Western “experts” prattled on
How the experts got Russian military prowess so wrong:
The resilience of Ukrainian resistance is embarrassing for a Western think-tank and military community that had confidently predicted that the Russians would conquer Ukraine in a matter of days. For years, Western “experts” prattled on about the Russian military’s expensive, high-tech “modernization.” The Russians, we were told, had the better tanks and aircraft, including cutting-edge SU-34 fighter bombers and T-90 tanks, with some of the finest technical specifications in the world. The Russians had also ostensibly reorganized their army into a more professional, mostly voluntary force. They had rethought their offensive doctrine and created battalion tactical groups, flexible, heavily armored formations that were meant to be key to overwhelming the Ukrainians. Basically, many people had relied on the glamour of war, a sort of war pornography, to predict the outcome of Russia’s invasion of its neighbor.
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Though analysts and historians will spend years arguing about exactly why prewar assessments of the Russian military proved so flawed, two reasons are immediately apparent. First, Western analysts misunderstood the Russian military’s ability to undertake the most complex operations and the robustness of its logistical capabilities. And second, prognosticators paid too little attention to the basic motivations and morale of the soldiers who would be asked to use the Russian military’s allegedly excellent doctrine and equipment.
So soldiers aren’t as predictable as machines? Who knew?
The Russian Army was ordered to make a lightning dash to Kyiv with the goal of swiftly occupying it and deposing the government in preparation for a puppet regime to be installed. This all fell apart when, contrary to expectations of a cakewalk, the Ukrainian resistance proved to be both steadfast and deadly. The problem wasn’t that the Russian Army couldn’t conduct an offensive operation, the problem was that it was told to do something foolhardy and more akin to the bloody Charge of the Light Brigade than beating back the Germans from Moscow in December, 1941. If Putin had initially ordered the Russian Army to occupy the Donbas only, they likely could have done this with much lower losses to their force that left Ukraine with no option but to accept defeat.
I think Putin expected a replay of Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, and failed to grasp how Ukraine had learned from that experience and was not going to allow it to be repeated. Also, Ukraine isn’t a small country and there just weren’t enough Russian boots on the ground or the logistics to accomplish Putin’s mission. Now it’s doubtful that the Russian Army is even able to do more that it has in the Donbas region, and may even have to retreat there as well to a front they can better defend and supply. About all Russia can hope for now is that Ukraine to be so exhausted by the war that they are willing to negotiate a cease fire which would allow the Russian Army to try and put itself back together.
So I don’t think Russia’s failure in Ukraine is simply about morale and poor tactics, but more about how the Russian Army was given a task that was beyond its ability to accomplish.
It’s taken just under 50 years to forget the lessons of Vietnam. I remember years ago someone comparing the Viet Cong use of people on foot (or bicycles) running supplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail, while the US used multi-million dollar bombers to try to interdict these supplies. The person commenting, noting the disparity, said words to the effect of “that’s why America lost.”
It’s not like the Russians aren’t up against people fighting for their families and homeland. That’s a big motivator right there. You’d think the Russians would know this.
Not to get too conspiratorial about it, but it’s hard to sell new weapons unless you say the other guy has better ones.
At the end of the 30s, the Soviets had one of the most advanced militaries in the world. Their tanks and aircraft were on par with those of any Western power, except the Germans had a slight edge in combat aircraft.
BUT. Stalin had systematically exterminated the officer class during the purges, something like 90% of the generals, down to about half of the lieutenants and captains. At every level of command, ‘political’ officers were paired with actual commanders and wielded life and death authority over every rank below them.
So the anticipated cakewalk to ‘liberate’ Finland descended into a hopeless slaughter. The Finns could not win in the long run—the Red Army could simply march leaderless masses of men forward faster than the Finns could kill them. But effective military leadership requires independence, professional competence, and initiative that dictatorships can’t stand.