Identity is social
At Psychology Today, Michael Moscolo explains that identity isn’t something we can determine all by ourselves. He starts with Yaniv’s ball-waxing caper.
Yaniv’s actions should not be taken to be representative of transgender individuals. Nonetheless, Yaniv’s actions illustrate the deep conceptual problems that arise when we think of gender a form of “self-identification.” I want to show that regardless of one’s views on transgender issues, it is an error to think that gender identity—or any other identity for that matter—[i]s something that can be completely determined by one’s self.
…
These actions underscore the problem of using self-identification as the sole criterion on which to establish a person’s gender identity. Although Yaniv identifies her gender as a woman, Yaniv’s biological sex is male.
In an individualist society, we prize the values of freedom, autonomy, equality and self-determination. We believe that people should be free to pursue their own agendas, to become whomever they wish to become, provided that they do not hurt others along the way.
Well, yes and no. Yaniv isn’t the only kind of “no”; Trump is another clear example. Trump “identifies as” all kinds of things that he emphatically is not, and he became president of the US partly by doing that, as well as partly by stealing, cheating, pussy-grabbing, racism-spouting, and other deplorable actions. I don’t think people should be free to do that. I think Some Restrictions May (and should) Apply.
From this view, it is easy to see how we might want to sanction the idea that gender—one’s experience of self as man or woman, masculine or feminine, as non-binary, or even non-sexed—as something that a person defines for oneself. But this is neither true of transgender identities nor of any other type of psychological or social identity.
I do not and cannot create my identity by myself. Identities are created in interactions that occur between people using public as well as personal criteria. Like it or not, I cannot establish an identity by myself; it must be negotiated with and validated in my relations with others. This does not mean that I have no role in establishing my identity—it simply means that I cannot and do not do so by myself.
You can have a fantasy by yourself. You can have a fantasy about yourself by yourself. That’s possible, and it makes conceptual sense. But the minute you start trying to impose your fantasy about yourself on other people, the Some Restrictions start to Apply. You can’t force us to believe your personal fantasies. It won’t work and it isn’t right. It isn’t possible and it isn’t a reasonable demand. Here’s the good news: the same applies to you. You don’t have to believe my fantasies about myself, either.
Mascolo chooses politics as his not very useful example – you can say you’re a Democrat but then if you vote and talk Republican, etc. It’s not very useful because it’s already purely external and social as well as voluntary. Better examples are race, nationality, and the like, or skilled occupations that can’t be just picked up in a moment.
The point here is not that one’s personal experience is irrelevant to one’s identity—it is indeed foundational. The point is that it is simply not sufficient. We need more than what someone says in order to establish and verify an identity. We need to be able to point to public and shareable expressions of the person’s experience in order to verify the person’s identity. A person can claim an identity as a Democrat, but without voting for Democrats, espousing Democratic principles and acting on those principles, a person’s self-identification has no warrant.
Or, more usefully, a person can claim an identity as an immigrant or a lawyer, but without actually being either of those things what are we even talking about?
Another thing is that, even to the extent that we identify our own identity, it is defined in most cases not by ourselves but by others. What does it mean to feel like a woman? Nothing, really, except how it affects our relations with other people, based on how others see us because of how they have defined being a woman. So female is strictly biologically defined, but how that being is perceived in gender is socially defined. They “feel like a woman” because of how society has defined a woman, not because of anything internal. They have things they like to do, things they enjoy, things they are, and society has defined those as female. Which is why they can’t manage to define what woman means, because to define what it means to feel like a woman is to admit that they are using external criteria that are determined by someone else, and that those characteristics are the ones feminists are fighting to abolish as a definition of a woman.
Admit that, and…well, they lose the ability to shout “Die in a grease fire, TERFs!” because it becomes obvious that what we want (the ability to be who we are regardless of biological sex) is identical in many ways to what they want (or say they want) and that our way actually makes a lot more sense.
” Imagine that a 6-year old biological male claims to be a girl, resists being characterized as a boy, seeks out feminine toys, activities and attire—and does so in the context of almost certain disapproval by at least some people. We do not become convinced of this child’s rejection of being a “boy” based on mere self-identification; we are convinced by the child’s many publicly observable expressions (empathically-felt by others) of identifying with the category “girl.””
Uh, no, no we’re not convinced. He’s still a boy. He’s just a boy who likes to play at being a girl. Of course we’re not going to be mean to him. But we’re not really going to think he’s a girl either. Because we are not delusional.
If a kid dresses like a pirate every day, and strangers in the street greet him with a hearty “Yo-Ho!” we’re not going to be convinced he’s actually a pirate. If he wears a fursuit and people scratch behind his fake ears, we’re not going to be convinced he’s truly a cat. Imagination and pretend play are great for kids. Inculcating delusion is not.
The article is a nice attempt by Mr. Mascolo to find a middle ground with the transgender ideology. I don’t think that’s really possible, though, given the absolutism of their demands.
If identity is social, why are those who are obsessed with it so anti-social?
Trump can identify however he wants. It’s not as though 46% of the electorate is going to enable him.
Wait, I’ll come in again.