Preference for Fairness
Did you read Jeremy’s article on justice? It’s very good.
One bit reminded me of something else I’d just read. Serendipity kind of thing. This bit reminded me.
If this is right, it does not follow that one cannot account for the existence of retributive feelings. Mackie, for example, employed Darwinian principles in order to explain their ubiquity and persistence. His argument was roughly this: individuals achieved an evolutionary advantage to the extent that resentment of injuries became a deeply ingrained psychological disposition in their personality structures; this disposition was then universalized for broadly sociological reasons, so that certain harms came to be cooperatively resented, which is the mark of retributivism generally.
It reminded me of this article in the New Yorker about the brain and psychology and behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. Especially this bit:
A good way to illustrate Cohen’s point is to imagine that you and a stranger are sitting on a park bench, when an economist approaches and offers both of you ten dollars. He asks the stranger to suggest how the ten dollars should be divided, and he gives you the right to approve or reject the division. If you accept the stranger’s proposal, the money will be divided between you accordingly; if you refuse it, neither of you gets anything. How would you react to this situation, which economists refer to as an “ultimatum game,” because one player effectively gives the other an ultimatum? Game theorists say that you should accept any positive offer you receive, even one as low as a dollar, or you will end up with nothing. But most people reject offers of less than three dollars, and some turn down anything less than five dollars.
See? It’s the same thing. Resentment of injuries, of perceived injustice, trumps economic benefit. I know damn well I’m like that. I’d happily spurn the two or three dollars for the sake of punishing the greedy unfair stranger on the bench. I would probably also pick up a nearby branch or tennis racket and smack the stranger with it then run away.
Cohen and several colleagues organized a series of ultimatum games in which half the players – the respondents – were put in MRI machines…When respondents received stingy offers – two dollars for them, say, and eight dollars for the other player – they exhibited substantially more activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area associated with reasoning, and in the bilateral anterior insula, part of the limbic region that is active when people are angry or in distress. The more activity there was in the limbic structure, the more likely the person was to reject the offer. To the researchers, it looked as though the two regions of the brain might be competing to decide what to do, with the prefrontal cortex wanting to accept the offer and the insula wanting to reject it…Maybe human beings have an intrinsic preference for fairness, and we get angry when that preference is violated—so angry that we punish the other player even at a cost to ourselves. Or perhaps people reject low offers because they don’t want to appear weak.
See? Same thing. It’s interesting. It’s why small children spend all their time measuring the size of each other’s pieces of cake to make sure they’re not getting stiffed – they’re making sure nobody’s dissing them.
Reminds me, from a completely different angle, of Fukuyama’s neo-Hegelian stuff about thymos [sp?] — how a confrontational sense of self-worth is central to socio-political interaction…
Frans de Waal talks about doing something similar to the ultimatum game with chimpanzees (or bonobos, can’t remember). They are trained to do a task for which they get a treat. The chimps are happy enough if they all get a piece of cucmember as a reward. But if one gets a piece of cucumber and he can see another one getting a grape (which they prefer) they get angry and agitated. Sometimes they throw the cucumber away in disgust at the unfairness of it.
De Waal described it as very reminiscent of a toddler throwing a tantrum.
One game theorist asked two of the secretaries something similar: he offered the first one $100, or $150 if the two of them could agree how to divide it. He thought that the fair way to divide it was $125 to $25 (the first secretary is guaranteed $100, so they split the other $50) but they in fact divided it $75 to $75.
I wonder how the park bench experiment would go with bigger rewards. $3 isn’t enough to compromise my principles, but $3000 might well be …
It makes perfect sense, though. We are not rational agents, we evolved to be as close to it as our survival requires. And throughout history, we haven’t been sitting on benches with complete strangers very often. We expect the other person to be somebody we shall meet again, and thus we get into iterated game theory. It may indeed be worth sacrificing a small sum and punish our greedy neighbour to have him play nicely in the future.
It is even more obvious with the secretaries: is friendship worth more than $49?
So which park is this bench in?
Ha! Waterlow Park.
Thymos, yeah – good point. And that probably ties up with shame and honour, which ties up with pushing women around. Which makes sense. If there’s a module, or a little clump of the limbic region, that’s all about outrage and feeling dissed and wanting to feel respected and suspected humiliation and rivalry and jockeying and anger and all the rest of it – well, it all makes sense; depressing sense, mostly, but sense.
Having worked with orangs and gorillas a fair bit in my zoo days, I find the grape-cucumber thing utterly recognizable. They’ll share less valued food, but the real treats – papaya, grapes, melon – absolutely not.
The bigger rewards thing occurred to me very belatedly. Duh. Of course it would be different with bigger sums. Idiotic of me not to think of that at once. (It’s cucumbers and grapes again, in fact.)
I grant that humans do it, and humans are evolved creatures – but I doubt this point: “individuals achieved an evolutionary advantage to the extent that resentment of injuries became a deeply ingrained psychological disposition in their personality structures.” It would be easy to find creatures who don’t carry resentments around and survive just as well. It could as easily be an accident that comes with other evolutionary features having to do with the way humans evolved.
To use an example used in the Peacock and the Ant – our blood is red, but it gives us no evolutionary advantage being red – the redness being simply a property of the hemoglobin in the blood.
If it gave us an automatic survival advantage, I doubt very much whether any culture would have developed counter-retributive behaviors. I think an equally convincing narrative would call the resentment factor an accidental byproduct of increased capacity for memory. According to the Elephant Crackup story in the NYT, Elephants are starting to act on their resentments towards human beings – but this is something new, as elephant ethology is disturbed. Rather than an advantage, it is the expression of an animal group in disarray.
Maya – toddler, tantrum? Well yes, they may well be sourced in the same brain wiring. But I can’t help wondering if it’s an implicit criticism of punitive, nasty men or Rethuglicans or reactionaries or something.
I felt Jeremy danced around the central point: the extremely SETTLED pattern of how this works is at odds with the speculative and wistful tone of the article. I felt he seemed to be implying ‘Surely there is a better, higher way to behave and feel about this?’
There is no proportionality in charging a few years in jail as punishment for maliciously taking the life of a good person. Yet the bereaved typically accept this token penalty as all they can get, because of the consensus that this is the best outcome that con be delivered.
If they exterminated every family member of the culprits, that would be a proportionate response to the violence of feelings on bereavement ; but the modern social compact requires us to do better than that. Even in the highlands of PNG, if only one life is taken for one life it is accepted as fair.
The stability of civilised western society is really only possible because of the effectiveness of limited retributive mechanisms, which psychologically underlie the solid social acceptance of the rule of law.
roger,
Sure; JS does say immediately after the quoted bit that it’s likely Mackie’s account is imperfect. But the idea is suggestive, at any rate (at least I think so).
Chris,
You think he danced around that point? That’s funny: I’d have said that was the point – how ‘settled’ the idea of retribution is.
I am unconvinced that the ultimatum game demostrates retribution. An alternative hypothesis might be that people resist imbalances of power in which they are the loser: the person who accepts even a low (‘unfair’) offer may end up wealthier than before in absolute terms, but they end up worse off relative to the other player (thilst also sending out the message ‘yes, I am willing to let you screw me over’). Such an analysis would suggest it’s all about negotiating relationships.