Yes it is too so a question for science
In a high school biology class.
“Can anybody think of a question science can’t answer?”
“Is there a God?” shot back a boy near the window.
“Good,” said Mr. Campbell, an Anglican who attends church most Sundays. “Can’t test it. Can’t prove it, can’t disprove it. It’s not a question for science.”
Can test it if it’s the kind of God that pokes around in our world. Is a question for science if it causes people to win sprints and get sick and get well and survive hurricanes.
PZ is on the case.
I despise that chicken-hearted answer. There are two reasonable ways to address that. One is to accept the usual open-ended, undefined vagueness of the god entity and point out that the reason it can’t be answered is that it is a bad question — it’s not even wrong. Science doesn’t answer it, but then no discipline can, because it’s a garbage question like “what color are invisible elephants?” If that’s what window-boy intends with his petty little gotcha, he deserves to have the inanity of his idea disparaged.
The other approach is to pin the question down. What god? What actions has it taken in the natural world? How does it influence us specifically? Then you can tackle that god with science by testing the purported effects it has. A potentially falsifiable or verifiable god is a legitimate target of scientific investigation…of course, that kind of god seems to vanish as soon as it is scrutinized, and its advocates rapidly fall back on the not-even-wrong version of a deity.
Just so.
I do wish – forlornly – there weren’t such a torrent of goddy nonsense in the US presidential campaign. I know that’s asking for the moon, but I do wish. I wish Obama didn’t have to ‘reach out’ to the godbotherers.
Russell Blackford is putting together a book of essays on not believing in God. I’m one of the contributors and I sent my essay off today.
You could argue that the existence of anything at all–the fact that there’s something instead of nothing–implies a “god” in the sense of a first cause. This would be a deistic rather than theistic god, and its existence would be deduced in a scientific way.
One could argue that, yes. But I fail to see how one could construe it as a scientific argument. What is the hypothesis? What are some competing hypotheses, even one? Where is the evidence that supports the “god” hypothesis and eliminates competing hypotheses?
I’m not even sure there is an actual argument which starts with this question, only pseudo-arguments. “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is just another malformed and misleading question, possibly the most ill-formed question ever. As PZ said, it’s not even wrong.
“Why” is ambiguous. It can be a causal question: “What caused this to happen?” Or it can be a intentional/teleological question: “For what purpose or intention (and whose) did this happen?” I’ll look at each in order.
The causal version of “Why is there something rather than nothing?” really amounts to asking, in some way or another, “What caused the universe to exist?” But there is no coherent meaning to attach to any conception of ‘being’ or ‘existing’ except occupying some volume of space-time: Nothing can simply BE, it must be someplace, somewhen. So asking questions which assume something exists outside of or in addition to the universe – that is, outside of the framework of space-time within which things can intelligibly be said to exist – is a non-starter, literally a nonsensical question.
Or, phrased differently, there is no conception of causation I’ve ever encountered – in ordinary language or in the mathematical language of physics – that is not temporal. So the question “What caused space-time?” is, again, a non-starter. Space-time is the framework within which causation occurs, and outside of that framework the concept of causation cannot be imposed or assumed – or even made sense of. How can a cause come before an effect if there is no before and after? Asking “What caused space-time?” is like asking “What home runs baseball?” Baseball is a game defined by and operating within a set of rules, and a home run is a game event defined by those rules. You can’t knock the set of rules which define what a home run is out of the ballpark when you’re at bat!
Interpreted as a causal question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is a physic question masquerading as metaphysics. Real physics, especially cosmology, is difficult to discuss coherently in any language but mathematics. It’s hard to discuss in that language, too, of course – but at least one starts with defined terms that can be related to each other in coherent, consistent ways!
(And before someone brings it up, Bell’s Theorem and the like won’t help with such problems. Rather the opposite, since quantum mechanics makes a hash of the concept of causation that all first cause arguments rely upon.)
The intentional/teleological interpretation of “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is even worse, since it simply presupposes that there IS an intention or purpose for the universe – which is exactly what is at issue in every argument where the question is posed in this way. This constitutes possibly the most transparent instance of question-begging in the history of ideas. Unfortunately, this bad question exploits human psychology, which is very, very prone to looking for intentions and purposes. After all, our brains have been shaped by selection for social interaction, where keen skill in divining motivations and intentions is a key survival (and reproduction) trait.
No matter how you slice it, “First Cause” turns out to be just another one of those open-ended, undefined, infinitely vague god concepts on which people expend a great deal of hope and hot air, but no critical thinking at whatsoever.
Until physicists come up with something better, the notion that universes are just the kinds of things that happen will have to do. At least, that perspective is quite a bit more parsimious and less question-begging than imagining a magic loving invisible sky-daddy what made it all happen – or even a distant, not particularly loving, ill-defined deistic clock-maker what made it all happen.
On which note, it occurs to me that I think I can answer that pesky question I started with, however ill-formed it may be.
Why is there something rather than nothing?
*shrug*
Universes happen.
If that answer doesn’t satisfy, I have an even better one.
Why is there something rather than nothing?
Why not?
G:
Another great comment, but… not another baseball reference!!! Why is it that American academics just *love* using baseball as an analogy for pretty much everything (and when baseball doesn’t work, American football sure will)? S.J. Gould spent 55 pages of his Full House referring to baseball as support for his statistical argument. Richard Dawkins, in his review of the book, expressed “a mild protest on behalf of those readers who live in that obscure and little known region called the rest of the world”.
He further invites Americans to imagine that he spun out a whole chapter in the following vein: “The home keeper was on a pair, vulnerable to anything from a yorker to a chinaman, when he fell to a googly given plenty of air. Silly mid on appealed for leg before, Dicky Bird’s finger shot up and the tail collapsed. Not surprisingly, the skipper took the light. Next morning the night watchman, defiantly out of his popping crease, snicked a cover drive off a no ball straight through the gullies and on a fast outfield third man failed to stop the boundary … etc. etc.”
Cricket and baseball are non-overlapping magisteria. Perhaps we can hand religious questions over to baseball metaphors and reserve the use of cricket metaphor for studies of consciousness, to which it is better suited.
I’m far from an expert on the philosophy of science, but from what I can see, there isn’t any more evidence for the existence of God than for the affirmation that Plato is still alive. However, Obama may genuinely believe in God.
“So asking questions which assume something exists outside of or in addition to the universe – that is, outside of the framework of space-time within which things can intelligibly be said to exist – is a non-starter, literally a nonsensical question.”
Actually, people are asking these kinds of questions in physics nowadays.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7440217.stm
(“Time before the big bang” seems to be a misnomer, since our “time” did not exist “yet”.)
I agree with Ophelia and PZ, but I also sympathize with the teacher. He’s probably discovered that ruling out God questions through a version of the “non-overlapping magisteria” argument is the only way to teach his course without it devolving into constant arguing with creationist students.
“Russell Blackford is putting together a book of essays on not believing in God. I’m one of the contributors and I sent my essay off today.”
Good luck, OB! I am sure RB and his co-author will derive as much enjoyment from your writings – as we do here at B&W.
Obama may genuinely believe in God, but he’s certainly intelligent enough to know that (to put it at a minimum) there are plenty of good reasons not to believe in God and that therefore (as well as for other reasons) political candidates ought not to assume that belief in God is either universal or morally superior.
“I agree with Ophelia and PZ, but I also sympathize with the teacher. He’s probably discovered that ruling out God questions through a version of the “non-overlapping magisteria” argument is the only way to teach his course without it devolving into constant arguing with creationist students.”
Of course, the article also demonstrates the fundamental problem with NOMA, which is that the religious refuse to stay inside the boundaries. cf. the kid muttering “well I didn’t come from an ape” and his before-school propaganda meetings telling him not to believe his teacher’s secular lies.
I posted this at Pharyngula, but at comment no. 400+ it will be more visible here.
A modest proposal:
Make an alliance with the math teacher. Have him post or distribute the following verses:
1Ki 7:23.
And he made a molten sea, ten cubits from the one brim to the other: [it was] round all about, and his height [was] five cubits: and a line of thirty cubits did compass it round about.
2Ch 4:2
Also he made a molten sea of ten cubits from brim to brim, round in compass, and five cubits the height thereof; and a line of thirty cubits did compass it round about.
If any Xians can pass a basic geometry test, point out the contradiction.
This suggests a T-shirt design:
Is the Bible inerrant?
π ≠ 3
John,
Would those be interior or exterior measurements? How thick was the material?
On PZ’s thread a commenter suggested that if the science teacher had decided to argue that god can be demonstrated not to exist – whatever arguments he used – he would be negating our right to object when another teacher used his position to push his religious views.
I don’t know how the separation of church and state works on the ground in US schools, if indeed it does, but a teacher actually arguing for atheism (as distinct from presenting valid evidence which might lead enquiring minds there) is something I would find questionable.
All of which is moot, as I gather the teacher was an anglican.
Is there a valid distinction between arguing for atheism and, say, 1. asking for evidence when people say God exists or 2. saying there is no good evidence that God exists?
I don’t particularly think teachers should argue for atheism, just out of the blue, as it were. But if they’re confronted by students who announce that God exists…are they being intrusive or impertinent if they ask questions?
I suppose I’m saying I think the classroom should be secular, and if pious students make it unsecular, then that changes the rules.
It’s a tricky one, OB. I believe that teaching critical thinking should be a bigger part of the curriculum, as early as possible, and that a direct question should be answered honestly. But to advocate a position vis a vis religious belief is not a teacher’s job.
Hell, I even check with the parents before I tell them there’s no Santa Claus. ( My favourite part of Year Seven – you gotta love the way their little faces crumple.)
I’ve had to be quite firm about incipient proseletyizing by some of my colleagues, so I’m very careful to keep myself in check. If asked directly I say that I don’t believe it myself but some people do.
From the press reports, this guy has developed a pretty impressive teaching strategy, slightly oblique but effective. Sounds like an excellent teacher to me.
Yes but is it advocating a position to ask (in reply to a claim) for evidence for that position?
I don’t think it is.
A student says X. A teacher asks for evidence that X. The teacher is not saying not-X – the teacher is simply asking for evidence that X. That is a teacher’s job, or if it’s not it should be.
I think we get confused about this because of the exaggerated-politeness convention, the result of which is that people generally don’t ask for evidence when people say God exists, so that people who do ask for evidence seem 1. rude and 2. to be advocating a position. But neither 1 nor 2 is necessarily the case.
Saying there is no good evidence that God exists may seem closer to advocating a position, and may even be closer – but I still think it’s not all that close. (And the proximity could be further reduced by saying ‘I know of no good evidence that God exists.’)
(I agree with Julien, by the way – I sympathize with the teacher. I certainly wouldn’t want to tangle with creationist students day in and day out.)
Back to Jenavir’s first claim – I don’t think there is such a thing as ‘a “god” in the sense of a first cause.’ That ‘god’ isn’t ‘God’ – it’s not anything; it’s just a place-holder.
outside of that framework the concept of causation cannot be imposed or assumed – or even made sense of.
Fair enough–but then the natural question is “what, if anything, exists outside of that framework?”
To elaborate, G.: “Universes happen” is the kind of answer that highlights just how clueless we are. It’s a non-answer. So is “Why not?”
You could say a non-answer is an appropriate response to a non-question. But I don’t see “why/how is there anything at all?” as a non-question the way you do, because simply pointing out that causality only makes sense within the space-time continuum is just a way of saying “There is a point at which our explanatory mechanisms fail,” since our explanatory powers are dependent on the concept of causality. And that’s not enough to satisfy anyone’s curiosity.
Which doesn’t support the existence of any particular God, but does explain the popularity of the Deist hypothesis, in my view.
Except how can it explain it when it’s not an explanation? Just saying ‘the answer is: the first cause, i.e. God,’ is exactly the same as saying ‘don’t know.’ The question is ‘what caused it?’, the answer is ‘the cause’. That’s not explanatory! So the explanatory quality can’t be what explains the popularity.
It gives the illusion of explanation, was my point. It sounds like an explanation at first blush.
And, even once you realize that it’s not an explanation, it does give you a placeholder. Placeholders are analytically useful because they help identify what you don’t know.
OB: “A student says X. A teacher asks for evidence that X. The teacher is not saying not-X – the teacher is simply asking for evidence that X. That is a teacher’s job, or if it’s not it should be.”
It IS the teacher’s job BUT only if X or not-X is relevant to material being covered.
Actually, Jenavir, I think placeholders are the very opposite of useful when they actively conceal what you don’t know. When you admitted – correctly, I think – that terms like ‘first cause’ or vague deistic conceptions of god give the illusion of explanation without actually explaining anything, I think you also necessarily admitted that one of the results (I would argue, one of the *intended* results) of using such terms/concepts as a placeholder is to hide our ignorance behind the label, not to identify or demarcate what we don’t know.
Worse, using the word “God” – even using it in the denuded, naturalistic way that someone like Einstein used it – invites everyone to mislead themselves even further by filling in whatever they are inclined to attach to the word “God” in place of the supposed placeholder for ignorance. It practically begs people to fill in gaps in their knowledge with whatever they imagine rather than earnestly seeking answers.
Aside from replacing ignorance with such imaginings, god concepts – including various pseudo-philosophical synonyms like “Uncaused Cause” and “Unmoved Mover” – actively preserve ignorance rather than simply marking its place. Historically, every invocation of ‘God’ or another essentially god-like notion is a science stopper – or, more broadly, an inquiry stopper: Once you invoke the deity, further questions are discouraged. You don’t question God, He speaks to you or doesn’t as He wills. Deities are ineffable and move in mysterious ways and exceed our understanding and all that rot, doncha know.
If the word “God” is just a placeholder for our ignorance, it’s a placeholder that seems awfully determined to keep hold of that place, and to fill it in with unsupported nonsense at every opportunity
In contrast, my non-answers to the metaphysical “Why is there something…” question are, while admittedly snarky, intended specifically to encourage further inquiry in two ways: First, my answers turn the conversation back on the question, suggesting that the question itself is problematic and should be re-thought before trying to answer it. Second, my answers very clearly point to the truth that we simply don’t know the answer, or even how to answer. A clear statement of ignorance is much better than a placeholder for ignorance that in practice serves to preserve and gloss over the ignorance, or fill it in with pretended knowledge.
Take the answer “Universes happen.” That answer isn’t intended to satisfy anyone’s curiosity, but only to call the question into question. The natural response might be, “Yeah, but HOW do universes happen. What does it even mean for a universe to just ‘happen’?”
Those are good questions, I think – questions that don’t smuggle in any assumptions about cause and effect, or even more egregious and unmotivated assumptions about purpose and intention. Those are the sorts of questions cosmologists can try to formulate clearly, to generate hypotheses about, and to look for evidence that could distinguish between competing hypotheses.
I had not intended to say that all questions in this whole area of inquiry are inherently useless: I argued pretty specifically that sloppy, misleading questions along these lines are worse than useless – they have negative value. I brought up physics and cosmology because I think there are more intelligible and interesting versions of those sorts of questions, questions for which I can imagine finding answers someday.
“It gives the illusion of explanation, was my point.”
Well it may have been your point, but it’s not the point you made – if you mean the illusion of explanation you have to say that, because there’s a huge difference between an explanation and the illusion of explanation – and it wasn’t self-evident that you meant the latter!
“And, even once you realize that it’s not an explanation, it does give you a placeholder. Placeholders are analytically useful because they help identify what you don’t know.”
Placeholders are useful if they help identify what you don’t know, yes, but they don’t do that if they give you the illusion that you do know. A helpful placeholder would make it clear that you don’t know, while using ‘God’ as a placeholder does the exact opposite – as you just said. In short, how can the illusion of an explanation serve as a placeholder that identifies what you don’t know?
(I wrote that before reading further – I haven’t read G’s reply yet but from a glance in scrolling I have a feeling he says the same thing.)
Yeah. What G says.
It’s funny what a lot of work the mere word ‘God’ does – how much the mere 3 letters in the right order contribute to that illusion of an explanation. Imagine saying the placeholder for the question ‘what is the cause that there is something rather than nothing?’ is ‘Mr Smith.’ It doesn’t have the same power of illusion, does it. Yet we grant that power to the mere name ‘God.’ Why? No real reason, actually. Lots of silly reasons, but no good ones. Very odd.
I disagree with you on what the term “God” does. I think the people who use it as a placeholder know quite well what they’re doing…and those who take advantage of the god-terminology to suggest a belief in an all-powerful figure in the sky are doing so DELIBERATELY, not out of an honest mistake.
And, G., frankly, I don’t care if people use this placeholder-God as an endpoint of inquiry rather than a beginning-point–so long as they don’t get in the way of the physicists and cosmologists who wish to use it as a beginning-point. Most people aren’t going to be physicists and cosmologists. So if they choose to accept this placeholder as an ultimate answer, then I see nothing wrong with it, even if it’s not scientific by any means. We can’t all have scientific curiosity about everything and there’s no reason why we should.
There’s no reason why we should? None at all? That’s a very sweeping statement, and a rather incurious one. The whole thing is incurious – ‘I don’t care,’ ‘I see nothing wrong with it,’ ‘there’s no reason why we should’ – it’s all just a big ‘so what?’. Not a very interesting contribution.
I can’t say I’ve much sympathy for the “pseudo-answers are good enough for the masses as long as WE still have curiosity” approach. It reminds me uncomfortably of those atheists who argue that religion is good or even *necessary*.