Philosophy of religion or theology
There are a couple of posts at Talking Philosophy about Dawkins and theology and the former’s lack of interest in the latter. The basic issue is this comment of Dawkins’s in an interview:
Look, somebody who thinks the way I do doesn’t think theology is a subject at all. So to me it is like someone saying they don’t believe in fairies and then being asked how they know if they haven’t studied fairy-ology.
Which Talking Philosophy disputes:
So what about this claim? Is it necessary to know a fair bit about fairy-ology to show that belief in fairies is irrational? The answer is that it is certainly arguable that in some circumstances at least it is necessary.
I think it is true that it is necessary to know a fair bit about arguments about God to show that belief in God is irrational; but I’m not sure that means it is necessary to know a fair bit about theology. It has occurred to me that people may be talking about different things in that discussion (it’s a long discussion, with lots of comments). It depends what is meant by theology, perhaps, and what Dawkins understood to be meant by theology when he answered the question.
I’m thinking for instance of that Eagleton review in which Eagleton rebuked Dawkins for ignorance of theology:
Has he read Eriugena on subjectivity, Rahner on grace or Moltmann on hope? Has he even heard of them?…As far as theology goes, Dawkins has an enormous amount in common with Ian Paisley and American TV evangelists. Both parties agree pretty much on what religion is; it’s just that Dawkins rejects it while Oral Roberts and his unctuous tribe grow fat on it.
But Eagleton is going back and forth between religion and theology there, and they’re not identical. Grace and hope are interesting subjects, no doubt, but are they arguments for the existence of God? Is Eagleton in fact talking about arguments for the existence of God, or is he talking much much more broadly about just talk about God? And more to the point, what did Dawkins have in mind when he answered that question?
It seems to me at least possible (and in fact likely) that he was distinguishing between philosophy of religion (and arguments for the existence of God) on the one hand, and theology on the other, and taking theology to be discussion of God. If that’s right – I don’t think he does need to know about that in order to show that belief in God is irrational. He needs to know about the arguments for the existence of God, but he doesn’t need to know (I would say) about claims about what God is like (unless they’re part of the arguments for the existence of God). There’s not much point in deep knowledge of claims about what God is like if you see no reason to believe God exists in the first place – is there? In that sense the fairyology simile is a serious comparison, isn’t it?
In short, I don’t think Dawkins was saying he had no need to know about the arguments, but rather that he had no need to know about detailed claims about God’s nature. That seems to me to be a reasonable claim. I could of course be wrong about what he meant though; it’s only a guess.
The relevant question is how did god come up in the first place. Was there evidence for god? No, there was ignorance of most of what we now know about the world and the ignorance was so all-pervasive that it permitted beliefs about something preposterous for which there was no evidence to take root. Our problem today is that the philosophical arguments, for which no evidence is required, developed after those ideas had taken root. If you develop your ideas about the world based on observable reality, without taking into account the fruits of our species’ original ignorance, you get called – well, all the things they’re calling Dawkins.
Slightly cribbing from Sam Harris here, but you don’t see contemporary scientists of chemistry being attacked because they’re not fully conversant in the various ideas that went with alchemy, do you? You’re allowed to call alchemy primitive nonsense today. But religion?
Before you argue for or against the existence of God, wouldn’t it make sense to settle on what exactly it is you are trying to prove to exist or not? You could test many classes of Gods to see if any gods could or must exist. That would require consultation with theologians (experts in various theologies). If theology means the study of God (despite the fact that theology often means much more), then it would make sense that there must be an interplay between the philosophical study of the question of God’s existence and theology. This is not to say that theology merely informs philosophy. Rather, when theologians suggest a conception of God, philosophers might well examine whether such a being could or must exist, and if the answer is negative (as for example, Yahweh or Zeus as depicted in the traditional stories) then the theologians will want to dismiss that conception of God. Or, they will want to study it as historians of religion.
Ah, but what qualifies any theologian even to give an opinion on whether any class of gods could or must exist? Scientists get to things like dark matter or infer the existence of planets not yet visible (but subsequently seen) because they can explain other observed phenomena. You certainly can’t do that with god. There’s no phenomenon for which god is the most likely explanation and, once (clumsily and artificially) introduced, god only complicates matters with all kinds of questions and problems that don’t arise unless such an explanation is attempted.
Angelo has a very valid point.
Before we argue the (non) existence of “god”, can we define terms as to what this “god” thing is, please?
Also, re-using an earlier comments: if “god” exists, and loves EVERYONE … then why is there such gross and unecessary suffering around?
To which there are two possible answers, really:
One: “God” doesn’t exist, and you are making it up.
or, much, much worse…
Two: “God” does exist, and he/she/it/they is a murderous, sick, torturing bastard, whom I want nothing to do with.
AND/OR
Is “god” in this universe, and real, with direct intervention in human affairs,
OR
Is “god” transcendant/immaterial, and “outside the universe, and hence space and time?
If the former, then why no detection, at all, ever, and if the latter, why bother?
We are all missing something rather obvious. How many theologians bother themselves with the works of theologians of faiths other than their own? Practically none. So how do these theologians come to their own personal belief in their own version of God? In part by ignoring the works of those other theologians. So what exactly is wrong with Dawkins’ approach, given that it is practiced by almost all theologians in respect of faiths ?
What is happening to Dawkins would happen to anyone who wrote a book titled “Why I am a Christian and not a Muslim/Buddhist etc” Apologists of those other faiths would be lining up to point out how the author did not take into account the ideas of any number of those faiths’ theologians.
Apologies: the last sentence of the first paragraph shoud end “given that it is practiced by almost all theologians in respect of other faiths ? “
Paul definitely has a point. Most critics of Dawkins et al are very partisan. Not to mention complete nutjobs like Debbie Schlussel, who claims atheists are only anti-Christian and anti-Jewish, but soft on Islam (and therefore regards all atheists as future Muslim fundamentalists). Sam Harris soft on Islam?
Stewart, wow, hadn’t heard of her before. Apparently all us European atheists are converting to Islam right now.
Well, that’s her solution to the problem of hating two groups who are opposed to each other (one side violently): simply declare the non-violent one to be merely a transitional phase on the way to turning into the other. As I already said (either here or on the Dawkins site – where I first discovered her on that awful CNN anti-atheist panel) the only comparable trick I’ve seen is the one pulled off by the antisemites who simultaneously blame the same Jewish conspiracy for both communism and capitalism.
To return to the original impetus for the thread, maybe not everyone saw that JS adds further down on the “Talking Philosophy” comments:
“Theology isn’t just about showing that God exists; in fact, most of it isn’t, since it already takes that as a given (which is precisely a criticism that it is possible to level at theology – and also it is something to be said in favour of Dawkins’s dismissal of theology).”
Ah, no, I didn’t see that. There you go then – this is what I’m saying. If that’s what Dawkins (sensibly enough) takes theology to be, then his dismissal is not so unreasonable.
I take it back, I did see that, it was a couple of days ago; but I either didn’t take it in or promptly forgot it. This post was prompted by reading philosophical arguments in that collection I mentioned – The Improbability of God. It reminded me that Dawkins may have simply been distinguishing between philosophical arguments and theology.
Paul Power: I think that’s fairly inaccurate. It seems to me there is in fact quite significant contact between various Christian theologies, Christian and Jewish theology, Western theology and Buddhism, etc. This is not something new either (medieval Western theologians were certainly aware of Islamic philosophy, Jewish theology (Maimonides) etc.).
Can’t really comment about Dawkins’ “God Delusion”. But I suspect Ophelia is being too charitable here. Dawkins’ dismissal of theology in his 1998 Free Inquiry letter seems to be based on theology being “useless” rather than being based on a false premise – a charge that can be levelled against philosophy in general (and probably a bunch of other highly interesting fields) to be sure.
There’s also a problem that a lot of theology that does not fall under theistic philosophy does not quite have as a premise that God exists. There work done in philology, Biblical exegesis, ethics and also philosophy of science (Lonergan) being done that is quite valuable independently of whether God exists or not. Because while Dawkins may believe God (probably) doesn’t exist, there are millions of people who do believe in a transcendent Deity and engage in various kinds of behaviour on the basis of that belief. Which by itself is enough of a justification for studying the belief-system, the institutionalized norms, the position of sacred texts, etc. on its own terms.
Wait – is it? Are you pulling a fast one there Merlijn? Why is that enough of a justification for studying the belief-system on its own terms? I can see why it’s a justification (and a good reason) for studying it, of course, but why on its own terms? There are good reasons of the belief-and-behavior kind for studying all sorts of belief-systems – but on their own terms? Hardly. There are lots of fascists, lots of racists, lots of Trekkies; is that a reason or justification for studying their belief-systems on their own terms? I would say emphatically not.
Also…about being too charitable…note for instance the emphasized ‘if’ just above. Note that the last thing I said in the post is that I could be wrong about what Dawkins meant and that it’s only a guess.
I’m getting increasingly tired of people ignoring my very obvious hedges and qualifications and then accusing me of being dogmatic. It’s happened a lot lately. I wouldn’t mind so much if there didn’t keep being a blindingly obvious qualification right in the comment that is being accused.
Pffff.
Did this before, but here’s a little test. Checking the 2001 editions of Harvard Theological Review, published by the Harvard Divinity School.
Results:
– Issue dedicated to Greek inscriptions of the Synagogue at Sardis.
– Article about sacrifice rites in ancient Israel
– Article about Isis cults in classical Samaria
– Article about the philosophical views of Origen’s pagan adversary, Celsus
– Article about 4rd-century Persian Christian celibates
– Article about the interpretation of Romans
– Article arguing the Prologue to John’s gospel shows a much closer connection with Judaism than previously thought
– Article dealing with rumours about “semicircumcision” in interrogation handbooks during the times of the Inquisition
– A Wittgensteinian analysis of religious language
– Article dealing with the interpretation of ancient Hindu texts
– An analysis of the way Luke tries to deal with explaining the (at first sight embarrassing fact of the) death of Jesus to Jews and Pagans
– An analysis of an enigmatic reference in Revelations
– Article dealing with the religious literature of the Montanists
– Article dealing with the way race and ethnicity were involved in the self-identification of early Christians
– Article dealing with Hebrew names in a medieval Armenian manuscript.
In other words, a lot of history, history of religion, philology, textual criticism, etc. Nothing obviously premised on the existence of God and vacuous otherwise. No discussions of the number of angels being able to dance on the head of a pin.
Paul Powers: note especially the amount of work done outside of a strictly Christian framework.
Now, one could say “this is not theology, this is philology/history of religion/psychology of religion”, etc. But that is, to a big extent, what theology as a real subject, studied by real people, is. To define it as not-theology and to reserve the moniker “theology” to something vacuous and then argue theology is vacuous would be to engage in a true Scotsman fallacy.
Of course, none of it is really germane to Dawkins’ point. But the subset of theology that deals with apologetics and theistic philosophy very much is[1]. Now, all of that may be wrong – but it has to be argued to be. It cannot simply be assumed to be on the basis of the notion that God doesn’t exist. And even if it be wrong, it is far from vacuous or worthless. Wrong ideas in philosophy can be quite interesting and worthwhile to study in many ways.
[1] However, this section is probably rather poorly represented in theology proper. I would venture a guess that most of the work relevant to this issue is done in philosophy departments rather than theology departments.
“In other words, a lot of history, history of religion, philology, textual criticism, etc. Nothing obviously premised on the existence of God and vacuous otherwise.”
But the objection to Dawkins is that he ought to know about this stuff – which as you clearly show, he doesn’t need to since it has nothing to do with the argument about whether God exists.
How about the history, psychology etc. of the Santa Clause belief. A very important and much overlooked field of academic study. And not an angel or head of a pin in sight.
OB: The difference is, though, that Fascism (not to speak of Trekkies) has not spawned an academic discipline. A better analogy would be Marxism, which has exerted a large influence on academic thought. I think the philosophical premises of Marxism are wrong (though, so to speak, interestingly wrong, as opposed to the rather boringly wrong premises (if any) of Fascism). But would I dismiss Marxist academical work on sociology, history, study of religion even? I don’t think I would – even if I still have nightmares trying to read Althusser. I certainly wouldn’t dismiss Marxist academical work dealing with Marxism itself. I believe “Marxist academical work” is not an oxymoron: that it is possible for work to be Marxist in outlook and filling up to academic standards. I think the same goes for theological work done within a certain religious tradition, provided the tradition in question allows for such academic standards. The latter does not go without saying. Mainline Protestantism does. Catholicism is having troubles (particularly recently). Literalist Protestantism has difficulties.
Of course, that doesn’t mean that Departments of Marxism-Leninism as they had in Eastern Europe are justified. The question of the justification of theology as opposed to, say, philosophy is a difficult one (and different from the justification of the academic value of theology). Personally, I think a lot of traditional departmental lines may be misplaced. I don’t see why social sciences had to split off from the humanities, for instance. But sometimes the existence of a tradition of research within a certain (named) field is enough justification in itself. Whether this is the case for theology, I don’t know.
And I do insist you are being too charitable (I don’t even think Dawkins’ possible taking of theology to be premised on the existence of God is sensible, at least for as far as most theology is concerned). I do not mean anything more than that: sometimes I think you are being too charitable, sometimes a bit too fast in your criticism, and I am sure many N&C commenters have similar opinions about me. I am certainly not accusing you of dogmatism or making any kind of imputation to your intellectual stance as a whole.
PM: Yes. I think Dawkins’ dismissal of theology as vacuous is mistaken, but so are his critics in as far as they are making a general “Dawkins has not read theology” as a criticism. Could be Dawkins failed to take a brilliant work of apologetics into account – but that needs to be specified.
Yeah – what PM said. That just shows that Dawkins does indeed not need to know about theology; all that sounds highly interesting and worthwhile, and irrelevant to arguments about the existence of God. Dawkins does need to know about apologetics (and he does, though it’s always arguable whether he knows enough or not), but not about theology.
Remember Eagleton’s very first sentence?:
“Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is the Book of British Birds, and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to read Richard Dawkins on theology.”
Now what is wrong with that? It’s that he’s somehow equating biology and theology. He’s surely not implying that his hypothetical “someone” is railing against the claim that living entities that merit a subject such as “biology” exist on this planet. Is he perhaps implying that one can’t do what Dawkins has done, i.e. dismiss an entire field of study because it’s about something that probably doesn’t exist?
Of course, we need to distinguish between theology as in the scholarly examples Merlijn brought and theology as mentioned by JS as assuming a deity exists. But once we know which one it is being mentioned, we can also know how to react and the latter kind should not try to involve us in arguments about details until it can shows that its basic premise holds water. A field of study in which there is not even concensus about whether the central aspect of the subject exists cannot pretend it is on the same level as something as uncontested as the existence of life forms.
Lot of cross-posting there.
“we need to distinguish between theology as in the scholarly examples Merlijn brought and theology as mentioned by JS as assuming a deity exists.”
But either way, it’s beside the point. Either way, the whole thing is irrelevant to apologetics.
But there are some theologians who argue the existence question, aren’t there? Or aren’t there.
My head hurts.
But there are some theologians who argue the existence question, aren’t there? Or aren’t there.
Yes. But then again, it’s difficult to specify whether Plantinga, Hartshorne, Lane Craig, etc. are “theistic philosophers” or “theologians” proper – I think it’s a bit useless to distinguish here, as their views can be placed either in the tradition of classical, theological ideas about God (Plantinga, Craig) or as responses to it (Hartshorne).
Then again, there are theistic philosophers from Whitehead to Peirce to Spinoza whose conceptions of God have much less to do with the omnipotent/omniscient/benevolent triad. Calling them theologians would be a stretch, even if they may have influenced theologians to various extent.
A lot of theology has turned away from the apologetics issue during most of the 20th century, when ideas of God as “wholly other”, incomprehensible, etc. (see Mark Vernon’s posts) came in vogue in especially German Lutheran theology. That tide is turning a bit now, though it seems to me that the Evangelicals are the most interested in arguing the existence question. Can’t say much about the Catholics. My impression is that they have succeeded in scaring away most of their theologians recently.
Merlijn:
In your long list I see nothing other than Christians looking at how their own faith was influenced by others in the distant past. I see nothing about the work of modern Islamic or Buddhist or Hindu etc thinkers. The only exception is the article about ancient Hindu texts. The Harvard Theological Review covers, inter alia, “comparative religious studies”. I would like to know what proportion of theologians engage in that particular field.
Stewart:
A more appropriate analogy is with the field of cryptozoology – the “the search for animals that are rumored to exist, but for which conclusive proof is missing” as Wiki puts it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptozoology).
God is then like the Yeti, Bigfoot or the Loch Ness Monster. Or rather much worse, because at least we know animals exist and therefore have some limits on the nonsense we can image to be true of these creatures.
Consider : the idea that the Yeti exists logically includes the claim that there is an as-yet-undiscovered life form in a certain part of the world. Now if a thorough search were done and no large hairy mammal found, but a new type of amoeba were found, we would not be impressed if the Journal Of Himalayan Yeti Studies (I hope this does not exist!) started crowing that the believers in the Yeti had been vindicated. Yet this sort of equivocation – the endless changing of the definition of God – is what Eagleton would have us countenance.
When dealing with religious believers, of any stripe, I think we need to agree on defined terms, so can we go back to my four questions?
Even the islamists claim that “god” is good and merciful (provided, of course, that you do EXACTLY as you are told)…
So, to repeat:
Before we argue the (non) existence of “god”, can we define terms as to what this “god” thing is, please?
Also: if “god” exists, and loves EVERYONE … then why is there such gross and unnecessary suffering around?
To which there are two possible answers, really:
One: “God” doesn’t exist, and you are making it up.
or, much, much worse…
Two: “God” does exist, and he/she/it/they is a murderous, sick, torturing bastard, whom I want nothing to do with.
AND/OR
Is “god” in this universe, and real, with direct intervention in human affairs,
OR
Is “god” transcendent/immaterial, and “outside the universe, and hence space and time?
If the former, then why no detection, at all, ever, and if the latter, why bother?
Note that any “theology” becomes irrelevant at this point.
Paul,
I did think of cryptozoology, but didn’t go there, because I recall having invoked Bigfoot in a post a while back and didn’t want to get repetitious.
New and surprising lifeforms that either did or do exist are always being discovered and their acceptance is contingent upon the evidence. We do not have a situation in which various minor spirit agents are being discovered and even if we did, would/should that lead us to think that there is one above them all that is our creator?
“Note that any “theology” becomes irrelevant at this point.”
Ah yes but that is because you do not believe. ;-)
Paul Power: There’s quite a few articles there which deal mainly with other religions. And your remark that “How many theologians bother themselves with the works of theologians of faiths other than their own? Practically none.” is still wrong. It was wrong during the time of the great medieval theologians: Islamic thinkers like Averroes and Jewish ones like Maimonides exerted a great deal of influence on Christian theology. For contemporary theology: google “Martin Buber” and “theology”, or “Pinchas Lapide” and “theology” for instance.
GT, no, we can’t go back to your four questions.
‘So, to repeat:’
Please don’t repeat. It’s a waste of space and attention; we heard you the first time; repeating isn’t going to make it any more salient. You’re already on the record, you don’t need to keep getting on it over and over again.
Merlijn:
Please tell me what proportion of theologians do this. I wrote “practically none” not “none”.
You will find the theology curriculum of Ireland’s oldest university here http://www.tcd.ie/Religions_Theology/undergraduate/ (scroll down to the “Undergraduate Courses ” section). It’s all about Chirstianity except for one first year module on Islam and another optional module in the final year. There is nothing – nothing – on other live conceptions of the spiritual, suchas animism, shamanism, polytheism and Buddhism. Where are these courses?
It’s as absurd as a degree course in physics that only covers gravity. Which would also require the study of Newtonian and Relativistic mechanics but only as they affect gravity.
Theologians are not trained in this way. They do not study every conception
of the divine and then choose which one, if any, is for them. They do not , with rare exceptions, convert to another religion they have studied.
BTW the course is run by “The School of Religions and Theology”. I just love that plural.
One of England’s pre-eminent Universities does a little better: http://www.theology.ox.ac.uk/prospective_students/undergraduates/prospectus/course_outline.htm
Theology would certainly be useful from a rhetorical point of view: when nineteenth-century evangelicals argued that Judaism properly “vanished” with the destruction of the Temple, their Jewish contemporaries were no doubt in a fine state of ROTFL. At the very least, it helps to know if your opponent thinks that something is a problem or a non-problem. (I mean, Christians have spent centuries thinking about evil and the problem it poses for the existence of God; it’s cringe-inducing to see someone raise the issue as though it had never crossed any devout believer’s mind.)
Still, this mismatch between argumentative positions crops up even when two believers are at work: John Henry Newman told his listeners not to engage in any argument with a Protestant who demanded that all elements of saving faith be derived from the Bible alone, whereas Victorian evangelicals told their followers not to allow arguments from “tradition.” At which point, one is up a creek, rather.
That being said, I’m not aware that knowing your opponent’s theology has ever been a prerequisite for arguing about it. Witness my Victorian Protestant clergymen, who held forth (at great length) on Catholic doctrines that they neither understood nor cared to research further.
“I mean, Christians have spent centuries thinking about evil and the problem it poses for the existence of God; it’s cringe-inducing to see someone raise the issue as though it had never crossed any devout believer’s mind.”
Hmm. Has anyone said the issue has never crossed any devout believer’s mind? I thought we were mostly arguing with the outcome of that crossing. That said, however, I would add that I’m not sure it has crossed all devout believers’ minds; I think some dbs take all the marshmallow fluff and leave behind the shells and bones.
Paul Power,
The Faculty of Theology at Uppsala University (geographically closest to me):
A-Course: Science of religion, deals with all world religions, though mainly focusing on Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Other foundational courses: Introduction to Biblical Hebrew; Introduction to Biblical Greek; Excursion to Saami sacrificial sites in arctic Sweden; Islam in Swedish society.
Advanced level: Courses on Biblical interpretation; Courses on ethics; Exegesis; Church history; Courses on missionarism/Christianity in 3rd world; Psychology and Sociology of religion; Philosophy of Religion (the latter includes a variety of subjects, including comparative studies of Christianity and Islam, but also philosophy of mind etc. Dennett’s “Consciousness explained” is on the literature list, as are of course Plantinga and Swinburne).
I also checked the theology courses at my old Alma Mater, Groningen university. The bachelor programme includes courses on Islam, religions in India as well as Judaism. The Master programme in theology includes a comparative course on Christianity and Judaism, another course on Islam, another course on religions in India as well as a course on the Qumran texts.
Now, let’s get back to what you originally claimed:
We are all missing something rather obvious. How many theologians bother themselves with the works of theologians of faiths other than their own? Practically none. So how do these theologians come to their own personal belief in their own version of God? In part by ignoring the works of those other theologians. So what exactly is wrong with Dawkins’ approach, given that it is practiced by almost all theologians in respect of faiths ?
This is simply not true. Theology is, by definition, rooted in the Christian tradition. As it is, however, other faiths are emphatically studied both at undergraduate and graduate levels (explicitly and implicitly through the focus on classical languages, texts, etc.) and they are very much taken into account in research, as I pointed out before. I also pointed out that classical theology such as that of Aquinas was greatly influenced by contemporary Jewish and Islamic thinkers, and that the same goes for the influence of modern-day Jewish philosophers such as Martin Buber on Christian theology. Finally, there are currents in theological thought that are common between Christian and Jewish theologians, for instance. This very much indicates “bothering themselves with the faith of theologians other than their own”.
Note that the point was not that theologians should study religion from a fully neutral perspective, and then come to their faith through a comparison of the world’s religions. Because Dawkins is not being accused of having an atheist perspective: he is accused, rightly or wrongly, of ignoring theology, and your original point was a tu quoque asserting that theologians ignore theological traditions other than their own.
You write:
“Theologians are not trained in this way. They do not study every conception
of the divine and then choose which one, if any, is for them. They do not , with rare exceptions, convert to another religion they have studied.”
I’m willing to bet that most students of theology end up with a different conception of the divine than they started out with. That is something different than adopting another religion than they started out with (though this happens too, including theologians embracing atheism). The reason for this is simple: most religions which have a theology to speak of, are quite flexible with the conceptions of the divine that they allow for. This goes particularly for liberal Protestantism. Catholicism has always had a tension between its theologians and its Vatican hierarchy, and currently there seems to be something of a purge going on for independent-minded theologians (Catholic orders such as the Jesuits are another story).
Conversion to another religion is not simply a matter of accepting that religion’s philosophical viewpoints. It includes immersing oneself in the cultural background, the textual tradition, the language and imagery of that religion – and this is not easy if one has not grown up with that religion. Even if my ideas of God were to resonate much closer with Judaism or Buddhism than with liberal Christianity, there is the issue of other languages (Hebrew, Sanskrit), of a wholly different cultural tradition that it alien to one’s own, etc. Far easier to fit the conception of God one has come to develop into the religious tradition one at least intimately knows.