The theist four-step
There’s something called the atheist two-step. Maybe so, but there is also a theist four-step.
1) There is a god. 2) It is good. 3) It wants us to be good in a particular way. 4) We have reliable knowledge of 1-3.
In a way 4) can be seen as the clincher – the least likely of all and the most dangerous of all. It’s 4) that produces these bastards dropping cement blocks on the faces of teenage girls and shooting women government ministers in the head and executing ‘apostates’ and ‘blasphemers.’ If only people could be content to believe 1-3 and realize that 4) is just out of the question, and deadly as well as presumptuous – the world would be a much better place.
1) There is a philatelist god.
2) It’s very good at philately.
3) It wants us to be good at it.
4) We know all this because humans have been producing stamps for centuries, and continue to do so.
So keep on licking.
5) One must have detailed knowledge of 1-3 that is known by 4 in order to reject 4.
Therefore, you must accept 4.
The cincher is not so much 4) by itself but rather how 4) relates to 3) – at least as far as deadliness and presumptuousness is concerned. Seeing as I am not a moral relativist, I do subscribe to the notion that “we should be good in a particular way”, i.e. no murdering and maiming, etc. The perceived origins of a moral system is, to me, irrelevant to the validity of the moral precepts constained. I am unconvinced by either utilitarianism or evolutionary accounts of morality – but I’m happy to agree with the morals of the person holding them. I think it is perfectly possible to hold both 3) and 4) if “good in a particular way” is used to refer to that set of general, moral precept which I would believe to have universal validity (i.e. no specific, scriptural revelation of morals).
Possibly, you were thinking of the same when you added “in a particular way”, i.e. particular revelation of morality combined with hostility to particular sectors of humankind. In that case, I don’t think I’d disagree with you.
I’m not sure I agree with your final sentence, though. Religious ideologies encouraging oppression and murder are as much as a product of their societies as a producer of them, and specifically non-religious ideologies justifying such have been around as well. Religion is not a necessary and sufficient condition for ideologically-motivated atrocities (then again, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions in human history).
“and specifically non-religious ideologies justifying such have been around as well. Religion is not a necessary and sufficient condition for ideologically-motivated atrocities (then again, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions in human history).”
Communalism – or any ideology regarding groups based on gender, class, allegiance as the primary subjects of rights and moral duties – would seem to be a prime culprit.
Which is one of the reasons “Communism” clssifies as a religion.
Apart from having holy books (The works of Marx, and – insert appropriate subsequent prophet here) which are known to be wrong, but we’re going to believe in them anyway ….
I think you get the idea?
By ‘in a particular way’ I meant to imply the arbitrary quality – that God wants us to be good in a sense defined by God – but then I suppose I should have qualified 2). 2) should perhaps be ‘God is “good”‘ or ‘God is good (according to God’s definition of good, which is not necessarily ours).
As for the final sentence, though…I think dropping 4) would at least get rid of some theocratic nastiness.
Yes, but 4 is an essential article of the faith probably ranked at 2 not 4 so you are, as many Australians say, bugg–ed.
Thinking about why the results of christianity are so benefitical and inoffpensive compared with say Offler the Crocodile God, I have to conclude that the selectivity of teaching is very high. Values are a selective filter on what scriptures are taught, and tradition and consensus manage values with reference to the book.
Using the OT to validate extermination of the murder cultists operating in some areas of the world would be easy to imagine, but somehow doesn’t happen. The consensus on Christian ideals is too strong. Those ideals despite not being lived up to, remain the measure against which our behaviour is tested. Watchman Nee put it that Christ is the normal Christian life.
I think there is an astonishing difference between the anti-Christian attitudes here (eg equating modern christianity with women-killing fascisms of other cultures/religions) and my observation of Christians living, teaching and talking – their lives as examples.
Anyway, keep up the good works.
BTW, the four-step post is succinct, clear and in my opinion a real contribution to the debate. Well done.
G.T. you are not going to convince anyone that comunism is a religion,I shall refrain from using the cat analagy!
I agree with Richard, sort of. It’s not so much that communism is religion, it’s that communism is a rigid ideology hostile to critical thinking – just like the vast majority of religious traditions.
No, Communism is not a religion. It just shares all the features of religion we secularists and atheists are most concerned about. The fluffy-bunny, feel-good aspects of religion don’t really raise any hackles around here. We’re not concerned about Utilitarians and Buddhists oppressing women, undermining secular government, or insisting that the rest of us treat every implausible belief they hold for epistemically questionable reasons as a sacred truth deserving of great respect (when by “respect” they mean reverence that forbids any disagreement, or even vigorous questioning). But the type of religious certainty captured by OB’s step 4 is exactly what is missing from the outlooks of Utilitarians and Buddhists, and is otherwise very common among theists.
And, interestingly, if you insert Communist claims about historical necessity and class conflict in for steps 1-3, step 4 is still the real problem.
Not to flog a deceased equine, but it’s not religion per se that’s the problem: The problem is faith. Going around believing things that one has no good reasons to believe is BAD, full stop.
And, incidentally, that post about the atheist two-step is total crap. If theists would stop equivocating wildly about the meaning of the word “God,” atheists would finally have some minimal reason to take the claims of theologians more seriously. But ordinary believers manifestly and undeniably do NOT believe in the abstract metaphysical, (possibly) rationally defensible deity that theologians (and theists who wish to avoid atheist criticisms) babble on about – so atheists are in fact addressing what the overwhelming majority of theists believe. Moreover, most atheists are quite careful to point out that this everyday concept of God is the one that they are addressing, so the argument that they are pulling this two-step is something that anyone who actually READS WHAT THEY SAY would know is false – if they were honest, which is a vanishingly rare trait amongst apologists. (Examples: Everyone who has ever said Dawkins needs to pay more attention to theology.)
More tellingly, as far as I can determine the vast majority of theologians themselves don’t really believe in the abstract notions of God they talk about in books and papers. When writing as scholars, they spout on about process theology and the simultaneous immanence and transcendence of God and whatnot – but outside the context of academic writing, they profess the same incoherent and self-contradictory mish-mash of theological concepts that other “less sophisticated” believers do. I know that this is true of Plantinga & Polkinghorne, two of the most oft-mentioned heroes of the “You’re not taking theology seriously enough!” whiners.
Here’s a hint, theists. If you really believed these abstract theological concepts of God, you would not in fact be able to call yourself a Christian by any reasonable definition thereof. You would not be able to accept the Nicene Creed, just for starters. And if you do accept the Nicene Creed (or even just parts of it), then you do not in fact adhere to some abstract Deist/process theology/ pantheist/ whatever concept of God.
In short: You can’t have it both ways, assholes.
Andrew Sullivan has demonstrated this wonderfully concise piece of erroneous thinking in an even more concise manner here: http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2007/05/not_making_this.html
He says in answer to the question ‘what’s so great about Christianity?’: “Er: that it’s true?”
I particularly like the question mark. Why ask a question when you know the answer?
If all ideology is now religion, I am off to join the church of the Miltonite monetarists (where the manna trickles down from heaven).
Since we are talking about religion, I will quote the “authority” of Bertrand Russell that communism is a religion – which I only found out about after i had worked this out for my self.
And communism is VERY prone to error 4.
I would agree with previous posters that the steps 3 – 4 are where it all goes horribly cactus-shaped ( covered in spines, and not nice if it touches you )
Incidentally, has anyone else seen this piece ( by the awful McGrath, again) …
http://www.virtueonline.org/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=6019
I would be tempted to use the l-word, but will, instead, merely remark that it is quite obvious that Mc Grath has either not read Dawkins book, or is deliberately making criticisms of things that Dawkins has not said – a classic strw-man argument, in fact.
Rockingham: “If all ideology is now religion, I am off to join the church of the Miltonite monetarists (where the manna trickles down from heaven).”
Brilliant!
G: “If you really believed these abstract theological concepts of God, you would not in fact be able to call yourself a Christian by any reasonable definition thereof.”
So true!
Tingey:
L-word? Love, lust, logic, Lenin, labor, language, life, logos? Whatever could you be referring to?
“Therefore, you must accept 4. “
You are confusing understanding with acceptance.
I understand the claims of 1-3, in some detail but I do not accept that they are reliable. That is, I do not believe that any claim for them as “knowledge” is true.
A theist will understand the claims of 1-3, usually in an alarmingly vague way, and will accept that they are reliable. That is, they believe that any claim for them as “knowledge” is true.
So I do not believe that we have reliable knowledge of 1-3. This is not despite but because I have detailed understandings of the claims of 1-3.
In other words I have knowledge of the claimed knowledge but I do not acknowledge it as knowledge.
Chrisper clearly doesn’t mingle with the ‘killing-abortionists-is-justified-by-God’ brigade, then…?
;-)
And here’s a nice peaceful bunch of religionists demanding “respect”, complete with burning effigies, etc – only this time, it’s the Sikhs! (ah well, makes a change I suppose)
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL123670.htm
As to this “atheist two-step”…er..you’d have to be pretty thick to make such a basic mistake, surely…?
Or perhaps the blog author simply doesn’t realise what real folks out there get up to in the name of the supernaturalism he personally subscribes to…
hmmm.
ignorants is bliz
;-)
Website: http://www.becauseiamagirl.
Desire for male progeny in India/Pakistan has caused natural imbalance and numerous problems for women.
Also, unwanted touching of women in public places — this problem is known as “Eve teasing
HOW OBSCENE.
Website: http://www.becauseiamagirl.
Well, G.
Got half a mind to return the invective – but it would be out of character. But first of all: I recall being lectured by you, not very long ago, about butting in (as a theist) in a discussion about the definition of “atheist”. I distinctly recall being asked whether that was not a mite presumptuous of me. I replied that “atheist” was in use both as a identity marker and as a philosophical designation – and that in the case of the latter, it shared a semantic space with theist, agnostic, deist, etc. and that therefore I felt justified to comment.
Now, when you start lecturing people about the necessity of accepting the Nicene creed in order to count as “Christians”, you have no such excuse. Because “Christian” designates no section of a more-or-less restricted philosophical space but a historical movement designated by a number of prototypical beliefs – a lot of which are, indeed, mentioned in the Nicene creed. But it is not my, or indeed your, business to tell people whether they, on the basis of this or that specific piece of dogma, are “Christians” or not.
As for theology. The “God that ordinary religious people believe in” is a non-entity. There is no “average” concept of God among believers just as there is an average age among believers: there are just different, more or less specific, concepts of God, converging around certain prototypical ones in various varieties of religion. And ordinary religious believers have a host of different, often quite nebulous and vague, beliefs and attitudes. That is their prerogative. There is not some kind of intellectual duty to posit a perfectly defined, determinate concept of God to believe in: indeed, with concepts such as “God”, I would find doing so quite dangerous.
There is an intellectual duty to posit a more-or-less definite, abstract conception of God in theistic philosophy. Because that is the conception that can be philosophically defended. The fact that this conception is not wholly identical with the God of religion – even the religion of theologians – is irrelevant. Because religion involves a set of attitudes, including faith, as part of its stance. There is no problem here as long as the believer is aware of the rational defensibility of some things that he believes in, and the rational indefensibility of others.
Now, in criticism, you always end up targetting a specific set of beliefs – either one which has been presented by someone else, or one which has been presented by you. The latter is a perfectly respectable method, if done carefully and reflectively. Just do not pretend that it is the “real” God of “ordinary” believers, as opposed to the irrelevant one of theology.
ChrisPer, thanks!
“I have to conclude that the selectivity of teaching is very high. Values are a selective filter on what scriptures are taught, and tradition and consensus manage values with reference to the book.”
Exactly; and that filter is secular. It’s informed by intuitions and commitments and emotions (its mesh is partly made up by them, if you like) that feel religious to many people, but it’s secular all the same. But because that fact isn’t generally recognized, people who want to go that way – the Jerry Falwells – are always at liberty to say homosexuals and feminists are bad because the Bible. The filter co-exists with the basic principle that in cases of dispute God’s version of good should always trump the human one and that we [whoever we are in the particular case] know for sure – know Absolutely, as the graduate of Regent University thinks she does – what God’s version is. The fact that other people, including other theists, dispute that, doesn’t slow them down as much as it ought to – doesn’t actually slow them down at all.
One does not need to view communism as a religion to combat the standard theistic raising of Stalin as a bad man (this is now a standard rhetorical “blood libel” against atheists). The theist is basically saying that Stalin became a mass-murderer because he was too rational and too sensible. If only he had been bonkers – then these terrible things would never have happened. One wonders what stopped A J Ayer from running amok with a meat-cleaver.
On an entirely unrelated note, have you come across The Threat to Reason by Dan Hind? Having just stumbled across a description of the book, it does sound very much like a reply to Why Truth Matters. Inevitably, there’s a matching blog at: http://thethreattoreason.blogspot.com/
Merlijn, I’ve never caught you equivocating about the definition of “God,” nor accused you of it. So you are not one of the assholes I’m addressing. :-)
More seriously: It is precisely because Christianity is a historically rooted set of ideas that it is perfectly legitimate for anyone at all to point out what the label typically entails. Every self-identified Catholic, Baptist, Episcopalian, Methodist, Presbyterian, Calvinist, et cetera either directly does claim to believe the Nicene Creed or implies that they do by associating themselves (of their own free will) with a large institutional structure which publicly declares “This is what you need to believe to be a Christian (of our variety).” So THOSE PEOPLE do not have any standing to deliberately switch from the concept of God they profess on a daily (or at least weekly) basis to ANY of the uber-vague concepts of God advanced by theologians UNLESS THEY ALSO ADMIT THAT THEIR EVERYDAY CONCEPT OF GOD IS INDEED VULNERABLE TO THE CRITICISM THEY ARE TRYING TO AVOID BY DOING SO!
I am in no way saying that there is some intellectual duty to hold a clear, well-defined concept of God or some such nonsense. I never said it, never implied it, never hinted at it. Framed in the terms you are using, what I intended was this: If you profess to believe one general cluster of God concepts (however ill-defined), you shouldn’t go around citing entirely different God concepts (which you don’t really believe) in order to defend your beliefs against criticism. That’s not only equivocation, it’s blatantly hypocritical.
My anger is entirely aimed at this strategy of (1) deliberate, willful equivocation, combined with (2) criticizing atheists for not taking seriously conceptions of God that the critic him or her self doesn’t actually believe. That move, which is essentially what the entire accusation of the “atheist two-step” amounts to, is rankest hypocrisy.
If I didn’t catch people actually doing this all the damned time, it wouldn’t tick me off. And Merlijn, since I’ve never caught you doing it, or in any way indicated that I even thought you were sort of doing it, you are clearly not the target for this criticism.
Merlijn wrote: There is an intellectual duty to posit a more-or-less definite, abstract conception of God in theistic philosophy. Because that is the conception that can be philosophically defended. The fact that this conception is not wholly identical with the God of religion – even the religion of theologians – is irrelevant. Because religion involves a set of attitudes, including faith, as part of its stance. There is no problem here as long as the believer is aware of the rational defensibility of some things that he believes in, and the rational indefensibility of others.
Irrelevant? It is not only relevant, but it is central to what I’m saying: If people defend their adherence to the God of their religion (which is rationally indefensible) on the basis of some abstract philosophical conception of God (which is, or at least plausibly might be, rationally defensible), then they are doing two illegitimate things. First, there is the equivocation fallacy itself. Second, there is the AIM of the equivocation.
Believers’ actual beliefs about the existence and nature of God are, as you imply, among those which are held as a matter of faith rather than among those which are rationally defensible. You say there is no problem when people are aware of which beliefs are rationally defensible and which are not. But in reality, as most believers are not Unitarians and Buddhists and the like, the overwhelming majority of religious believers do not really separate the two, in theory or in practice. More importantly, anyone who pulls the particular argumentative maneuver I am criticizing here is deliberately conflating the two. And the deliberate conflation is where the aim of the equivocation seems to be revealed.
Believers often adhere to other beliefs which follow from or otherwise attach to their beliefs about the existence and nature of God – beliefs about how they ought to act in this world. They take those moral beliefs to follow from and be legitimated by their beliefs about God, but if their beliefs about God is rationally indefensible, then so are their moral beliefs. So the purpose of the equivocation is to illegitimately claim rational defensibility for their beliefs about God, and by implication claim rational defensibility for all the beliefs that follow from or attach to their conception of God. The whole purpose of the equivocation is to legitimate step 4! By pretending (using equivocation) that a completely indefensible article of faith is instead rationally defensible – and in fact is rationally defended by whatever argument is offered for the abstract theological conception of God on offer – people who pull this rhetorical maneuver also sneakily attempt to legitimate all the other beliefs they attach to and derive from that primary article of faith.
G.T. the fact that Russel thought comuunism a religion only proves that you are both wrong,I think G. made a fine job of pointing out(without cats)why your theory dosnt hold up,just because you say it often wont make it true!
Look at it this way a chimp has 90% of the same d.n.a. as a man,but a chimp is not a man!
“Look at it this way a chimp has 90% of the same d.n.a. as a man,but a chimp is not a man!”
And this is why a man who tells his wife that he is the man of the house and he will go out tonight whether she likes it or not cannot excuse coming home drunk in the small hours by telling her “I’m sorry dear, it’s because I’m 90% chimp”.
Or why when the faithful come out with how Jesus is their personal savior and they have a personal relationship with God they cannot then switch to a set theory-based exegesis of a possible deity as a seven-dimensional being unaffected by theodicity, infinite regress or evidence for reasons they don’t have time to explain just now.
Theology is faith’s Wookie Defense, the way Really Smart People fool themselves and impress others. There will be economic and computational theologies as well as folk and philosophical theologies. They will all serve the same psychological end.
That’s the ‘Chewbacca Defense’ dude.
Look at the monkey!
For others who wanted to know what the normally lucid G was talking about (I know I did.), here’s the explanation:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chewbacca_defense
Now I would say G is abnormally lucid.
Or, if you’ve got a couple of minutes, you could go here to see that bit of animation:
http://www.comedycentral.com/sitewide/media_player/play.jhtml?itemId=61727
It’s pretty funny, especially when you think about defenses of theism while watching.
Thank you, OB.
I like to think of myself as decidedly abnormal, and everyone who knows me comes to agree sooner or later…
;-)
G
G: Allright. Most of the gist of what you’re writing I don’t really disagree with.
Just a few remarks:
It is not only relevant, but it is central to what I’m saying: If people defend their adherence to the God of their religion (which is rationally indefensible) on the basis of some abstract philosophical conception of God (which is, or at least plausibly might be, rationally defensible), then they are doing two illegitimate things. First, there is the equivocation fallacy itself. Second, there is the AIM of the equivocation.
I’m not sure there is an equivocation fallacy going on here, as I am not sure whether the God-of-religion and the God-of-philosophy are ultimately incompatible. Rather, I would tend to see the latter as a minimalist, 3rd-person view of the former. I should be precise: I do in fact believe that the highly abstract God of Hellenistic Christian theology and the present God of religion are problematic to reconcile: but this because of the properties habitually associated with each. There is not, I believe, a necessarily illegitimate move going on here. Though I’m happy to agree the move is often illegitimate.
Move 4) is problematic – I am not sure it is necessarily illegitimate. It tends to lead to, in my opinion, wrong moral precepts, but that’s another issue. I am not sure whether morality can be ultimately founded on rationality. Now, any moral system basing itself on a literal interpretation of scripture is unlikely to have much internal coherence, and can be criticized on that basis. But I have no problem with a theistic interpretation of natural law/natural right.
Though I should add that I have no problem either with moral precepts attained through a dialogue with a giant pink elephant in a tutu dress during one’s dream – if the moral precepts are correct. A theistic interpretation of morality is of potential interest to theism, or to apologetics, but not as a justification for the morality in question.
I may seem to be nitpicking here, but the issue is hideously complex. God as a concept lies right at the edge of what we can comprehend (and many would indeed agree that we cannot). But I think this in itself is an argument for theistic philosophy to be the primary front for defense (and attack) of theism: the theistic God may be rationally defensible, but it is also open to attack (though I believe the dialogue will reveal, at best, the underlying philosophical differences of the theist and the atheist, which in itself is a useful exercise).
For this reason, I am unimpressed by theistic defenses couched in religious language, i.e. an “I-thou” version of God. Because this precisely refers to religious experience, rather than to theism as such. In as far as theology deals with the analysis of religious experience (and a lot of it does), atheists would be right to dismiss it as irrelevant to the issues they are interested in. Though I believe the field to be justified in its own right. The theistic-philosophy part of theology is a different kettle of fish, though.
“But I have no problem with a theistic interpretation of natural law/natural right.”
A thestic interpretation that claims to know what god thinks is good and what it wants us to do? Well if you don’t you ought to. That’s sinister, dangerous stuff, in my view – because it’s immune to dispute or revision, and because it’s just as open to sadistic lunatics (who are not scarce!) as it is to good people who want everyone to be compassionate.
We have no reliable knowledge of what any putative god wants us to do, and I don’t think it is ‘rationally defensible’ to claim we do. We have competing guesses and claims and stories, but that is not reliable knowledge.
“I am not sure whether morality can be ultimately founded on rationality.”
Suppose you’re right about that; your rightness wouldn’t magically transform the competing guesses and claims and stories about what the putative god wants us to do into reliable knowledge. Are you claiming that a putative need for god as a guarantor of morality somehow forces the guesses and claims and stories to stop competing and become reliable? How would that work?
“sadistic lunatics (who are not scarce!)”
I fondly recall a time when I thought they were. Sadly, the evidence shows that I was wrong.
Merlijn wrote: Move 4) is problematic – I am not sure it is necessarily illegitimate. It tends to lead to, in my opinion, wrong moral precepts, but that’s another issue. I am not sure whether morality can be ultimately founded on rationality.
Even if I am not sure that morality can be founded on rationality, I am sure that morality cannot be ultimately founded on simply choosing what to believe, or by “what one knows in one’s heart to be true” – i.e. pure inclination or emotion subject to no analysis or criticism. If moral reasoning cannot get at correct moral precepts, then it may be reasonable to throw up one’s hands about judging right and wrong. However, that would still grant no legitimacy whatsoever to any alternative (non-rational) path to moral precepts ever offered in the history of religious or theological thought. As far as I can tell, every denial of a central role for reasoning in morality has inevitably led to monstrous evil. Sometimes moral reasoning might prove flawed and lead to monstrous conclusions, but the rejection of reason will always be – and I’m willing to say has always been – much, much, much worse.
In other words, what OB said, but with more exclamation points!! ;-)
And to be perfectly honest, Merlijn, I don’t think you merely “seem to be nitpicking,” I think you are manufacturing nits out of nothing just to pick at them. The situation is not nearly as hideously complex as you make it out to be. Whether “God as a concept” – by which you seem to mean God as you conceive it, the abstract sophisticated theologian’s conception of God – actually does lie “right at the edge of what we can comprehend” or even beyond it is quite irrelevant. There’s nothing any harder to comprehend about the various current Gods-of-religion than there is to comprehend about more old fashioned gods such as Zeus and Thor and Marduk: The various Christian, Muslim, and Jewish conceptions of God are (until stripped down and gussied up by theological argument) just like all the rest of humanity’s gods except for the insistence that He’s the only one. The oh-so-difficult to conceive concepts of God you cite are simply NOT the same thing as what you have aptly termed the God-of religion, which are altogether simpler than you keep making them out to be. They may not be logically coherent or the slightest bit rationally defensible, but that does not make them difficult to comprehend: If anything, easy answers to difficult questions are usually much easier to comprehend than the difficult actual answers. The problem with them is not that they are incomprehensible – the problem is that they are false.
You say that you do not think the God-of-religion and the God-of-philosophy are necessarily incompatible. I’m immediately suspicious, not sure about how much weight you want that “necessarily” to carry. If they almost always are in fact incompatible, and if the people who pull this equivocation maneuver I’ve been criticizing are the very ones deliberately exploiting incompatible conceptions of God as I’ve accused, then what mileage are you trying to get out of possible exceptions (which surely even you would admit are rare)? People who aren’t advancing a bunch of silly propositions bolstered by an insupportable and incoherent conception of God are not the ones who pull this equivocation maneuver in response to arguments against the nature and existence of their God in the first place, so they are exceptions AT BOTH ENDS! They don’t pull this equivocation (one hopes) because they are not the targets of the arguments against which this maneuver is useful, so these hypothetical exceptions of yours are the very definition of nitpicking – rare and absolutely irrelevant.
Even without my suspicion of your use of “necessarily,” I cannot figure out what you mean with the rest of that paragraph. I’ve re-read it several times, and I still don’t see any argument or explanation of why the God-of-religion and God-of-philosophy are not truly different concepts. Not only do I have no idea what in the heck you are saying when you say you see “the latter as a minimalist, 3rd-person view of the former” – I don’t even know why you would think that I should know what the heck you mean by that. If all you mean by “minimalist” and “3rd person” is that the God-of-philosophy is stripped of all those pesky maximal and 2nd-personal qualities like the prayer-answering, soul-saving, ex-nihilo-creating, morality-dictating, miracle-performing God-of-religion – well, that’s an awful lot to take away and say that somehow they really aren’t completely different concepts. If you mean something else, you haven’t offered any clues as to what that something else might be.
You talk about the “properties associated with” the two (or more) different conceptions of God, but I repeatedly used the phrase beliefs about the existence and nature of God for a reason: Surely you’re not going to say it’s okay to separate the “properties” from the “essence” and pretend that you’re still talking about the same thing? That’s just another way of equivocating – especially if (and I’d say “when” is more likely) it turns out that nothing coherent and intelligible can be said about that essence.
If you are going to deny the accusation of equivocation, then you have to give at least some sort of account of what the various concepts of God actually have in common, and why the obvious and telling differences between the different concepts of God really don’t matter the way everyone who notes the equivocation says they do. Anything less is worse than nitpicking – it’s hand waving.
And, of course, there are problems with parts 1 – 3 of the 4-step.
Like: 1. “There is a god”.
OK, show, please?
Why is this god undetectable?
Do not pass step 1 until more evidence available ……..
And step 2.
Really?
Follow by list of natural and man-made disasters and tortures ……….
And step 3.
Says who? and why does this disagree with all the OTHER particular ways ……
( sigh ) never mind …..
“Even if I am not sure that morality can be founded on rationality, I am sure that morality cannot be ultimately founded on simply choosing what to believe, or by “what one knows in one’s heart to be true” – i.e. pure inclination or emotion subject to no analysis or criticism.”
That’s exactly what I realized later (when miles away from the computer) that I hadn’t said and should have. I don’t claim that morality can be founded on rationality alone, but I sure as hell do claim that it mustn’t be expelled. That way ‘Homosexuality is wrong because it’s a Sin’ lies. That’s how you get sacred taboos that Must Not be questioned or altered; welcome to the wonderful world of ‘honour’ killings and wives who ‘graciously’ submit to their husbands (Southern Baptist Convention). The hell with that.
OB: There are, to wit, very rational foundations for the establishment of sacred taboos and the like, it’s just that their ultimate aims are amoral (and, to you and me, immoral), i.e. the imposition of dominance of a given sector in society, the control over people through the control of their sexuality, etc.
Now, I wrote earlier that I doubt whether morality can ultimately be founded on rationality but that’s a long stretch from saying that morality and rationality are wholly divorcable. But the point I was making is germane to a specific interpretation of 4). If morality is to be based on some ultimate moral first principles, it becomes philosophically possible to come up with a theistic interpretation of those first principles. I added that this is of potential interest to theistic philosophy, but not to the valuation of the moral principles concerned. There’s a “context of discovery/context of justification” thing going on here: what one regards as the ultimate foundation to one’s ethics is, to me, irrelevant as to the valuation of those morals.
“it becomes philosophically possible to come up with a theistic interpretation of those first principles.”
Well of course it’s possible, but what of that? Is it just a random observation (theistic philosophers are interested in such things) rather than a dispute of the point at issue?
How can it be irrelevant what, say, legislators or lobbyists or pressure groups regard as the ultimate foundation of their ethics if they use a theistic foundation to justify their demands? How can it be irrelevant that, say, many people want to discriminate against gays (or women, or dalits, or infidels) for reasons that are solely theistic?
But people do not discrimate against gays, women, dalits or infidels for reasons that are solely theistic. The reason is rather the perpetuation of a social order that may be justified on theistic grounds (but not necessarily so). To be sure, they may justify discriminating practices and policies with reference to religious scripture: but this justification does not make them any more right or wrong.
The Christian Union, a small conservative protestant party, is currently taking part in Dutch government. They have, on the one hand, a very progressive approach to a lot of social issues, especially immigration – they’re just about the only party untouched by the poisoned debate on multiculturalism in the Netherlands. And they base that policy on partially religious grounds. On the other hand, they tend to be opposed to gay marriage, this too on partially religious grounds (I say partially for a reason. Both policies can be and are in practice based on a mixture of religious and secular reasoning).
The basis on which they come to these policies is irrelevant to my valuation of these policies: I support the former, and oppose the latter, regardless of whether they are motivated on religious or secular grounds.
“To be sure, they may justify discriminating practices and policies with reference to religious scripture”
They may and they do; they do it a lot; that is the whole point: if you ask them for reasons to think homosexuality (for instance) is wrong they can’t give you any that aren’t theistic, and they fall back on scripture or sin or knowing what God thinks.
“but this justification does not make them any more right or wrong.”
It doesn’t make them any more right or wrong, but it does make them impervious to change or correction or rational argument. Have you ever tried to have a rational argument with a theistically motivated homophobe? I have, and it’s both maddening and frightening. People who think that way are dangerous because they can’t change their minds, they can’t take in new information or unfamiliar ideas, and they take those incapacities to be virtues.
The point is not the valuation of the policies themselves but their revisability. Revisability is absolutely crucial. It doesn’t take much to see that! It doesn’t take much to come up with one or two bad laws human being have come up with over the past twenty or thirty centuries.
“I say partially for a reason. Both policies can be and are in practice based on a mixture of religious and secular reasoning.”
Well you’ve conceded my point then, perhaps without noticing. It’s a damn good thing it is ‘partially,’ isn’t it! Because if it weren’t, there would be no room for discussion, and that is a bad thing.
Are you evading my point on purpose or by accident?
“Well you’ve conceded my point then, perhaps without noticing. It’s a damn good thing it is ‘partially,’ isn’t it! Because if it weren’t, there would be no room for discussion, and that is a bad thing.”
I think the point you think I’m conceding is actually another one, which I “conceded” earlier when I wrote that: “I doubt whether morality can ultimately be founded on rationality but that’s a long stretch from saying that morality and rationality are wholly divorcable.”. This has nothing to do with the mixture of secular and religious reasoning one sees in practice; the question is whether there is any reasoning going on.
Note that I wrote that: “If morality is to be based on some ultimate moral first principles, it becomes philosophically possible to come up with a theistic interpretation of those first principles.” What I mean by “first principles” would be some kind of metaphysical or utilitarian notion of “good”, or, a bit more concretely, principles such as the sanctity of human life, etc. If they are to be based on religious notions (and they can be), then their inference from say scripture necessarily involves interpretation and reasoning (nevermind the embedding of those first principles into some kind of coherent moral system), and can be challenged on that basis.
Now, a principle such as “human life is sacred”, “you shouldn’t kill” – religiously or not – is dubiously revisable, and it probably should be. Another issue entirely is how such a principle manifests itself in attitudes towards the death penalty, abortion, warfare, euthanasia, etc.
I have had fruitful and intriguing discussions concerning gay marriage with opponents of it (both theistic and atheistic). I have had frustrating discussions concerning the morality of being gay with both theistically and atheistically motivated homophobes. The former discussion was open to rational argument, the latter usually not.
What do you mean note that you wrote etc? I did note that: I quoted it and asked what you meant by it.
I’ve lost any sense of what, if anything, you’re getting at; I’m not sure you’re not just putting down words for the sake of it.
There’s broadly two things I’m heading at. The first is that, to me, the underlying reasoning/revelation/etc. underlying a given moral precept is irrelevant to the valuation of it. You seem to agree – but I never said anything more than that. I never said “irrelevant, period.”
So when (23:32), I wrote: “what one regards as the ultimate foundation to one’s ethics is, to me, irrelevant as to the valuation of those morals.”, you replied: “How can it be irrelevant what, say, legislators or lobbyists or pressure groups regard as the ultimate foundation of their ethics if they use a theistic foundation to justify their demands?” In my reply (02:05), I (mistakenly) went on to expand upon my original point – which you weren’t really attacking.
Second, the kind of theistic reasoning I’m defending is something like:
Religious inspiration/Scripture –> Interpretation –> General moral precepts –> Reasoning –> Specific moral precepts, policies, etc.
The one I think you are attacking is something like:
Religious inspiration/Scripture –> Specific moral precepts, policies, etc.
I don’t think I disagree with your attack – but I don’t think that, at any point, I gave the impression that I did. I think I assented to it three or so times in this thread.
Oh. Well…I’m not sure I quite see the point then. Not quite sure I see the point of replying to claim X with claim Y that no one is disputing. It seems like something of a red herring, or distraction. I suppose you could be enriching or complicating the argument, but…well, it can be hard to tell the difference between the two, I guess. It looks to me more like distraction than enrichment in this case.
Thing was, y’see, I already had a headache, so I just skipped to the bottom. Glad it turned out OK.
;-)))
OB: I’m not trying to distract. It is not at all clear to me that my “claim Y” (which, I guess, that a kind of theistic justification of morality as I proposed in the previous post may be legitimate) is something no-one is disputing!
More precisely: the question (to me) is whether the “theist four-step” is intrinsically fallacious, in which case any reasoning based on it can be dismissed outright; or whether it is “merely” open to abuse, in which case any reasoning displaying it cannot be judged independently of the content concerned.
For the same reason, I wondered earlier whether the “switching” between the God-of-religion and the God-of-philosophy is necessarily fallacious and illegitimate, or whether its illegitimacy depends on the contexts wherein it appears. The distinction is, to me, quite important.
Well what is your view? Do you think 4) is accurate? Do you think we do have reliable knowledge of 1-3? I don’t mean rationally defensible beliefs about 1-3, I don’t mean belief that is satisfying to you, I don’t mean belief that is robust enough to feel like knowledge to its possessor; I mean reliable knowledge.
Depends on what you mean by “reliable knowledge” as opposed to “rationally defensible belief”. My own views would be that perhaps we may, to the extent that the moral beliefs involved correspond to some kind of “natural law” or some kind of universal human values. I’m toying with the idea that some kind of ultimate moral intuition or imperative reflects God’s will and that it may constitute reliable knowledge on our parts. (Note that I say “toying with the idea” – that’s kind of what I do around here.). Whether anything more specific can be pinpointed as being possibly “reliable knowledge” of God’s will is something I simply cannot answer at the moment. Because the answer would involve an evaluation of the most central claim of Christianity (that of the nature of Jesus) which is something I’m grappling with at the moment.
You may challenge whether this in any way constitutes “reliable knowledge” – but this depends on your definition. If you believe that reliable knowledge is always founded on empirical evidence, for example, it would not be (but that would be something I would disagree with). You may also say that the theism involved in the above is so weak as to not matter – but that’s what I’ve been arguing all along.
No, I don’t think that constitutes reliable knowledge. I take reliable knowledge to be unmistakable, undeniable (by people with intact faculties), beyond dispute, not contested, universal. That should have been clear enough by what I said I didn’t mean. I can easily see how the idea you’re toying with could be personally believable, but that’s not at all what I’m asking about.
I don’t take this to be some side issue; I think it’s central.
But that sets the bar for reliable knowledge very high, and I am not sure whether anything can be regarded as reliable knowledge according to that definition. (Our most basic moral intuitions, maybe. The validity of logical inference. The existence of one’s own and other minds. There you are).
I’m also unsure whether anyone arguing that we have reliable knowledge of God’s intentions actually means reliable knowledge to mean what you mean (if they did, they wouldn’t have any need to argue).
You have reliable knowledge of the existence of other minds?
Gosh.
I would have thought that reliable knowledge of something like that would come only after one was sure one had reliable knowledge of just about everything else amenable to the senses, wouldn’t you?
Of course it sets the bar very high; that’s the whole point! The bar should be set high – at least to the extent that 4) is used to justify 3), and also to the extent that people are (implicitly or explicitly) expected to believe 1) and 2). That is, exactly, the point.
Why on earth should the bar be set low on such a question?
“I am not sure whether anything can be regarded as reliable knowledge according to that definition.”
I have some examples. Things we can’t doubt even if we try – and no matter how hard we try. They’re all physical-experiential. What will happen if we drop an object. What will happen if we hit something with a heavy object, or if a heavy object hits us. Consequences of things like fire, very sharp knives, red-hot stove burners.
“I’m also unsure whether anyone arguing that we have reliable knowledge of God’s intentions actually means reliable knowledge to mean what you mean (if they did, they wouldn’t have any need to argue).”
That is, again, exactly my point. There’s a lot of cheating and a lot of evasion that goes on around precisely this point. (I’m afraid I think you’re doing some evasion yourself on this one.) People mostly don’t even bother to argue it, because they’re mostly not even asked to, and because ‘faith’ is so widely considered an adequate reply. It’s mostly just tacitly politely ignored that we don’t have reliable knowledge about any of this and that is in fact a real problem about public claims and demands.
Dave: I think the existence of other minds is something that we have a hard time doubting in a sustained fashion, while at the same time keeping in control of our faculties. Nevertheless it is open to skeptical attack.
OB: Hang on here for a moment. You argue that we don’t have reliable knowledge on an issue according to your definition of reliable knowledge. This does not imply that those who claim we have reliable knowledge on an issue (perhaps holding a different conception of what constitutes reliable knowledge than you do) are engaging in cheating and evasion.
Furthermore,
You claim a certain high standard for reliable knowledge. I disagree with that standard, but do not disagree that, on that standard, we cannot have reliable knowledge of God’s plans (as well as of a whole lot of other things).
Now, you advanced your conception of reliable knowledge in a sketch of an argument attributed to an opponent. If you argue (and I think you do) that the claimed reliable knowledge of God’s plan is not at all reliable knowledge (according to your standards), your argument makes sense – but it does not show the theist four-step to be fallacious, in and of itself. This was what I was wondering about earlier – and one of the reasons I posited an alternative four-step. Namely, whether you were criticizing the structure or the content of an argument.
And I insist I’m arguing in good faith here.
Merlijn,
I’m not really claiming that the 4-step is fallacious, because I don’t take it to be an actual argument, I consider it to be just a quartet of assumptions. (I suppose that means I’m criticizing the content.)