) is how they trigger ccd’s in sensors, or 4 photons in series will trigger an chemical change in a photographic film – which will then be chemically developed to make an image.
OB: I think we are straining at gnats here. My point is an historical one – in response to A C Grayling’s original historical challenge – that monotheism just is the context from which the metaphysics of an intelligible universe emerged. It seems ridiculous to want to re-write history to expunge any reference to Christianity from the annals of science – unless you have the agenda of an atheistic puritan, that is.
But there is a deeper point about the link between science and its religious context, as Karl Popper illustrates with his distinction between the psychology and the logic of scientific discovery.
The psychology of scientific discovery – notably in this case the religious-shaped imaginations of various scientists – is the wellspring of the intuitions that inspire new theories; it is absolutely essential. However, the difficulty that Popper identifies with this psychological part of the scientific process is that it is not susceptible to rigorous analysis. So, he develops the logic of scientific discovery to derive a test for the intuited theories, via his preferred method of falsification. Of course, Popper means that part to be strictly scientific. But without the psychology, the logic would have nothing to work on, as it were.
So, it is not only to go against common sense but also against Popper, to deny the religious-shaped inspiration behind monotheism. I suppose, in theory, the idea of an intelligible universe could have emerged without monotheism. But to insist on that would require re-writing history as it happened.
So, you are right that a metaphysical commitment to the universe’s intelligibility doesn’t require belief in monotheism now. But it was pre-Christian monotheism (towards which, for example, the pre-Socratics were moving in their natural philosophy), and then Christian monotheism, that provided the original psychological context.