The limits of ironism
Thought for the day, from Owen Flanagan’s The Problem of the Soul (no, he doesn’t think there is such a thing as the soul).
“As for my ironist friends who think that science is no more objective than any other way of thinking, I have observed in most of them a fairly deep ignorance about science. Being around intellectuals who know almost nothing about science does not particularly bother me, except when they pronounce on the nature of science. My view is that if you are going to claim that all forms of discourse are equally subjective, you better have real familiarity with all the forms of discourse you aim to level.” p. 54
Well, it sounds good at first. But it also seems to me to veer close to those detractors of Richard Dawkins who label him unqualified to comment on the existence of God until he knows the details of “sophisticated” theological thought.
On the other hand, “familiarity” doesn’t have to imply detailed knowledge; it’s totally feasible that Dawkins and other atheist commentators are far more familiar with current theological debate than Flanagan’s friends are with science.
I cross paths with Dr. Flanagan every now and again. Perhaps next time I’ll ask him what he thinks of Dr. Dawkins’s qualifications to dis theology.
My favourite response to “different ways of knowing” has always been well how are they different: stumps them every time.
What’s worse, there is no excuse at all for this sort of sloppy thinking and rubbish about “different ways”.
Robert Pirsig flattened that load of codswallop way back in “Zen and the Art of…”
Where he clearly defines, that for difficult, intractible problems, it is time for the formal notebook and the scientific method.
Slow, painstaking, difficult, and works every time.
IIRC, he likened it to a heavy-industrial bulldozer, eradicating all obstacles.
Kallan:
Does it really stump them? A typical answer seems to be: “Science answers the ‘how’ questions, while religion answers the ‘why’ questions. That’s how they’re different.”
So instead of asking them *how* they’re different, maybe next time you should ask them *why* they’re different ;)
‘But it also seems to me to veer close to those detractors of Richard Dawkins who label him unqualified to comment on the existence of God until he knows the details of “sophisticated” theological thought.’
Really? Why? I would say it’s the opposite sort of thought, as opposed to being ‘close.’ Theological thought, however sophisticated, is still about making stuff up. Science isn’t, and the ways it isn’t are very detailed and (as it were) information-rich. There really is something (a lot, in fact) to know about science, and what there is to know is relevant to understanding what science can know. None of that applies to theology as a way to know stuff about god.
For the most part, Dawkins does not criticize the “sophisticated” beliefs held within the ivory tower, but rather attacks beliefs found among the general citizen body. Others, more learned in the centuries-long discourse about the Emperor’s Feathered Hat, have written their own books about the vacuity of theology (Avalos’s The End of Biblical Studies is one example). Good as they are, on their own terms, nobody reads them.
The situation with regard to the sciences is different. In science, the only thing to discuss is the “elite” level of knowledge.
Theological thought, however sophisticated, is still about making stuff up. Science isn’t.
I agree with that, but would OF argue that we need to know the “substance” of theology before making that judgment?
Actually, I just reread his quote and realized he’s suggesting familiarity for those who are saying all forms of discourse are equally subjective. So I guess for those of us who think theology is more subjective (or more to the point, just making stuff up) are in the clear. Which is good, since I don’t want to know details about the competing theories of the nature of God’s will any more than I want to watch documentaries about paint drying.
Oh good, the italics tags worked.
Blake, it’s been a while since I’ve read The God Delusion or much else by Dawkins on religion, but I thought he did criticize the “sophisticated” stuff.
That is to say, I seem to recall something about how all that crap about a God of Transcendence or a Universal Consciousness or whatever is meaningless if said God’s thoughts/actions are undetectable. So while the non-personal God ideas are not as harmful as man-in-the-street’s God ideas, they still oughtn’t be taught in schools as though they have any relation to the truth.
But maybe I’m projecting, because so many others have made the same point that it seems Dawkins must have as well.
I don’t know if I agree with your last point either, Blake, but I’ll have to come back to that another time.
I agree with that, but would OF argue that we need to know the “substance” of theology before making that judgment?
I doubt it–because OF is talking about the methods of science, the methods that make it less subjective, rather than the actual content of science.
So a parallel statement would be that Dawkins should be familiar with the methods of those who believe in God (not necessarily their specific claims) before declaring that their belief in God is absurd.
Which I think is reasonable, and I think Dawkins is fairly familiar with the methods of the majority of people who believe in God.