Ontology or epistemology
Chris Mooney says why compatibilism matters via a discussion of Robert Pennock’s testimony at the Kitzmiller trial and Judge Jones’s decision.
Jones and Pennock describe science, and its “ground rule” of methodological naturalism, as an inquiry into the workings of the natural world–one assuming the existence of natural laws that we can discern, and naturalistic processes that we can measure and describe. But, they add, there science basically ends. Is there a “supernatural” that is somehow beyond or outside of nature? Science just can’t say.
Why can’t science say? Because a “supernatural” that is somehow beyond or outside of nature is by definition beyond or outside anything we can meaningfully inquire into: ‘meaningfully’ in the sense of being able to get real results. The reasons science can’t say are the reasons no one can say. It’s not as if science can’t say but some other kind of inquiry or investigation or examination can. There is no discipline or branch of knowledge that can say. That which is outside or beyond is outside or beyond – so we know nothing about it. That means all of us – not just scientists, but all of us.
People can of course believe anything they want to about that which is outside or beyond – but that’s not the same thing as being able to say. I think people who say ‘science can’t say’ often tend to blur that distinction, whether deliberately or not. I think saying ‘science can’t say’ leaves an impression that non-science can say, which is mistaken.
Pennock’s testimony, a key basis for all this, draws a core distinction between such methodological naturalism on the one hand, and “philosophical naturalism” (or atheism) on the other. The latter is a stronger view, and goes beyond the limits of science to claim that the natural is all there is, period. This view may well be true; indeed, I personally believe it to be true. But it is a philosophical view, not a scientific one.
Not exactly. Atheism doesn’t necessarily or always claim that the natural is all there is; atheism doesn’t even necessarily or always claim that there is no God; atheism can be and often is just non-theism, which needn’t say anything so definite as that the natural is all there is. Furthermore, even more assertive atheism, or ‘strong’ atheism, doesn’t necessarily claim that the natural is all there is; it often contents itself with pointing out that the natural is all we can know anything about.
In truth I’m not really sure how philosophical naturalism fits here – I’m not sure whether or not it’s true that philosophical naturalism does necessarily say as a matter of definition that the natural is all there is, period, or whether it says simply that we (humans, stuck here in nature) don’t and can’t know anything about the non-natural. I don’t know if its claims are ontological or epistemological. But frankly I’m a little skeptical that many people are philosophical naturalists of the type who say the natural is all there is, period. I suspect that the vast majority say simply that no one knows, and perhaps further that, by definition, no one can know.
Does it matter? Yes, I think so. I think it’s at least possible that if Chris and other accommodationists could take it on board that most atheists and philosophical naturalists don’t actually claim that the natural is all there is, period, but rather that anything beyond nature is beyond us so we simply can’t know anything about it – then there might be less worry about strategy. Because the next bit of Chris’s argument goes:
Crucially, such logic suggests that it is most emphatically possible to accept the results of science’s naturalistic methodology, and yet also retain supernatural beliefs that science cannot touch.
But that’s still true with philosophical naturalism if it is as I have described it. It’s perfectly possible to know that one can’t know X and still believe X. It’s a constant battle, to be sure, and there’s no guarantee that atheists and naturalists won’t always be saying ‘But there’s no good reason to believe that’ – but that’s life as a grown-up, isn’t it.
Barbara Forrest says that methodological naturalism is procedural and epistemological, while philosphical naturalism is metaphysical claims built upon the findings of methodological naturalism.
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/barbara_forrest/naturalism.html
I hope it’s OK to do a cross-post of a comment I put on Richard Dawkins’ site. I was dearly hoping OB would do a Note and Comment on this (I’m so glad you did), but I got my dander up at Dawkin’s site first.
For context, a commentor at Dawkins’ site was pointing out that accomodationism has been tried for. . . thousands of years and it hasn’t worked. I replied:
I’d appreciate everyone’s thoughts.
Firstly, I don’t think you actually represent ‘accomodationism’ very well. Much as I feel like spitting over that anti-abortionist killer, I can’t help but feel a touch of accomodationism would have done him and his victim good.
It just stops being CALLED accomodationism when its so far over the potential range of behaviours. You choose, you set the limit for yourself. The Party Line isn’t consistent, so people will accomodate to you as you place yourself in their mental map of the world – there will always be many more and many less overt out there, you just choose if you want to be taken as a grown-up with his own views and communicate accordingly. Others respond as they choose, and you live with that.
Hope it works out.
Whom are you referring to, ChrisPer? Who is the “you” in your statement? Who are you asking to respond to you?
I’m putting up my hand as someone who denies the existence of gods and spooks. Not that there’s a knock-down argument against them successful against all comers. Still, by now we have good reason to draw the inference that (probably) these things just don’t exist.
But even if some kind of powerful spook does exist, we have plenty of reason to think that it’s not much like the Abrahamic God. Furthermore, those reasons are based on what we know about the world. And much of THAT comes from science.
And even if I’m wrong on all the above (though I’d have a lot to say to support it), bodies such as the NAS shouldn’t be taking a position on whether I’m right or wrong. These are issues where there is legitimate substantive disagreement. It’s the taking of stances by science bodies, the injunctions to shut up by various people, and so on, that is especially annoying.
It’s late, and perhaps I’m just feeling crotchety. But it seems to me that philosophical naturalism is simply a red herring in these contexts, because those who brings up philosophical naturalism in contradistinction to methodological naturalism as an objection to atheism (of any stripe) always accuse philosophical naturalists of taking said position as an assumption. But it isn’t, and it never has been. Philosophical naturalism is the conclusion that many have reached based on specific chains of evidence and reasoning which start only with the minimally necessary operating assumption of methodological naturalism: It is from the basis of methodological naturalism that many people arrive at philosophical naturalism as the conclusion of an argument, rather than it being the starting point.
And philosophical naturalism is not just the conclusion of an argument in some abstract, theoretical sense; but rather is the conclusion of particular arguments made by various people which are of course open to objections – if the opposition had any objections to offer. But they don’t. So instead, they freely accuse philosophical naturalists who make arguments for that conclusion to be taking the conclusion as an assumption. In my experience, they never back up this accusation with anything but empty rhetoric, nor do they develop any real counterarguments or legitimate objections to the positive argument for the conclusion of philosophical naturalism.
I’m not even arguing this: I’m stating it as an empirical claim, based on what I’ve seen of the quality of “arguments” on this topc. Feel free to provide me a citation that proves me wrong. I’ll be waiting.
But I won’t hold my breath.
Me too, Russell…but then the way you qualify it in the second and third sentence is why there is still room for other people to [choose to] believe otherwise, if they want to. I’m arguing that that ought to be enough, and anyway it’s all anyone is entitled to. No one is entitled to the kind of room to believe that requires other people to stop disputing such beliefs.
“But it seems to me that philosophical naturalism is simply a red herring in these contexts”
That’s what I suspect too…but I’m not sure about it.
Well, there’s also the position I tend to hold.
1. I can’t be certain that there’s nothing at all “beyond nature.”
2. But there’s no reason that I should think that there is.
3. And there’s a lot of reasons to think that people who have, in the past, claimed to have reasons to believe in the existence of something “beyond nature” were extremely wrong.
4. Looking at everything as a whole, I am justified in concluding that there is nothing “beyond nature.”
5. This is necessarily provisional- new arguments or information could cause me to change my conclusions.
6. But I’m relatively certain this won’t happen.
We don’t demand scientific proof for the vast majority of things we do or think or believe on a daily basis. Science may touch on how we think or behave, but it doesn’t define it. I don’t “believe” that my wife is having an affair, for example, though its possible I could be wrong. But I’m certain enough to live my life as if its 100% sure that she’s not. My skepticism about things “beyond nature” is the same.
This gap between actual 100% certainty and functional 100% certainty is often exploited by the religious as a way to argue that everything is faith. Which is dumb, of course. More realistically its just a part of everyday life. There’s of course a big difference between “I can’t quite prove this 100%, but I have enough that I’m convinced,” and “I’m going to choose to believe this even though I don’t have a real reason I should.”
Yes…and in reality the fact that there’s no good reason looms a lot larger than the lack of certainty.
But then when the issue becomes people wanting to hang on to the possibility of believing whatever they wanna – well what can one say but ‘sure, you can – go right ahead.’ We just draw the line at agreeing that it’s reasonable.
I think that the ‘red herring’ may be “methodological naturalism,” not philosophical naturalism. Is there really such a thing as “methodological naturalism” actually built into the structure of science.
I think that science today proceeds on the assumption that there are no supernatural forces for the same reason that modern chemistry proceeds on the assumption that water doesn’t have a special way to remember what’s been in it when you shake a stick at it, and modern astronomy proceeds on the assumption that the movements of the planets are not secret messages meant for us to decode. At one point, a lot of people confidently expected the evidence to go in a way it did not.
And if that changed, and strong, new evidence from well-controlled studies began to show that both homeopathy and astrology make valid predictions based on their models, then homeopathy and astrology would consequently become branches of science, and would be integrated into the rest of the disciplines.
There’s nothing in the methods of science — which are designed to catch subjective errors — which rule out the supernatural upfront, or even make a distinction between what is and isn’t natural, and what can and can’t be studied. Depending on how it’s defined — and if you define it in the way the term is actually used — Science could confirm the ‘supernatural.’ It just didn’t, and doesn’t. Homeopathy and astrology would both bring magical forces into science, and an enchanted Nature is equivalent to Nature — with a Supernatural element (or, perhaps, a Supernatural reality, with a Natural aspect.)
The force of apologetics, then, has to go into taking anything conceivably demonstrable out of God, and making “God exists” into untestable, value-laden, non-scientific statements similar to saying “It’s nice to be nice” or “I love my mother.”
I think this only goes so far before it, too, becomes atheism.
Depending on how it’s defined indeed. As soon as I start discussing it I always wonder exactly what people mean by it anyway – it’s supposed to be outside and beyond and yet everyone can make claims and announcements about it. Well which is it?! It’s a pretty incoherent concept, as far as I can tell.
Well put, Sastra & OB! Naturalism, however defined, is just plain where evidence and arguments leads us. Supernaturalism is that from which some people don’t want to be led by evidence and arguments, no matter how much weight they clearly have.
Still, what makes the discussion of these issues so irritating is the rhetorical trick by which the conclusions of evidence and argument are accused of being unwarranted and overreaching assumptions by people who damned well know better, like Chris Mooney. Humbug!