Scientism on stilts
Carlin Romano goes after the annoying scientistic arrogant smug Galileo-wannabe whatsits that get on everyone’s nerves so much.
A brave champion of beleaguered science in the modern age of pseudoscience, this Ayn Rand protagonist sarcastically derides the benighted irrationalists and glows with a self-anointed superiority. Who wouldn’t want to feel that sense of power and rightness?
You hear the voice regularly—along with far more sensible stuff—in the latest of a now common genre of science patriotism, Nonsense on Stilts: How to Tell Science From Bunk (University of Chicago Press), by
By…one of the new atheists it must be? This should be good. By?
by Massimo Pigliucci, a philosophy professor at the City University of New York.
Yes! Massimo, the scourge of the scientistic scientists! Being scourged for being so god damn scientistic. It’s the funniest thing I’ve read in weeks.
…it mixes eminent common sense and frequent good reporting with a cocksure hubris utterly inappropriate to the practice it apotheosizes…Pigliucci offers more hero sandwiches spiced with derision and certainty…Tone matters. And sarcasm is not science.
Does that remind you of anyone? No, I won’t rub it in – it’s too cruel.
The problem with polemicists like Pigliucci is that a chasm has opened up between two groups that might loosely be distinguished as “philosophers of science” and “science warriors.” Philosophers of science, often operating under the aegis of Thomas Kuhn, recognize that science is a diverse, social enterprise that has changed over time, developed different methodologies in different subsciences, and often advanced by taking putative pseudoscience seriously, as in debunking cold fusion. The science warriors, by contrast, often write as if our science of the moment is isomorphic with knowledge of an objective world-in-itself
They don’t, do they?! That’s so unsophisticated! If only they were philosophers, they wouldn’t do such silly things. But isn’t M – now now, none of that.
Pigliucci similarly derides religious explanations on logical grounds when he should be content with rejecting such explanations as unproven.
Okay – that’s all. It’s too funny; I don’t want to do myself an injury.
I don’t think post modernists are capable of understanding irony.
Although now I get what they mean by the text being self referential, “Ego Trips” being in the headline.
Also: Pigliucci haha
I’m no fan of scientific triumphalism, and I will concede that Romano deserves to be read, but I was only about a quarter of the way through this little essay when I had to ask, What is your point?
And the question never left.
Brian Leiter pretty much calls Carlin Romano a fraud – maybe he actually does.
Since they are both agreed that tone is the most important part of any discussion I think it’s clear now that Pigliuccis behavior, in the words of a certain philosopher, “should strongly be condemned by the rationalist community on the *sole* basis of language, regardless of any substantive issue.”
LOL, the biter bit. MP presumably agrees with anyone who attacks his derisive tone?
“Carlin Romano … teaches philosophy … at the University of Pennsylvania.”
Another data point in support of my apparently contested contention…
Science envy in the humanities can be a terrible thing to have to listen to. Philosophy is also created by society, yet it seems to be “real” enough to critique science with…
Michael,
But he doesn’t teach philosophy as far as I can tell. He has an adjunct position at the Annenberg School of Communication and is a lawyer.
Yes, Brian Leiter has taken Romano to task more than once for not knowing what he’s talking about.
Michael G…for cryin out loud…surely you get that it can be true both that some or many philosophers say silly things and that philosophy as such is not silly.
Nice bit of reasoning, dirigible.
I shall remember that next time I encounter any lazy ‘that’s just a social contruct-ists”. :)
As a philosopher of science, I should say that not all of us spout this sort of nonsense. I do not operate “under the aegis of Thomas Kuhn”, and it is intellectually sloppy and/or dishonest to cast all philosophers of science in the same light. Some philosophers do indeed have science-envy. But some of us aspire to the rigor of good science.
I appreciate the sarcasm and all, but the lack of precision among the so-called “new atheists” and “anti-accomodationists” is more than a little disappointing. Why must they so consistently confuse alleged inductive probability with deductive certainty?
Someone
Eh? What are you talking about? What lack of precision?
CR:
I mentioned philosophers of science, not philosophers in general, and said “can be” rather than “is always”. I admire philosophical rigor of whatever kind, and I fully recognise that science is based on philosophical assumptions that are open to philosophical critique where they are.
But the fact that I write carefully considered art theory in clear language doesn’t disprove the existence of artbollocks… ;-)
someonesaygrace:
Even if this confusion was the result of incompetence on the part of Dawkins et al rather than mendacity on the part of their critics, deduction from false axioms or using faked logical moves can lead to mistaken certainty. Which is precisely the case with religion. And is it really that clever to admit that there is and can be no evidence for God’s existence in His creation?
Surely you jest.
Science, at its best (which is pretty spectacular, by the way), leads to inductive probability. Indeed, the scientific endeavor, by its nature, is inductive rather than deductive. It does not conclusively demonstrate and is always open to new evidence and better explanations. Thus rock-solid, in-your-face certainty is a highly dangerous position. Evidence of this danger is provided conceptually, historically and experimentally.
The scientific method itself provides the conceptual grounding. It falsifies; it does not prove. Kuhn, if nothing else, shows that alleged scientific certainties can be overturned (and far more often than we tend to think), providing the historical grounding. And any number of experiments (e.g., those relating to the Ellsberg Paradox) show how prone we are to excessive and unjustified certainty.
Despite these obvious dangers, Pigliucci (like so many of the “new atheists”) speaks as if deductive certainty exists. Romano criticizes the tone. I criticize the inaccuracy and imprecision. We simply can’t be as sure as Pigliucci claims.
I agree both with respect to religion and science.
I disagree (at least with respect to philosophical necessity).
You can surely disagree with how religionists interpret the evidence, and do so reasonably. But the existence of evidence by any reasonable definition is obvious (or so it seems to me). This evidence is both experiential (alleged experiences of God and transcendence of various sorts) and historical (religious reports, miracles and stories). These types of evidence are problematic, of course, and needn’t be accepted, also of course, most obviously because they aren’t repeatable and thus are particularly susceptible to error and misinterpretation. But the problematic nature of the evidence and its non-empirical status doesn’t eliminate it from the evidence category.
There are also significant problems with the physicalist hypothesis. Physicalism demands a closed system, prohibiting free will and creativity in any meaningful sense (compatibilism being determinism in a nicer suit). As Cashmore recently pointed out: “A belief in free will is akin to religious beliefs. …Neither religious beliefs, nor a belief in free will, comply with the laws of the physical world.” Indeed, he asserts that “[w]e are conscious automatons.” Quite obviously, this claim violates universal experience. Accordingly, physicalists must assert that our observations (about choice, volition and freedom, for example) are wrong essentially all the time. If that’s so, science itself — utterly dependent upon our observations — is necessarily incoherent. It seems to me that the physicalists bears the burden of overcoming universal experience conclusively, and haven’t done so. That failure is evidence (by inference) that physicalism is false and suggests that religious claims may well be true.
On the other hand, and perhaps more fundamentally, every system (as far as I can tell) requires an unevidenced starting point taken as axiomatic. Science, for example, takes as given the idea that the universe is ordered and comprehensible. It then builds itself upon the axiomatic foundation. That the edifice that has been and is being constructed works so incredibly well overall is good evidence in support of the foundation and the system.
I think religion works in a somewhat similar way. There is sufficient reason to allow a God hypothesis (based upon alleged evidence, personal experience, cultural/societal norms, etc.). People who adopt such a hypothesis then, in effect, test it every day. To the extent it works, people retain it. To the extent it doesn’t work, they modify it or reject it. That religion survives and exists in every culture (at least that I’m aware of) suggests that it works pretty well, justifying its continued use pending good reason to change or dismiss it. Atheists attack the God hypothesis (in its multiple forms), and rightly so. But there is no basis (it seems to me) to offer arrogant certainty as to its falsity and to assert an utter lack of evidence.
I’m always disappointed when someone mistakes my inductive probability for deductive certainty. It’s almost as if they do it on purpose.
Most of what you say is sensible, and I would agree with. I would perhaps point out that the evidence for theism, whilst conceding it falls into the evidence category, might qualify for Singh’s famous ‘not a jot of evidence’ remark. So to assert that there is an ‘utter lack of evidence’ is more akin to saying that there is no good evidence. Saying that a proposition has no good evidence doesn’t immediately make the sayer arrogant; he’s simply making a scientific judgement. Otherwise you would have to accuse everyone who came down on one side of an evidential argument ‘arrogant’. Harsh indeed, and maybe a little arrogant :-).
I’m not sure this is a safe assumption; that religion survives could just show that it’s good at surviving, not that it ‘works pretty well’. And there do seem to be some good reasons pending for reconsidering the religion project? Let’s see if we can think of one or two…
“But the existence of evidence by any reasonable definition is obvious (or so it seems to me). This evidence is both experiential (alleged experiences of God and transcendence of various sorts) and historical (religious reports, miracles and stories). These types of evidence are problematic, of course, and needn’t be accepted, also of course, most obviously because they aren’t repeatable and thus are particularly susceptible to error and misinterpretation. But the problematic nature of the evidence and its non-empirical status doesn’t eliminate it from the evidence category.”
I disagree – the poor quality of the evidence is exactly what eliminates it from the evidence category, at least if we are speaking about scientific evidence – anecdotes are not evidence and all that. You say evidence (for god hypothesis) exists “by any reasonable definition” (and all of a sudden here you are being “reasonable,” i.e. relaxed, when a moment before you were insisting on a kind of purity regarding assertion and the limits of inductive reasoning), but in fact this sort of evidence doesn’t meet even basic standards – you yourself acknowledge its problematical nature. Plus, you are conflating personal (i.e. psychological and social/cultural) experience with scientific evidence. The ‘miracle at Fatima’ is not evidence that the sun can dance sometimes, and no interpretational issues can make it so in a scientific sense. I would say too that it is overly generous to call “miracles and stories” historical evidence, since such things leave no physical remnant and are never independently verified. For example, no one outside that field at Fatima saw the sun dancing/moving, no astronomical observations were made of such a thing, such an event in fact defies both experience and the laws of physics, there are better competing cultural/psychological explanations, etc.
I have no objection to the use of the second characterization. The first is unsupportable, but makes for a better sound bite.
I agree, except for the suggestion that the judgment is somehow scientific.
If people didn’t think it worked for them in some way, why and how would it survive?
Since I expressly noted that such evidence wasn’t scientific (“But the problematic nature of the evidence and its non-empirical status doesn’t eliminate it from the evidence category “), the objection is misplaced.
Nonsense. Eyewitness testimony of a murder is perfectly valid evidence despite its lack of repeatability and problematic nature.
How much of what we deem “history” (and especially ancient history) do you suppose is supported by physical remnants and independent verification? You can object to given instances without eliminating the category from consideration.
“Nonsense. Eyewitness testimony of a murder is perfectly valid evidence despite its lack of repeatability and problematic nature.”
Eyewitness testimony is not scientific evidence, which is the subject under discussion – or so-called “scientism” at any rate. Eyewitness testimony is also the very worst form of criminal evidence. Watch Errol Morris’s ‘The Thin Blue Line’ for an excellent example of this. Eyewitness testimony used to be considered nearly infallible, but thanks to psychological testing and proven misidentifications (for example, rape victims misidentifying their assailants even though they saw them full in the face) we now know that eyewitness testimony is unreliable at best and only has any value when placed in the context of other corroborating evidence – entirely lacking in the case of supernatural claims. You could not convict someone in court on the basis of eyewitness testimony alone these days. Previously, people could be hanged on the basis of it.
“How much of what we deem “history” (and especially ancient history) do you suppose is supported by physical remnants and independent verification? You can object to given instances without eliminating the category from consideration.”
There is a variety of physical and independent evidence for, say, Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar or Tutankhamen. There is also lots of physical evidence for ancient history such as the evolution of life – the theory is itself derived from this evidence. But miracle stories have zero independent confirmation and are in any case in a special category because they defy all known laws of physics (pretty solid confirmation of those). No one jumps out of a building to challenge gravity theory, but people will still believe Jesus walked on water on the basis of some words in a book.
I find it interesting that believers in the supernatural want science to carefully state its uncertainties at every turn, in effect remaining always within the bounds of first principles – or at least when criticizing (or examining in a critical light) people’s cherished beliefs in the supernatural. Again, no one gets upset over gravity theory; only when science encroaches onto the territory of ‘human specialness’ do these concerns for very explicit accuracy surface. But they are only too happy to marshal evidence for their side from miracle stories and anecdotes, which are very weak in an evidentiary sense, and even worse in a scientific sense. That dichotomy, to me, seems clearly based in psychological/emotional, and not truly evidentiary, concerns.
I second what Chris says about eyewitness testimony. I don’t even know what ssg could mean by saying it’s “perfectly valid.” It could hardly be any more fallible! There’s massive research on this (as Chris says) – eyewitness testimony is terrifyingly unreliable – terrifyingly because the legal system depends on it so heavily, and because people tend to be tremendously confident about it.
“Since I expressly noted that such evidence wasn’t scientific (“But the problematic nature of the evidence and its non-empirical status doesn’t eliminate it from the evidence category “), the objection is misplaced.”
My objection isn’t misplaced, since you are asserting that its problematical nature doesn’t eliminate it from the evidence category, and I’m asserting that it is the very thing that does eliminate it from the evidence category.
Let’s take the story of Jesus walking on the water. Do you think science, despite the laws of gravity, etc., should be very cautious regarding this truth claim? (Or secondarily, that it should say nothing regarding this claim?) And if so, shouldn’t someone who believes in this ‘miracle’ be, at minimum, similarly cautious, and admit that it’s only a story, that it may only have been a dream, there is no corroborating evidence, the bible is known to be historically and scientifically inaccurate as well as self-contradictory at multiple points, humans are physically incapable of walking on water, it contradicts the laws of physics, etc. – because certainly believers don’t operate in this fashion. And if they did, they would have absolutely no basis for believing in the truth of this story about from psychological/cultural reasons – which is, of course, the actual case of the matter.
What all this is about is epistemology. Supernaturalists want science to remain epistemologically circumspect in its theories/beliefs whenever they encroach on their beliefs, but they are don’t seem to consider it a given going in the other direction. They accuse these uncareful scientists of arrogance, but never turn those guns on themselves whenever they criticize evolutionary theory on the basis of their supernatural beliefs.
Except that the claim being discussed here (and ga-zillions of times on atheist bulletin boards) is the charge that there is no evidence for God (period). Only rarely (if at all) does one see the qualifier scientific used in this context and in relation to “evidence.” Are we talking about theoretical atheism here or how it is actually practiced {snort}?
I have already acknowledged its problematic nature. But “the very worst”? I don’t think that’s a supportable claim. Have you had much experience with bought-and-paid-for, rent-an-expert testimony?
Based upon my courtroom experience, I disagree. That said (and to repeat), I fully recognize the inherent problems with eyewitness testimony. Had you more carefully read my earlier comments, that fact would have been readily apparent to you.
But, of course, that carefully ducks the question.
This is carefully crafted to suggest that somehow I’m a creationist. I have no quarrel with evolution specifically or with science in general.
It is a perfectly valid (as in acceptable) form of evidence, subject (like all evidence) to interpretation, scrutiny and attack. I have repeatedly noted its problematic nature and concede as much. That said, if your mother (assuming she’s alive and in good health, though not terribly mobile) in the next room tells you that she had just seen a thief steal a $20 bill from her wallet and that he had run out the door (you saw nothing, heard nothing, and there is no evidence apparent to you that anyone else had been there other than your mother’s word), are you more likely to take action or to tell her that her eyewitness testimony couldn’t possibly be more fallible, so you are going to do nothing until there is some scientific evidence for what happened?
So your answer to my thought experiment above is that you’d demand scientific evidence from Mom before taking any action since there is no legitimate evidence for her claim?
Since I don’t criticize evolutionary theory, you’re barking up the wrong tree (again).
My goodness, I’m ducking questions, barking up the wrong trees, misplacing my objections, and harassing me poor mum!
Oh, and not reading carefully….
Speaking of which, I never said you criticized evolutionary theory. I said “They,” not “you.” If you would read my posts more carefully….
I was speaking generally and using evolutionary theory merely as a particular example – but I did regret after I posted not having added “for example.”
As for my ancient history examples, again, they are simply particular examples suggesting that, yes, ancient history is corroborated to a greater or lesser degree. If there is a particular example you feel is widely accepted yet totally unsupported, please feel free to offer it and we can debate. I admittedly wasn’t prepared to list and support every single event and/or personage of ancient history in that one comment. I used a few particulars to in essence say, yes, ancient history is supported by physical evidence – and certainly it is more supported than any supernatural claim.
As for your thought example, besides unsurprisingly trafficking in emotionalism, it’s a bit outside the discussion of scientific epistemological arrogance, isn’t it? But for what it’s worth, I might very well not believe my mom in that circumstance – she has begun to be a bit dotty, after all.
If you wish to try the evidence for god in a court of law, well then certainly your case would be allowed to go forward. But if those of us for the prosecution brought in our bought-and-paid-for scientific experts to counter your eyewitnesses, your case might be put in great difficulty.
No – you’d still probably win. But only in a court of law.
someonesaygrace
Yes, it’s difficult to see how it would survive if people didn’t think it worked for them in some way. People think all sorts of strange things.
But you said that “religion (…) works pretty well”; that’s a different claim, and I addressed that one.
Indeed. That’s why I described your post as being “carefully crafted to suggest that somehow I’m a creationist.”
I didn’t suggest anything like “totally unsupported.” Many instances are supported to a greater or lesser extent, but not often scientifically. Can the gospels (canonical or otherwise) be treated as historical at all? The vast majority of historians apparently say they can. You seem to disagree, if I’m understanding you correctly. Moreover, I doubt whether much of what we take for ancient history has the kind of empirical evidence you’re demanding. How about Hannibal and his elephants? Perhaps it was a miracle….
That wasn’t the hypothetical. I proposed “good health” for precisely that reason. And besides, if your rejection of her personal testimony is predicated upon her mental health, you obviously haven’t rejected such testimony categorically.
I have no such wish. But the most carefully considered and continuously discussed view of what evidence is and how it shold be evaluated has taken place within the legal arena. If you want to look at things differently, I think you have a pretty big burden to overcome. Moreover, people also (and routinely) accept non-empirical evidence all the time. I’m highly confident you do too. Just sayin’….
And that was my point.
someonesaygrace
But not what you said :-), which was (to remind you) that religion ‘works pretty well’.
Your new point is different, but deserves some thought. Just because some people think something works for them, doesn’t automatically make it valuable or worth retaining; that much should be obvious; if it did, it would imply a 100% correlation between what people *think* works for them and what actually *does* work for them; an unlikely proposition. But if people think something works for them, should it be removed from them? Generally speaking, I don’t see why it should, in a free society, as long as it isn’t doing them any harm, or anybody else any harm. Perhaps that was your point? Much private religious practice falls into this category (no harm), so I don’t see why it should be affected by the demands of atheists, which are predominantly restricted to the public sphere. In any case, atheists aren’t looking to wipe religion or superstition off the planet, in my experience. OK, perhaps the odd one is, but that’s unreasonable.
Of course, we are presented with many examples of the *harm* caused by religious practices that society has a duty to prevent, I’m sure you would agree. In fact, it often *does* prevent these harms, through legislation and common law, but secularists think there is more work to do on this front. It’s difficult to disagree with that assessment.
Which, in my view, is a distinction without a difference.
I agree.