I’ve been meaning to share passages from the ruling on the travel ban.

It is undisputed that the Executive Order does not facially discriminate for or
against any particular religion, or for or against religion versus non-religion. There
is no express reference, for instance, to any religion nor does the Executive
Order—unlike its predecessor—contain any term or phrase that can be reasonably
characterized as having a religious origin or connotation.
Indeed, the Government defends the Executive Order principally because of
its religiously neutral text —“[i]t applies to six countries that Congress and the prior
Administration determined posed special risks of terrorism. [The Executive Order]
applies to all individuals in those countries, regardless of their religion.” Gov’t.
Mem. in Opp’n 40. The Government does not stop there. By its reading, the
Executive Order could not have been religiously motivated because “the six
countries represent only a small fraction of the world’s 50 Muslim-majority nations,
and are home to less than 9% of the global Muslim population . . . [T]he suspension
covers every national of those countries, including millions of non-Muslim
individuals[.]” Gov’t. Mem. in Opp’n 42.
The illogic of the Government’s contentions is palpable. The notion that one
can demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by targeting all of them at
once is fundamentally flawed. The Court declines to relegate its Establishment Clause analysis to a purely mathematical exercise. See Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at
*9 (rejecting the argument that “the Court cannot infer an anti-Muslim animus
because [Executive Order No. 13,769] does not affect all, or even most, Muslims,”
because “the Supreme Court has never reduced its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to a mathematical exercise. It is a discriminatory purpose that
matters, no matter how inefficient the execution” (citation omitted)). Equally
flawed is the notion that the Executive Order cannot be found to have targeted Islam
because it applies to all individuals in the six referenced countries. It is undisputed,
using the primary source upon which the Government itself relies, that these six
countries have overwhelmingly Muslim populations that range from 90.7% to
99.8%.12 It would therefore be no paradigmatic leap to conclude that targeting
these countries likewise targets Islam. Certainly, it would be inappropriate to
conclude, as the Government does, that it does not.

“It would be no paradigmatic leap” – I like that.

The Government compounds these shortcomings by suggesting that the
Executive Order’s neutral text is what this Court must rely on to evaluate purpose.
Govt. Mem. in Opp’n at 42–43 (“[C]ourts may not ‘look behind the exercise of
[Executive] discretion’ taken ‘on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.’”). Only a few weeks ago, the Ninth Circuit commanded otherwise: “It is
well established that evidence of purpose beyond the face of the challenged law may
be considered in evaluating Establishment and Equal Protection Clause claims.”
Washington, 847 F.3d at 1167–68 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“Official action that targets religious
conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the
requirement of facial neutrality.”); Larson, 456 U.S. at 254–55 (holding that a
facially neutral statute violated the Establishment Clause in light of legislative
history demonstrating an intent to apply regulations only to minority religions); and
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68
(1977) (explaining that circumstantial evidence of intent, including the historical
background of the decision and statements by decisionmakers, may be considered in
evaluating whether a governmental action was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose)). The Supreme Court has been even more emphatic: courts may not “turn
a blind eye to the context in which [a] policy arose.”

I like that even more. Courts may not turn a blind eye to the context in which a policy arose.

“[H]istorical context and ‘the specific sequence of events leading up to’” the adoption of a challenged policy are relevant considerations. Id. at 862; see
also Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *7.
A review of the historical background here makes plain why the Government
wishes to focus on the Executive Order’s text, rather than its context. The record
before this Court is unique. It includes significant and unrebutted evidence of
religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its related
predecessor. For example—
In March 2016, Mr. Trump said, during an interview, “I think
Islam hates us.” Mr. Trump was asked, “Is there a war between
the West and radical Islam, or between the West and Islam
itself?” He replied: “It’s very hard to separate. Because you
don’t know who’s who.”
SAC ¶ 41 (citing Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview With Donald
Trump (CNN television broadcast Mar. 9, 2016, 8:00 PM ET), transcript available
at https://goo.gl/y7s2kQ)). In that same interview, Mr. Trump stated: “But there’s
a tremendous hatred. And we have to be very vigilant. We have to be very
careful. And we can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred
of the United States. . . [a]nd of people that are not Muslim.”

Talking like that helped get him elected but it’s not helping him now.

The Government appropriately cautions that, in determining purpose, courts
should not look into the “veiled psyche” and “secret motives” of government
decisionmakers and may not undertake a “judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart
of hearts.” Govt. Opp’n at 40 (citing McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862). The
Government need not fear. The remarkable facts at issue here require no such impermissible inquiry. For instance, there is nothing “veiled” about this press
release: “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States.[]” SAC ¶ 38, Ex. 6 (Press Release, Donald J. Trump for
President, Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7,
2015), available at https://goo.gl/D3OdJJ)). Nor is there anything “secret” about
the Executive’s motive specific to the issuance of the Executive Order:
Rudolph Giuliani explained on television how the Executive
Order came to be. He said: “When [Mr. Trump] first announced
it, he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a
commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.’”

SAC ¶ 59, Ex. 8. On February 21, 2017, commenting on the then-upcoming
revision to the Executive Order, the President’s Senior Adviser, Stephen Miller,
stated, “Fundamentally, [despite “technical” revisions meant to address the Ninth
Circuit’s concerns in Washington,] you’re still going to have the same basic policy
outcome [as the first].” SAC ¶ 74.
These plainly-worded statements,14 made in the months leading up to and
contemporaneous with the signing of the Executive Order, and, in many cases, made by the Executive himself, betray the Executive Order’s stated secular purpose. Any
reasonable, objective observer would conclude, as does the Court for purposes of the
instant Motion for TRO, that the stated secular purpose of the Executive Order is, at
the very least, “secondary to a religious objective” of temporarily suspending the
entry of Muslims. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864.

It’s a good read.