Not Entirely Fuzzy, Actually
One interesting and valuable current in the comments on Scott McLemee’s interview at Inside Higher Ed was the discussion triggered by Adam Kotsko’s comment:
I’m glad to see that she at least concedes the existence of more fuzzy kinds of truth at the beginning and restricts the empirical kind to science and history — too often, arguments “defending” the existence of scientific empirical truth head down the slippery slope of asserting that such truth is the only real or worthwhile kind and that anything else is mere charlatanism. There are ways of making interesting and even (validly) persuasive claims about the world that do not mimic the scientific method. It would be great if everyone could agree on that principle.
Well…that depends on what is meant by ‘mimic the scientific method,’ I would say. When people make claims of that kind it is usually defined very narrowly; perhaps as something necessarily involving either petri dishes or centrifuges. But the kinds of claims that are meant are claims that do in fact rely on rational thought and evidence; they’re not claims that are entirely untethered from, shall we say, the real world. When you look at them more closely this becomes apparent. So I was pleased when ‘we are all scientists now’ set about doing just that, by asking for ‘a precise example of a validly persuasive claim about the world that doesn’t follow something very much like the (a?) scientific method’. The answer came, ‘There is more to life than material gain. This says something about the human condition and it means more than its literal rendering gives.’ ‘We are all’ replied:
It certainly hints at (controversial) claims about the human condition, but I’m not pursuaded. How would we persuade the Wall Street hedonist driving a kickass car that there’s more to life than money and positional goods? Well, we might appeal to evidence: many people, even very rich and powerful people, find that there is more to life than material gain. Ergo…But that anecdotal claim alone cannot be persuasive, because I’m willing to bet that a carefully designed and sufficiently representative survey of a great many people will find at least a few reasonable folks who, after due consideration, think that material gain really is all they need to live a satisfying life. Are these people simply wrong? Are they morally deficient? [etc] No doubt, once we had a better idea of the correlates of variation in claims about life satisfaction in our sample, we’d be tempted to make a moral argument about character and virtue, to the effect that some sorts of life really are better than others, and these more worthy ways of life feature more than simply material gain. We might then be tempted to use this moral framework to explain the variations in our survey data. But notice that, if we followed this path in turning your pithy aphorism into a persuasive claim, we’d end up making precise philosophical arguments and sociological hypotheses in light of careful empirical research. That sounds a lot like a scientific approach to me…
Exactly. I’m always irritated by this rather unexamined idea that literary or moral or aesthetic claims are completely different from empirical or scientific claims, as opposed to being, say, more tentative, more fuzzy in parts, more reliant on guesswork and personal commitments and the like, but still not completely untethered to any rational forms of inquiry or exploration or verification or checking at all. If such claims were like that they would be of no interest, and they would be undiscussable; but they’re not, are they. When people make moral or aesthetic claims we disagree with we jump right in and argue, don’t we; we give reasons; we cite counter-examples; we may even cite studies or surveys or statistics. We mostly don’t just make stuff up from scratch out of nowhere and fling it down in a ‘take it or leave it’ manner. If we did it wouldn’t get us anywhere. We would have to talk gibberish to do that, and people would just shrug and talk about something else (so there goes your ‘validly persuasive’).
This attempted radical separation between the two kinds of truth seems to me to be quite mistaken, but it’s popular. The discussion went on, and it’s a good read.
It seems to me that aesthetic reactions, emotions, religious belief and the like simply have no truth value beyond the fact that they are being felt or experienced by someone. And so they are not “claims” except in the sense that the person who experiences them “claims” that they experienced them when they recount them.
And consequently there is no such thing as aesthetic truth. I would go so far as to say there are not “two kinds of truth” or “different ways of knowing” although there is a vast wealth of experience and another of feeling…
I thought that this comment from “we’re all …” was particularly insightful:
I mean, of course it’s possible to persuade people with pithy aphorisms that hint at supposedly deep “truths” about the human spirit or what have you. And of course we can persuade others with clever and misleading rhetoric, or selective and emotional appeals to partial evidence (which is what a lot of great literature really amounts to, and is no less beautiful and moving for that fact).
It’s certainly true that from a sociological perspective we do tend to engage in debates with reasons and examples but that is a quite different question to whether such an approach actually has any merit to it. It still seem to me that much discussion of literary or moral or aesthetic questions does indeed consist of discussing the undiscussable. Simply because a critic asserts the merits of a particular work, including as many reasons, examples and surveys as he likes, it still provides me with no basis for according any truth value to said arguments. Whereof we cannot speak…
I’m also somewhat confused as to how exactly you propose to defend yourself against the argument that scientific and empirical truth truth ‘is the only real or worthwhile kind and that anything else is mere charlatanism.’ Your argument does appear to consist of asserting that other ‘truths’ (if that term is applicable) are indeed simply the poor cousin to the scientific method.
Yeah, I agree about kinds of truth, Juan; but people use the word that way (aesthetic truth, emotional truth, etc), and that was the point I was conceding. It’s the old ‘it depends how you define’ thing. If you define truth very loosely, then you can prattle about aesthetic truth.
But the discussion about claims was different, because Adam did specify claims, and not just claims but (validly) persuasive claims, which would (surely? which is no doubt why ‘we are all’ asked for an example) rule out purely aesthetic responses. Purely de gustibus claims.
“Simply because a critic asserts the merits of a particular work, including as many reasons, examples and surveys as he likes, it still provides me with no basis for according any truth value to said arguments.”
Hmm. Really? It still leaves you entirely free to reject them all, of course, but are you sure it provides you no basis at all for according any truth value? Ever? (I mean, you could say if the reasons etc are all terrible, it does, but if some of them are good, are you sure it doesn’t?)
I just don’t buy it. I don’t think morality, for example, is that arbitrary and dadaist. I think we hook it up to things we think are true about our needs and wants and those of other people. It also relies on some inarguable commitments, perhaps, but that doesn’t mean it’s through and through inarguable.
“Your argument does appear to consist of asserting that other ‘truths’ (if that term is applicable) are indeed simply the poor cousin to the scientific method.”
Does it? I don’t see why. I don’t think of them as the poor cousin at all. Just for one thing I know perfectly well I rely on a lot of guesswork and gossamer bridges thrown over gaps in my knowledge, in my arguing and thinking about all sorts of things, without necessarily considering that thinking a poor cousin. I think it’s necessarily more tentative and fuzzy than thinking that is based on solid evidence at every point – but that’s not a poor cousin; it’s a different cousin. Look, we’re humans, we don’t get to have complete knowledge on all subjects, that doesn’t mean we can’t or shouldn’t ever make educated guesses. (Other things being equal, though, I would agree that more knowledge is better than less knowledge; so sure, in that sense less informed claims are poor cousins to more informed ones. But the other kind are essential. Science itself begins in speculation.)
“are you sure it provides you no basis at all for according any truth value? Ever? (I mean, you could say if the reasons etc are all terrible, it does, but if some of them are good, are you sure it doesn’t?)”
I suspect the answer depends upon what is meant by ‘any truth value.’
In the event that you could describe the arguments as being ‘good’ or ‘terrible’ then you might be right, but my difficulty is that I’m not at all sure that the quality of the arguments necessarily has a particularly strong relation to truth. Tolstoy marshalled a great many good arguments in support of his view that Shakespeare was a poor artist. The arguments are consistent and one can typically see the grounds for him citing them. In that sense they have a limited truth value, though one could equally accord truth values on the same basis to statements that argue exactly the reverse. A concept of truth that can accord itself to two contradictory statements does not strike me as being worth much.
The only sense in which they could be judged to be true in the fullest sense is that it was true that Tolstoy thought Shakespeare was a bad artist. If there is a truth value to that, it relates to the description of his own subjective reactions rather than to the original object (i.e. Shakespeare).
Frankly, none of this sounds to me particularly like the basis for a rallying cry as to why truth matters.
No; granted; this isn’t really the basis for or part of a rallying cry as to why truth matters. But it is, if you like, part of a rallying cry or at least an argument for why thinking matters, why rational discussion matters, why argument matters, and why they are all continuous with science or ‘the scientific method’ rather than discontinuous. Because it seems to me that if one accepts Adam’s claim (and that of serried ranks of other people) that there are validly persuasive truth claims that are radically discontinuous with ‘the scientific method,’ and so with rational inquiry and discussion, then you’re left with nothing but force. ‘Validly persuasive’ becomes a euphemism for ‘because I say so’.
Tolstoy on Shakespeare. But if his arguments are good (it’s been ages since I read T on S), couldn’t they be good arguments for why Shakespeare is flawed without being good arguments for why he is wholly bad? And couldn’t they open up whole areas of discussion about what is good or bad in art, and so on? In short, couldn’t they be true in many ways, without necessarily being definitively probative that ‘Shakespeare is bad’?
And that’s how we think about fuzzy things. Like people. Jones is mean. Well, sometimes, but she can also be quite kind. Okay but she’s selfish. Sure but aren’t we all, but she’s been generous to me. Well she’s been rotten to me. Etc.
I would submit that these claims he is talking about are not claims about truth but rather about the critic’s evaluation of a particular experience. And the evaluation is per force in subjective terms. As someone listening to or reading the critic, I may respond to the critic’s evaluation by agreeing with it or not, or in part or whatever. I may see the play or exhibit or read the book (or get to know the person if one is talking about the merits of sharing a pint with someone). But if I act on the basis of what the critic said it is because I think I may share his evaluation if I follow his recommendation. (Or I may decide to do the opposite of what is recommended because I expect that to lead to a positive experience for me.)
In that way groups of people may agree about something aesthetic or otherwise subjective, and no doubt many of them will many times have a tendency to talk about it in terms of truth, but if we are precise in our use of language I think we will agree that it is not the truth of the matter that we are discussing but rather where our likes and dislikes coincide or not.
If the discussion is about whether Ian McEwan gives a realistic description of life, or even of the life of a verisimilar neurosurgeon, then there are bases for talking about truth and falsity. But that shouldn’t be confused with whether you enjoyed reading Saturday or whether you think it was a good novel — or whether you can convince your friend to read it so you can talk to her about it!
So, a big yes to “different cousins” but not different kinds of truth, rather different things that are worth talking about and doing. It occurs to me that according experience ‘truth value’ in conversation may be something akin to treating religious beliefs with ‘respect’. And both for the same reason, really: it shakes a lot of people up to think that truth is only accessible by generating hypotheses and testing them. But it seems the response is not to compromise on truth but rather to ‘validate’, in the sense of agree there is value to, experiences and feelings on their own merit, not because they contain truth.
“But that shouldn’t be confused with whether you enjoyed reading Saturday or whether you think it was a good novel”
Yes but those are two different things. Sorry to be nitpicky – but I think separating the two is crucial to understanding all this. It is quite possible to recognize that something is good without yourself enjoying it or liking it; the reverse is also quite possible. Liking and disliking is that whereof we cannot speak; is inarguable; is de gustibus; but whether something is good or not is that whereof we can speak and argue. The speaking may be fuzzy, but it’s not (necessarily) meaningless.
Yes, certainly. It’s not meaningless to talk about whether something is good or not, but such talk can only have truth value to the extent that the definition of good is shared and agreed — and then the truth value is the extent to which the statement accurately represents the thing being discusses, the extent to which the statement accurately represents the agreed definition, and the extent to which the statement draws on valid logic about how those things relate.
In practice, most conversation (at least most of mine!) falls short of those criteria in various ways but usually not so far short as to remove all its truth value.
Yup. You bet. Such conversations can be pretty much infinitely fuzzy. I know the ones I engage in always are! (And I’ve been leading a book group for ten years…) But that’s entirely consistent with what I’m claiming, which is merely that the attempt to cite reasons and evidence is made.
“Because it seems to me that if one accepts Adam’s claim… then you’re left with nothing but force.”
Taking this as granted, what if that was all one was left with? Would that change the question of whether the claim Adam is making is well founded or not? I do worry somewhat that discussions of this kind take truth as granted because they see a social necessity in doing so. Truth must exist, therefore it does. In this context in particular, I can’t help but wonder whether you aren’t defending truth as a indivisible concept, even in areas where its value is limited, because you don’t wish to expose any chinks in the armour as a whole.
“But it is, if you like, part of a rallying cry or at least an argument for why thinking matters, why rational discussion matters, why argument matters, and why they are all continuous with science or ‘the scientific method’ rather than discontinuous.”
The problem is that this does rather return us to the poor cousin argument (apologies for lacking time to address this in my previous reply). Science is as, you say, frequently likely to originate in speculation. Nonetheless, it has a considerable arsenal of techniques and methods that can be used to experiment, test, validate or falsify such speculations. In so far as such techniques cannot be as easily used to falsify or verify aesthetic or moral propositions, I’m struggling to see how such matters could be anything other than the poor cousin.
Incidentally, I have to admit to being confused at your earlier observation that “but that’s not a poor cousin; it’s a different cousin;” how does this differ from the argument being advanced by Adam?
“But if his arguments are good (it’s been ages since I read T on S), couldn’t they be good arguments for why Shakespeare is flawed without being good arguments for why he is wholly bad?”
Not easily; he is advancing claims that are intended to advance an entirely different theory of art, that accords with his own method of writing. One cannot meaningfully coflate, for example, Tolstoy’s view that art should serve a moral and social purpose with Wilde’s view that art should aspire to uselessness.
“And couldn’t they open up whole areas of discussion about what is good or bad in art, and so on?”
They could and indeed have. The difficulty is that this accords Tolstoy’s arguments with a value that is based on their role in propagating other ideas rather than with truth per se and doesn’t necessarily offer an explanation of how other discussions would avoid similar difficulties.
“Truth must exist, therefore it does.”
Yes except I said what I was defending there was not truth but thinking and rational discussion and argument.
“I can’t help but wonder whether you aren’t defending truth as a indivisible concept”
Same thing. I’m talking about methodology rather than truth – because that’s what Adam was talking about, if I understood him correctly.
“how does this differ from the argument being advanced by Adam?”
I contradicted myself, didn’t I! [slaps self upside head]
Still, I’m not sure I really did. I think I was arguing that other kinds of inquiry are, not identical to scientific inquiry, but related to it; so that they can be different from sci inq without being radically discontinuous. There is overlap as opposed to no overlap. So they are different but not opposite; different but not altogether different.
“Nonetheless, it has a considerable arsenal of techniques and methods that can be used to experiment, test, validate or falsify such speculations. In so far as such techniques cannot be as easily used to falsify or verify aesthetic or moral propositions, I’m struggling to see how such matters could be anything other than the poor cousin.”
Because some of the techniques can be used: logic, inference, analysis, quest for evidence, and the like. Aesthetic and moral propositions aren’t just wild cards, based on nothing. Of course they can’t usefully be examined under an electron microscope, but they can be thought about in a rational way; in that sense, it seems to me, the ‘scientific method’ isn’t as radically alien to them as many people like to think, and claim.
Yeah. I take your point about Tolstoy. (I take all your points, actually.) I think that’s how I’ve experienced his take on Shakesr. Completely disagreeing, but at the same time being kind of attracted by his view of the matter; with no reconciliation.
But – again, I’m not concerned to defend the idea that Tolstoy’s view is true (or untrue), only that he used at least some rational tools to argue for it.
I feel I’m watching people arguing about how many angels can dance on a pin…Tolstoy gave reasons why he thought Shakespeare was a bad writer but he didn’t then go on to say “And so I forbid you to read Shakespeare and if you do I will try to ensure that you are killed”.
That, surely, is the nub of why reason, rationality and science are so important and what WTM is one attempt to clarify. Lets’ not argue who has the brightest candle when the darkness threatens us all.
I don’t think it is about angels on pins though. If you think art has some form of important function in sociological terms, then it matters what type of art is being advocated and practiced – and Tolstoy was making arguments of that kind, not merely making statements of personal preference. This is part of my point; apparently private issues relating to mental states are not easily separated from broader concerns, in this or other areas.
Exactly, Richard. Tolstoy was arguing – not issuing fatwas. Our differences are insignificant compared with our agreements.