The fresh air of the explicit
And another thing. I replied to Taner’s “We do have proposals to this effect, and they come down to communities having a good deal of autonomy in regulating their own affairs…” with “But again, that treats ‘communities’ as if they were people. ‘Communities’ don’t have affairs; people do, one at a time.” Taner replied with “I find it perfectly sensible to talk about the interests of a corporation, the affairs of a university, or the internal rules of a bridge club. And so with communities.”
Ah yes – but there is a difference. It’s not ‘and so with communities,’ because ‘communities’ are different from corporations and universities and even bridge clubs. The difference is part of what makes them so risky, so difficult to deal with, so potentially and sometimes actually oppressive. The difference (the one I’m thinking of anyway) is that corporations and universities are specifiable, and precise, and explicit; they have rules and contracts, in writing; you know where you are with them. ‘Communities’ are not any of those things, they don’t have any of those things, you don’t know where you are with them. Communities are all about the tacit, the implicit, the understood, the unwritten – which means they are opaque to outsiders and unaccountable to insiders. This means that if you decide that ‘communities’ should be free to make and enforce their own rules, you’re left with no real way to call them to account, and you’ve left their members helpless.
And ‘communities’ are different from corporations and universities in having no real borders or definitions, too. ‘Communities’ are notional, and it’s really anybody’s guess who belongs and who doesn’t. Who decides who belongs to what community? Who decides who doesn’t belong? Is everyone allowed to decline to belong to any particular community?
The answer to that last question, at least, seems pretty obviously to be ‘no’ – especially in the case of ‘the Muslim community,’ which does not encourage leaving Islam. Some people are going to be considered to belong to some communities whether they consent or not – and they will be treated accordingly. Corporations and universities don’t operate that way. The ‘communities’ Taner has in mind are non-liberal and non-secular ones, since liberal secularism is exactly what he is departing from in this series of posts. But in that case, he is arguing that non-liberal non-secular ‘communities’ should have power over people who might very well have no desire whatsoever to belong to said ‘communities.’ This isn’t a contrived worry, either, to put it mildly – secular Muslims decidedly are subject to social pressure from ‘the Muslim community.’ If they don’t have the liberal state to turn to – they’re sunk. This ain’t no game of bridge.
I’m not aware of anyone being born into a university, a corporation or a bridge-club, and any university, corporation or bridge-club which discriminated on grounds or race or religion – pretty much the defining characteristics of ‘community’ in this context – would soon find itself running foul of the law.
“I’m not aware of anyone being born into a university, a corporation or a bridge-club, and any university, corporation or bridge-club which discriminated on grounds or race or religion – pretty much the defining characteristics of ‘community’ in this context – would soon find itself running foul of the law.”
Suddenly I’m imagining a possible future where the concept of “corporate personhood” is even further extended than it already is, and people really are born ExxonMobils or DowChemicals. I wonder if Taner would object to that? Certainly there are large multinational corporations that have at least as much influence on the world stage as any religion.
Furthermore, I wonder if pointing out, say, the safety flaws in Toyota’s line of vehicles would be considered “socially divisive” in such a world. After all, that would be an insult to all of the good children/employees of Toyota.
Ha – I didn’t think of that. Brilliantly apposite, dzd.
I have the best commenters of anyone.
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Do Emos and Goths count as communities? How about bikers or second-generation cops?
What about ‘Star Trek’ fans? Can they be treated as a single community or do schisms between ‘The Original Series’ fans, ‘TNG’ and ‘DS9’ fans mean they constitute seperate communities?
If we see them as a single community were does that leave ‘Voyager’ and ‘Enterprise’ fans who may be despised within the ‘community’ hierarchy?
What about the even more marginal fans of the debatably canonical Animated Series of the 1970s who may not even be regarded as authentic Treckers by others within the community?
1. Religious “communities” have self-appointed leaders with dictatorial power over every aspect of their members’ life and death.
2. This power even even extends to people who never asked to be part of the “community” and are “included” against their will.
dzd, read Jennifer Government by Max Barry, unless you already have and you’re just riffing off it…
Shatterface picks up on the part of Ophelia’s post that I find really interesting. We don’t seem to have a clear idea of the nature of a community. Is a cult a community? Do communities necessarily have charismatic authorities? Are communities organizations?
It seems to me that communities are kinds of groups or networks that has the purpose of fostering a sense of social identity. That is, they are definitely not aggregates or demographics. The People Who Enjoy Star Trek does not constitute a community, though the people who attend Star Trek conventions regularly might. Also, I see a difference between organizations and communities. Religions are institutions, not communities — though the religion may be made up of religious communities.
Cults are characterized by the fact that they most resemble Mussolini’s vision of a corporate state. Cults have total control over their members. Still, by my definition above, cults seem like borderline cases of communities.
But even if that’s so, cults are not what most communitarians defend. Contra Taner, it seems like when most people defend communities, they mean to defend liberal communities: i.e., those that have enough autonomy to engage in interpersonal sanctions (snubbing, strident chastizing, expulsion, etc.), but not so much autonomy that they are free to engage in abuse, nor so much that they would bar their members from leaving. It’s instructive to consider how our legal systems treat the notion of the family (which I think we can treat as imperfect sorts of communities). We still have robust legal sanctions against child abuse for good reason, beyond “life and limb”.
Quite – we don’t have a clear idea because Taner won’t say. I really don’t see why not – especially since he puts so much emphasis on communities. It’s really impossible to know exactly what he’s suggesting.
“interpersonal sanctions (snubbing, strident chastizing, expulsion, etc.), but not so much autonomy that they are free to engage in abuse”
That’s the thing. It just isn’t the case that people are free to punish each other in ways beyond relational ones like that, and it would be a very extreme step to say that ‘a community would be able to impose significant costs on members violating internal norms’ if what is meant is anything more than defriending and similar.
Even with robust legal sanctions against child abuse, parents are free to punish their children in ways that would be entirely illegal for anyone else.
Mind you…it occurs to me I would love to be able to confiscate people’s cell phones…No no, it’s just a dream.