Respect One and Respect Two
I gather that Brian Leiter is thinking about this subject too.
I am wondering whether any readers know of literature making the case for toleration of religion qua religion. What has struck me in reading the literature is that while religious toleration is often a paradigm case for discussions of toleration, the arguments for it are not specific to religion: arguments from autonomy and well-being would equally well encompass toleration of many other kinds of belief that are not religious in character…What I’m wondering is whether there are other articles that try to argue why religion in particular should be tolerated, arguments that make claims appealing to distinctive features of religious belief and practices. Or as Macklem frames the question: “What is it that distinguished religious beliefs from other beliefs, so as to make them worthy of distinctive, perhaps superior constitutional protection?” That, to my mind, would be an argument for religious toleration.
It looks as if there aren’t very many, and as if those there are aren’t very good. Which won’t surprise us much, I should think. It is apparently just what I’ve been saying for a long time: it’s just an unargued, assumed, longstanding, habitual asymmetry that everyone takes for granted but that doesn’t have much justification. Religion is a special case. Yes, but why? Dunno – it just is.
Let’s consider what Nussbaum says, again. From the earlier comment:
But to claim that freedom of speech promotes truth in metaphysics and morals would be to show disrespect for the idea of reasonable pluralism, and to venture onto a terrain where one is at high risk of showing disrespect to one’s fellow citizens. Mill is totally oblivious to all such considerations. He has none of the delicate regard for other people’s religious doctrines that characterizes the political liberal…In On Liberty he does not hesitate to speak contemptuously of Calvinism as an ‘insidious’ doctrine…One may sympathize…without feeling that he understands the type of mutual respect that is required in a pluralistic society. I agree with Rawls: such respect requires (in the public sphere at least) not showing up the claims of religion as damaging, and not adopting a public conception of truth and objectivity according to which such claims are false.
What does ‘respect’ mean there? What is the mutual respect that is required in a pluralistic society, and that requires us not to show up the claims of religion and not to adopt a conception of truth and objectivity according to which such claims are false?
Respect means at least two different things, I take it. One, it means basic civility, politeness, the right way to treat people; decency, good behavior, not shoving people or spitting on them or calling them rude names. It doesn’t require thinking the people are nice people, or interesting, or right about anything – it doesn’t require any opinion of them at all. That’s not the point. The point is that the default mode for how to treat people, unless they’re approaching you at speed with a sharp sword or trying to take your lunch and eat it themselves, is to be civil. That’s respect one; respect two is quite different. It’s cognitive, and substantive, and involves judgment; it has content, it’s about something, it’s earned in some way. That means it can’t possibly be universal, or automatic, or a default mode for how to treat everyone; or mandated, or expected or demanded. But Nussbaum seems to be demanding respect two in addition to or even instead of respect one. Well, that’s ridiculous. And not only ridiculous, but surely a recipe for mental abdication and vacuity. I don’t see how one could even begin to implement such a program without giving up thinking of any kind. Especially given that last terrifying clause – ‘and not adopting a public conception of truth and objectivity according to which such claims are false’. Eh? Such respect requires us not to adopt a public (B&W is public) idea of truth in which such claims are false and wrong? Well then respect requires us to adopt no conception of truth at all! To just bag the whole idea!
Respect one is a good thing, but Nussbaum’s expansive idea of universal entitlement to respect two and its entailing the non-disagreement with religion, seems to me to be an intellectual nightmare.
Historically speaking, I suspect the special case for religious toleration in Europe is that large numbers of people were prepared to kill each other and overthrow governments over religion, but weren’t prepared to do the same over which end of a boiled egg should be opened.
If this is so, religious toleration is a consequence of the egregious nature of religious belief.
I’m less sanguine than Nussbaum about the possibility of even political respect for the religious because they have a tendency to take several thousand miles if given a millimeter… But, if you consider the technical use of “reasonable” religion (see my comment on previous post), I think the pure political liberalism perspective is grounded in a very pragmatic view of respect – not the full intellectual respect you refer to as “respect two.”
The confusion of types is not helped by the feeling that barely defensible things of the heart should not be attacked, and for fear of the social consequences when beleaguered shitheads are confronted by the possibility of increasingly encouraged widespread bigotry. As they say, let sleeping dogs lie! – and that’s our problem.
_
Sort of respect 1.5, maybe. Thanks, G – helpful.
Have agree Kiwi Dave; religious toleration as a liberal principle was created in the aftermath of catholic exterminations of protestants, expropriation of property, rape and forced conversion, and in some parts vice versa.
In its initial conception it was a protection of a freedom of thought.
So religious tolerance as a principle these days should include the tolerance of speaking rationally to the religious.
“I suspect the special case for religious toleration in Europe is that large numbers of people were prepared to kill each other and overthrow governments over religion”
I thought that it was this history that nearly led to a glorious secular, if not atheist, enlightenment until Rousseau buggered it up…
“…such respect requires (in the public sphere at least) not showing up the claims of religion as damaging…” Holding the claims of religion exempt from honest scrutiny is tolerant only of the illusion, not the reality. An interesting illustration of “showing disrespect to one’s fellow citizens” by means of sophistry. Excellent find!
Actually, I can think of one good reason that religion is singled out for tolerance — since it relies on unprovable claims, there is no rational way to settle disputes of religious doctrine. As such, religionists are perhaps peculiarly likely to resort to force and coercion, since they have no more evidence for their viewpoint than any other religion has (and state so proudly!), so the purpose of religious tolerance was to head off these unresolvable arguments before they could get ugly (again).
Hmm. That seems more like an argument for sequestration than one for tolerance. Or perhaps for tolerance as sequestration; tolerance in the form of sequestration. Or tolerance with sequestration as a proviso. Tolerance if you keep it to yourself, but not if you attempt to force it on other people.
Totally off topic – have a listen to today’s PM on BBC Radio 4 – all about Iqbal Sacranie AND the Lynette Burrows homophobic incident doollaly.
Thanks, PM, will listen to PM, PM.
I suspect that the origins of the concept of religious tolerance are even more dubious than some contributors are suggesting. During the Reformation, as well as the conflict between Protestantism and the Catholic church, Protestantism itself split into a large number of mutually hostile sects. There is evidence that the concept of toleration evolved within the Protestant camp to avoid these splits jeopardising their united resistance to Catholicism. So initially, toleration was bound up with the existence of an external enemy seen as far worse.
Obviously, once the idea took root it gained a life of its own, and people started accepting it for its own sake. Once this happened, the way was open for it to be gradually extended and to become one of the core beliefs of the enlightenment and hence the modern world.
Harry writes, “…the origins of the concept of religious tolerance are even more dubious… During the Reformation, as well as the conflict between Protestantism and the Catholic church, Protestantism itself split into a large number of mutually hostile sects. There is evidence that the concept of toleration evolved within the Protestant camp to avoid these splits jeopardising their united resistence to Catholicism.”
The rise of the discussion of religious toleration in the 17th century is complex; before there was a sort of theoretical conception (Spinoza) there was a practical response to ongoing persecution.
There’s a discussion of international relief efforts to alleviate suffering caused by Calvinist persecution of Mennonites in Switzerland, and Catholic persecution of the same Mennonites as refugees in the Rhenish Palatinate, in the introduction to my book – Letters on Toleration, Dutch Aid to Persecuted Swiss and Palatine Mennonites, 1615-1699 (Picton Press, 2004). The book publishes ca. 250 letters urging religious toleration, in a context that includes not only the expectable Dutch Mennonites, but also Polish Unitarians, Dutch Remonstrants, some Dutch Calvinists, William Penn, government bodies in the Netherlands. This is the social and intellectual background in which John Locke conceived his “Letter on Toleration” while the guest of the leading Remonstrant theologian of the time, Philip van Limborch. The arguments in favor of toleration are varied, ranging from analogy (Protestants shouldn’t oppress other Protestants because that could be used by Catholics to justify oppressing all Protestants – an argument used by Dutch Calvinists to try to convince Swiss Calvinists to stop executions, confiscations, imprisonment, and banishment to galley slavery), to general human imperfection (all theology is man-made, and consequently if all men are “fallen” not only is all theology imperfect but so are all assessments of it), to political arguments (the Elector Palatine had better not offend the Prince of Orange, King William III of England, if he wants aid in opposing the King of France, so should stop imprisoning Mennonites and confiscating their property).
[author’s unashamed advertisement for the book aimed at the admittedly small number of people who might have an interest in the history of the idea of toleration.]
Or the history of Mennonites. I’m descended from Mennonites myself, oddly enough. At least I think it’s odd.