A concatenation of its ephemeral contents
Let’s consult the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a moment.
Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas’ that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.
One damn thing after another, with an illusion that they all add up to a single Self.
In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas—that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner.
It’s quite a cheerful way of looking at it, because it loosens up the sense of personal investment.
Psychotherapy is also interested.
Neuroscience, social psychology, and artificial intelligence all agree that each of us consists of a multiplicity of identities that account for the richness and complexity of the human experience.
In other words, no one is a “unitary” self. At the same time, there’s more than one way to use this knowledge to elicit therapeutic healing, self-awareness, and growth. This workshop will showcase how two noted psychotherapists bring the concept of multiplicity into their therapeutic work.
- Help clients not over-identify with a single part of themselves, and empower them to move beyond the diagnostic labels they feel define them
If one single part of yourself is giving you the pip, switch your attention to a different one.
It can be hard to sideline an identity if the outside world is intent on tormenting you over it. But when it’s not, and/or when we can escape from the outside world for awhile…we can be a bunch of different selves. We don’t have to nail ourselves to any of them.
This actually helps connect two things for me.
One, I always had a strong sense of self, so I was having a bit of trouble with the idea that it’s illusory, which is kind of how I’ve put it before. BUT my sense of self has always been very fluid, *consciously* fluid. I know I’m a little bit of this and a little bit of that and my moods and capabilities shift constantly. I guess I just always assumed that’s how it should be, and others expects something… objective?
Yes, bundle theory is a great way of thinking about “identity”. We’re a mess of beliefs, desires and dispositions, some of which are in conflict with each other. I think we must also have some kind of narrative aspect to our psyches as well: we seem to be a story-telling animal. Saying “I identify with x” might be a shorthand way of telling a story about ourselves, a way of picking out a behavioural pattern and giving it a name. And neuorscientifc insights around the phenomenon of confabulation should give us pause for thought about taking personal narratives at face value. Having said all that, I see no reason why we shouldn’t treat each other’s claims about our personal identities with basic respect (where it is not harmful to do so – if you tell me you identify with Jack the Ripper I won’t be supporting you in that identification). We can question notions of identity in general while at the same time respectfully acknowledging and responding to people’s claims about their own identities.
Well it depends. People in general, sure. People in discussions like this? Not necessarily, at least not if that’s the subject under discussion. If I do a post asking what we mean by “identify as” it’s not enlightening for people to give lists of what they identify as.
In the past I’ve mostly found it a sad, angst-provoking way of looking at it, because it involves facing the fact that I–to the extent there is an “I”–am not the discrete and continuous self that it feels like I am. It’s a sorry thing, this self of mine, but what else have I got?*
(Also I started reading, and consequently novelizing myself to myself, at a very young age.)
But as I get older I’m getting more comfortable with the idea.
* Perceptions and experiences–fleeting, but sometimes worthwhile.
I definitely meant “people in general”. If I meet someone out in the world who says they identify with squirrels and they would like me to respond to them in particular ways related to their squirrel identity, then sure, why not? I don’t usually have discussions with general people in the world about the psychological mechanisms underlying personal identification, so I don’t see why I should bring it up just because someone is telling me about how they identify. But that doesn’t mean I can’t write about my thoughts in relation to meeting someone who identifies with squirrels, or have a discussion about it, etc.
And, alas, whatever our brains tell us about our identities, they can be deceitful little shits, and lead us astray about what we think about who we think we are (and also what we think about who we think other people are). Not saying that mind = brain mind you. But brain has something to do with it. And brain, she can do you wrong.
I read this interview yesterday after I saw a post on about Cordelia Fine on Facebook and it makes me totally want to read her books, esp the one about gender http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/an-interview-with-cordelia-fine
Cordelia Fine is swell.
I’ve recommended Delusions of Gender, and I think Ophelia has as well.
(I have a few criticisms, among which that she goes too easy on the should-be-infamous vervet study.)
While from what little I understand of the neuroscience and social psychology of consciousness leads me to agree with this statement in general, the field of artificial intelligence (in which I hold a doctorate) says next to nothing about this topic. Just a slight derail/correction of that article’s claim. (Indeed, AI is not at all what the popular conception of it is. It’s not about making robot butlers.)
I re-read An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding last spring (and this time, I took notes — I love e-books for that facility!). It’s fascinating how *modern* Hume often sounds — he anticipated debates we are still having today.
The idea of “not self” is central to Buddhism too. It’s a concept that stretches back a long way.