With All Due Respect
So, a couple of days ago, turning over and over in my mind this much-vexed subject of belief and respect and faith and religion and whether we are or are not allowed (‘allowed’ in the broadest sense, not the most literal one) to criticise them – I re-read an essay of Martha Nussbaum’s that has puzzled me in the past, and behold, it puzzled me all over again.
The essay is packed full of statements that puzzle me – the margins are riddled with question marks. I’ll give just a sample.
Even if one were convinced…that all religion is superstition, and that a comprehensive secular view of the good is correct, we do not show sufficient respect for our fellow citizens when we fail to acknowledge that they reasonably see the good differently…So it is hard to see how we can respect the bearers of such convictions and yet not respect the choices they make to lead traditional religious lives.
We do not show sufficient respect for our fellow citizens when we fail to acknowledge that they reasonably see the good differently? So – we have to acknowledge – in advance, without questioning in particular – that our fellow citizens reasonably see the good differently, in order to show them sufficient respect? That’s an odd idea.
By calling them [comprehensive doctrines about the good – OB] reasonable, the political liberal shows respect for them and commits herself to a political course that is as protective of them as it is possible to be, compatibly with a just political structure.
Well, yes, no doubt. By calling everything that anyone thinks or says ‘reasonable’ one does show respect – but at the price of calling everything that anyone thinks or says ‘reasonable’. The trouble with that idea is that not everything that anyone thinks or says is in fact reasonable. I’ve noticed that on more than one occasion.
Political liberalism [in contrast to comprehensive liberalism; this is a distinction from Rawls – OB], the type of liberalism I would defend, seems to me far more able…to accomodate the very great value of citizens’ religious freedom…by calling the conceptions ‘reasonable,’ it gestures toward the many contributions religions have made, and continue to make, to the goodness of human life.
But why would one want to gesture toward those instead of toward the opposite? Why would one want to gesture toward the contributions rather than toward the diminutions and deprivations, the subtractions and denials, the removals and excisions, the narrowing and stifling and stunting, the frightening and bullying, the dominating and tyrannizing? And then, another question, why would one want to perform such gesturing by calling the conceptions ‘reasonable’ when one in fact thinks they are the very opposite of reasonable? Why should one decide ahead of time, as a matter of principle, to call any conceptions ‘reasonable’? Why doesn’t one rather wait until one has learned what the conceptions are, and thought about them? Why doesn’t one then call them reasonable if they are reasonable and unreasonable if they are not? Why does Nussbaum think we should put the need to ‘respect’ our fellow citizens (and it’s highly debatable whether such an approach even does respect people, but that’s a separate question, which I want to pick at later) ahead of our need to evaluate conceptions on their merits?
I’ve talked about this before. I don’t understand it now any better than I did in June 2004. So I was pleased to note how Barbara Forrest’s contribution to the Kitzmiller comments starts:
One of the greatest gestures of respect for one’s fellow Americans is to tell them the truth. To do otherwise is the height of disrespect.
Well exactly. Surely ‘respecting’ people by firmly deciding in advance to assume that their conceptions are, sight unseen, reasonable, is – no respect at all. It’s just a caucus race, it’s just Lake Wobegon. All have won, all shall have prizes, all conceptions are above average. With respect like that who needs contempt?
“…the margins are riddled with question marks…” I can’t imagine that any book that you own, OB, escapes riddling with question marks.
I can’t possibly know how sincere Nussbaum is when she says those things, but I do know this. If I were to come out of my classroom/closet and publish anti-religious judgments where they could be found and unambiguously cited by religious believers at my school, I would never go anywhere in my academic career. I would never be tenured or promoted simply because I would have offended many colleagues’ sensibility and made a enemies. Nussbaum’s diplomatic gestures towards the faithful are consistent with what is expected in the delicately tolerant and diverse political life of academia. It’s a damn shame, of course, that drawing attention to the irrationality of faith has to be viewed as disrespect of persons rather than simply intolerance of irrationality.
Not a bit of it, roger – most of my books are packed full of ‘how true’ and ‘profound’ and ‘I never thought of that’ and ‘that’s exactly right’ and ‘yes!!!’ and ‘hear hear’. Really they are.
I don’t know, Angelo – I’m not sure Nussbaum’s gestures are the kind of thing that’s expected in big, well-known, secular universities like Chicago. I think she is sincere, unfortunately – she bases her argument partly on Rawls, and I think she does mean it. I just wish she didn’t – I admire her work in a lot of ways.
How amazingly thin-skinned so many religious folk are. Even the meekest and most polite dissent from their views provokes them. I think this is generally because, somewhere below the level of consciousness, they realize that they don’t have a prayer (so to speak) of backing up these views with actual reasons which non-believers might be able to assess in an objective, intersubjective way, and that the closest they could come to such reasons would likely be sophisms that would easily lose the contest of rational debate. So they react by vituperative attacks on the dissenter: “You don’t show me the proper respect, by agreeing with me!” They are overjoyed by a Dawkins, because his aggressiveness allows them to portray themselves in their favorite guise, as pitiable martyrs. St. Stephen stoned to death by words.
Good point, JonJ. I don’t think they actually like Dawkins (meaning I do think they’d rather he weren’t there, hadn’t been created or intelligently designed) but they are trying to make the most of the fact that he’s so outspoken. They probably think it helps them a little that one of their most prominent opponents is also a firebrand of sorts, enabling them to caricature him into being nothing but bluster, providing them with something to react to other than what he’s actually saying. I think, as far as they’re concerned, we’re damned if we do and damned if we don’t. If we say nothing against religion, it’ll trample all over us, so it’s a good thing at least some of us are taking up the cudgels. A less passionate approach than Dawkins’ is more easily ignored and, let’s face it, is also unlikely to have gotten a shot at such a wide television audience. I absolutely think there’s room for more than one kind of approach, but that by no means invalidates having the kind espoused by Dawkins as one of them.
I don’t recall whether I’ve read that particular essay, but if Nussbaum was talking about Rawls then the word “reasonable” is a philosophical term of art, not the ordinary use of the word. Rawls draws a distinction (certainly in “The Law of Peoples,” and possibly even in “A Theory of Justice”) between the ‘rational’ and the ‘reasonable.’ ‘Rational’ means just what it usually means – conceptions of the good grounded in reasoned argumentation and so on. The adjective ‘reasonable’ is used to describe an attitude towards one’s conception of the good such that (1) the conception may not be rational, but (2) the believer does not insist that it is the only conception of the good and that other people must accept it or live by it. Given the special definition of “reasonable,” Nussbaum (and Rawls) seem quite right to talk about the importance of respect for those who hold reasonable conceptions of the good.
By no measure are most of the people who tick us off ‘reasonable,’ and it is not merely religious beliefs or people who are being defined as ‘reasonable’ in this way. It is only those religious people who do not seek to impose their conception of the good on others who count as reasonable. You know, the ones who look at politics and say, “Render unto Caesar…”
You’re quite right, OB, that Nussbaum needn’t concern herself at this point with avoiding toe-stepping-on at a place like Chicago. I have observed, however, that the habit of diplomacy and tolerance meets with career rewards, while the practice of straightforward criticism of what your colleagues care about seldom meets with career rewards.
Ah – thanks, G, that’s elucidating. (I was reading The Law of Peoples just the other day – and doing a lot of fretful question-marking, too. I seem not to be a Rawlsian.)
“Given the special definition of “reasonable,” Nussbaum (and Rawls) seem quite right to talk about the importance of respect for those who hold reasonable conceptions of the good.”
Yes but – does she seem quite right to define that respect as something that cannot co-exist with disputing the truth-claims of religion?
Although, I will agree that I in fact do have a lot more respect (respect 2) for believers who do refrain from trying to impose their religion on other people. But enough so that I would be willing to stop writing critically about religion? No.
Remember, though, that this is, well, POLITICAL LIBERALISM.
LIBERAL = FREE SPEECH
Neither Nussbaum or any other advocate of this perspective would ever say that you (or I, or anyone else) shouldn’t dispute the truth-claims or value-claims of any religious tradition or person. Silencing free speech? That ain’t liberal. That isn’t what they mean by respect. So what do they mean?
POLITICAL
What I think the political liberal position advocates is that both political institutions and political culture accommodate and stay out of peoples’ *reasonable* differences between conceptions of the good – religious or otherwise, rational or completely unfounded. Despite Nussbaum’s criticisms of Mill, it is at heart based on very Mill-ian principles: As long as you’re not harming others, believe whatever stupid things and act in whatever stupid ways you want. But in the interest of public harmony in a pluralistic society (the part Nussbaum disagrees with Mill on), we won’t call those beliefs and actions stupid **within the context of political discourse**, where attacks on reasonable (if not rational) conceptions of the good it can only do harm. The fact that Mill is right – Calvinism really is a very insidious theology – has no place in political dispute. As long as the Calvinists in question are adhering to the standards of reasonableness – i.e. as long as they aren’t demanding special accommodation or exception to general rules of justice and fairness for themselves or otherwise pushing their (irrational) conception of the good into the political process – then the incoherence of the truth claims which ground their conception of the good is simply not relevant to POLITICAL discussions or disputes. But that limited form of political respect is not a blanket request for “hands-off our delusions,” such as the proposed religious hate speech law in the UK. Rather, it is a disagreement with Mill’s blanket endorsement of non-coercive (persuasive and argumentative) means to change people’s minds about falsehoods “for their own good.” (I refer you to Mill’s strong statement of principle in Ch. 1 of On Liberty, where he talks about reasoning, remonstrating, persuading and entreating…)
Interestingly, though, once the reasonable/unreasonable dichotomy is established, it becomes possible to talk about establishing LIMITS for what sort of religious conceptions of the good ought to be tolerated in a just society (where justice is conceived purely politically, in the Rawlsian tradition). I think the problem with Nussbaum & Rawls’ discussions of this subject is that they tend to emphasize the importance of respect for the reasonable. I think the focus ought to be on disrespect for the unreasonable, which is the real problem: How can our political institutions deal with all those terribly unreasonable conceptions of the good that are out there? What do we do about the religious right wingers, the ideologues and fanatics – those who are quite thoroughly unreasonable, who want special dispensation to indoctrinate children in falsehoods and keep women in chains, all in the name of their god? Or, to name names, what do we do about the Southern Baptist Convention, the Mormons, the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims, the Hindu nationalists, and on and on and on…
And the general failure to address this sort of question is why I’m not convinced by the merits of pure political liberalism, incidentally.
G
This is my concern about the Dawkins programme – although he may address it in the second one next week. Accepting that neither Dawkins nor anyne else is going to change the minds of the kind of people he spoke to in the programme, how do we approach the job in relation to the majority of religious believers? And, picking up the earlier point, if they are ‘reasonable’ are we justified in trying to do so? If we don;t like them trying to indoctirnate us are they likely to feel OK about the reverse approach? Or do we argue that ‘it is for their own good’ – a bit Orwellian surely?
Tricky innit? After all, as Dawkins points out, if reason and facts worked, the problem would’ve disappeared long ago.
G,
“Neither Nussbaum or any other advocate of this perspective would ever say that you (or I, or anyone else) shouldn’t dispute the truth-claims or value-claims of any religious tradition or person.”
Well, I certainly would have thought so, but that’s just it – that’s why I did all the hunting back and forth in various books that I mentioned in the old comment (last year) – I couldn’t believe she was saying what she seemed to be saying. But she does seem to be saying it. If it’s not what she means, I must say, she did a terrible job of making herself clear.
And yes, I agree, about the mistake of emphasizing reasonable instead of unreasonable. And clearly that’s why I also am not convinced by political liberalism – why I keep sticking question marks in the margins.
For instance, page 321 of Hiding from Humanity.
‘Although there are many political conceptions in which the subordination of minority religious, sexual, and other identities is affirmed, for political liberalism all such subordination is deeply problematic, since the guiding commitment of such liberalism is equal respect for persons, understod as entailing respect for their comprehensive conceptions of what has worth or value.’
I’m with her up to the last clause, but the last clause completely throws me. I refuse it, I reject it, I hurl it violently away from me. I think we should have equal respect for persons – but equal respect that does not depend on substantive, cognitive, evaluative respect for their comprehensive conceptions. For one thing, that’s impossible, so it makes equal respect impossible; for another thing, if that were possible, it would be a horrible idea.
Surely the kind of equal respect for persons that prevents us from subordinating people, is precisely formal, empty, content-free, non-substantive respect. Respect as simply a rule, a pre-condition, an enabling condition. Surely the minute you say it has to include – that it entails – real respect, the kind of respect we want to reserve for ideas and conceptions that we really do respect, you simply make the whole idea impossible.
One could take this further. I consider you, and you alone, responsible for the ideas and views you hold (which incidentally is why I am so uncomfortable with the idea of “memes” or worse “mind viruses”) – and my respect for you as a person _must_ include that I challenge them if I feel they are mistaken. And vice versa. I am convinced enough of my own ideas that I would be prepared to defend them if I were to present them – and if they are proven wrong, so much the better. The “respect” we would show ideas by not subjecting them to criticism is the same kind of respect we show to childrens’ belief in the tooth fairy, or the lunatic’s belief in that he is, in fact, Napoleon Bonaparte. In other words, “respecting” ideas because we are too afraid to hurt feelings is no respect at all: I prefer to be treated as an adult who is capable of rational discussion of beliefs and who will not be either psychologically traumatized or start to blow stuff up if I am shown to be mistaken. And of course religious ideas are to be treated in the same vein as other ideas in this regard (and note that I am, compared to OB and Dawkins at least, quite soft on religion otherwise).
And now I note that that was pretty much the gist of Barbara Forrest’s comment.
Exactly. It was quite a nice little convergence, I thought, and I told Barbara Forrest so. There I’d been pondering the thought that respecting people by ‘respecting’ all their ideas without question is a very infantilizing kind of respect, and then there was BF’s comment in my Inbox.
“Although there are many political conceptions in which the subordination of minority religious, sexual, and other identities is affirmed, for political liberalism all such subordination is deeply problematic, since the guiding commitment of such liberalism is equal respect for persons, understood as entailing respect for their comprehensive conceptions of what has worth or value.”
Note the context, though. Respect for comprehensive conceptions of the good is a guiding commitment of POLITICAL LIBERALISM. Equal (political) respect for persons is entailed by political liberalism. I still think that the most charitable and plausible interpretation of the requirement that respect for persons entails respect for their conceptions of the good is simply a minimal, POLITICAL notion of respect. I’m fairly certain that Nussbaum and Rawls are advocating no more than that we leave our private differences over comprehensive conceptions of the good out of political discourse and negotiation, and certainly out of political institutions themselves.
Naturally, when one sees the phrase “respect for persons,” one is inclined to think that a full-blown attribution of basic human value is being discussed – perhaps even a Kantian notion of respect for humanity itself. And yes, that sort of value commitment is part of some particular comprehensive conceptions of the good which sometimes goes hand in hand with liberal ideals in the broader sense. But in the narrower context of pure political liberalism, “respect for persons” is simply shorthand for basic presumptions in favor of autonomy and noncoercion. It means no more than letting people decide how to live for themselves as much as is consistent with the common good and the freedom of others to do decide how to live (where the notion of “common good” is itself fairly narrowly constrained and defined).
As Nussbaum notes in the quoted passage, even this minimal notion of respect has a problem with conceptions of the good that advocate political subordination of others (women, ethnic groups, adherents to other religions, etc.), because respect for individual autonomy is so basic to political liberalism. Which is why I think she ought to write more about exactly that. Does she say anything more compelling other than pointing out that this is “deeply problematic”? Never mind. I’ll look up the essay myself one of these days…
“I still think that the most charitable and plausible interpretation of the requirement that respect for persons entails respect for their conceptions of the good is simply a minimal, POLITICAL notion of respect.”
Well, maybe. Nussbaum rebukes Mill over a passage in On Liberty – expressing contempt for Calvinism – and I’ve been taking that to mean she thinks one ought not to say or write such things in public at all. But maybe I’m wrong, maybe she’s saying that that’s a symptom of something wrong in Mill’s system. I tried for the charitable reading though – since I found this one so surprising, I kept trying to find further remarks that would show I had it wrong. Wasn’t able to.
“I’m fairly certain that Nussbaum and Rawls are advocating no more than that we leave our private differences over comprehensive conceptions of the good out of political discourse and negotiation, and certainly out of political institutions themselves.”
Well maybe that’s what I don’t understand. What is political discourse then? It includes books and articles, right? But then she is saying what I’m objecting to – isn’t she? That we should leave our private differences over comprehensive conceptions of the good out of political discourse – say, in the Guardian or Boston Review or Dissent? And books?
“because respect for individual autonomy is so basic to political liberalism”
Actually she argues that autonomy itself is a comprehensive conception of the good, and one of the ones that political liberals ought to be very hesitant about advocating.