Originally a comment by Your Name’s not Bruce? at Miscellany Room 6.

Retweeted by Dr. Jane Clare Jones:

Apparently, her Thoughtcrime was to write this paper for the journal from whose editorial board she was removed: Scrutinizing the U.S. Equality Act 2019: A Feminist Examination of Definitional Changes and Sociolegal Ramifications.

Abstract:

The U.S. Equality Act, which amends civil rights statutes to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, passed the House in May 2019 with unanimous Democratic support. Adopting a feminist perspective, I scrutinize the act from a largely neglected position, one that supports both LGBTQ and sex-based rights. Although laudable in its aims, the Equality Act is objectionable in form. The Act extends non-discrimination protections to LGBTQ individuals not by creating new protected classes but by redefining sex to include gender identity and sexual orientation, which is not only terminologically imprecise but also creates a clash between sex-based and gender identity-based rights. By defining gender identity as something that exists to be protected “regardless of sex,” the act undermines sex-based provisions, replacing them with provisions based on gender self-identification. Recognizing confusion over terminology, I describe key terms (sex, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation) and consider various usages. I conclude by discussing ways the bill might be modified so as to protect LGBTQ people without undermining women’s (sex-based) rights.

From farther into the paper:

Like many political issues at present, public debates around the Equality Act usually fall on left–right party lines with little debate on substance, including the gender identity theory implicitly endorsed by the bill. The Congressional discussion of the bill consisted of Democratic lawmakers lauding the bill (e.g., as “literally a life-saving bill”) with Republican representatives panning “the deep flaws” in the legislation (H.R. 5 Text, 2019). Much of the public seem largely content to adopt party-line positions without discussion or critical scrutiny. This lack of public discussion is objectionable in a democratic society, in general, but it is even more problematic in this case given the pronounced shift in American jurisprudence the Equality Act will institute from sex-based to gender identity-based protections. Many on the left supporting the bill appear unaware of the sweeping nature of this legislation and uninformed about the practical details.

Although laudable in its nondiscriminatory aims, the form of H.R.5 is problematic. The Equality Act extends federal nondiscrimination protections to LGBT people not by creating new protected classes or by protecting sexuality or gender expression under existing sex-stereotype protections but rather by expanding the definition of sex to “include sexual orientation and gender identity.” Departing from our creditable legal tradition of definitional precision, the Equality Act is terminologically imprecise, as it conflates distinct terms (i.e., sex, gender, and sexual orientation), defines gender identity vaguely and circularly, and fails to define gender at all. More concerning, however, is the bill’s prioritization of gender identity over biological sex. The Equality Act defines gender identity as something that exists to be protected “regardless of sex” without exception, thereby giving primacy to gender identity over sex when they clash (i.e., in determining eligibility for [otherwise or previously] sex-based provisions). The result is the erosion of females’ sex-based provisions, which include sex-separated spaces (e.g., prisons, locker rooms, shelters), opportunities and competitions (e.g., awards, scholarships, sports), and events (e.g., meetings, groups, festivals) (see Lawford-Smith, 2019c, for a discussion and justification). As I will discuss, female sex-based provisions remain important given both women’s historical disadvantages and different reproductive biology.4

For these reasons, while I support the Equality Act’s nondiscrimination aims, I submit that the bill, in current form, fails to strike a balance between the rights, needs, and interests of two marginalized (and overlapping) groups—trans people and females—and instead prioritizes the demands of trans people over the hard-won rights of female people. This imbalance led Rep. Lesko (2019) to argue that the bill should be called “The Forfeiting Women’s Rights Act.” In current form, the Equality Act’s elision of the distinction between biological sex and gender self-identification, with the prioritization of the latter over the former, amounts to an impracticable attempt to provide sex-based protections with sex-blind policies. Because, as I will discuss, gender identity is vaguely and circularly defined without the requirement for any verification or formal status change, any person can access opposite-sex provisions merely on the basis of first-person testimony through gender self-ID (e.g., “I identify as a woman”), no medical or legal gatekeeping or even presentation style (e.g., as feminine) required.5 Therefore, and unbeknownst to many, the Equality Act eliminates the right to sex-based provisions.

We can see here how the UK has become “TERF Island,” something that seems to puzzle non-UK TAs to no end. Because in UK law “sex” is a protected characteristic, women have a solid legal foundation from which to defend their rights. In the UK, gender critical feminists have a position to defend, meaning that trans activism can be portrayed, accurately, as trying to undermine and destroy women’s legal, sex-based rights. Women in the US and Canada , because of the way protection for “gender identity” has come to be incorporated into the law, have already lost that legal position, making regaining it that much harder.

Here’s how the journal describes itself, and we can see in a single word the genesis of Burt’s removal:

About this journal

Feminist Criminology (FC), published five times a year, is an innovative journal dedicated to research related to women, girls, and crime within the context of a feminist critique of criminology. The official journal of the Division on Women and Crime of the American Society of Criminology, this international publication focuses on research and theory that highlights the gendered (emphasis mine) nature of crime. This journal is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE).

Here’s a link to a response to Burt’s piece above, by Nishant Upadhyay.

It’s not open access, but the abstract is heavily loaded with orthodox, anti-colonialist, “white-feminism” jargon:

Coloniality of White Feminism and Its Transphobia: A Comment on Burt Abstract

In this comment, I challenge Burt’s colonial epistemological framework in her theorizations of sex, gender, and transness. Drawing upon anti-racist, decolonial, and trans of color feminisms, I argue that transphobia is inherent to white feminisms due to its roots in colonialism. Heteropatriarchy and cisnormativity are products of colonialism, and feminists who espouse transphobic discourses invariably reproduce colonial and white supremacist frameworks of patriarchy and gender violence.

Sounds like well-poisoning bullshit to me. With all that name-calling in the abstract, I’d bet he addresses none of Burt’s actual arguments. If he could, he’d emphasize that in the abstract. Instead, he denounces her as a heretic.

Here’s where you can find him, sorry, them.