Remarks on Theory
People have been commenting here and there on Mark Bauerlein’s “Theory’s Empire”, no doubt because of the links on Arts and Letters Daily and (cringe) National Review Online’s The Corner. There’s this colleague of Mark’s for example:
If the original impulse of theory was to shatter orthodoxies and challenge hierarchies (it wasn’t all that, but that’s the mythology), the current incarnation is tediously hegemonic…I’m sure deconstruction was really exciting back in the day, but, well, I don’t live back in the day, and I don’t care…the theory evolved into elaboration for its own sake, turning a corner of literature departments into Philosophy-Lite (“Just as much deep meaning, but a third less logical rigor”). You can see how theory for its own sake could take over…But in the end theory has alienated people from literature rather than drawing them in with all the cool new tools of analysis. Why? Because theory, as it is currently constituted, is no longer about finding things out but rather about obscuring them…Theory is dying a long, slow death because it has become boring and opaque. When it comes to praxis, it’s predictably pseudo-radical. When it comes to literature, it’s predictable. Theory won’t die out entirely because there is a quorum of young scholars who have staked their careers on it (I know someone who says “I am the person who does Lacanian analysis of female saints’ lives; That’s my niche” — and a tiny niche it is…).
Snicker, snerk. Lacanian analysis of female saints’ lives – I wish I’d known about that while we were doing the Dictionary. There’s nothing in there about Lacanian analysis of female saints’ lives, although Lacan is definitely there.
There’s another medievalist, this time one who doesn’t think much of B&W:
Sure, the article is a shameless plug, and it is found on the frequently disappointing Butterflies and Wheels site, but he still acknowledges the institutional nature of theory study.
Now see here – B&W may well be frequently disappointing (all depends what you were looking forward to, dunnit), but the article is not a plug, shameless or otherwise – I asked Mark to write it and he kindly consented; plug doesn’t come into it. Plug, indeed – given the kind of site B&W is, it features a lot of talk about books, doesn’t it! That doesn’t make it plugs. [mutter mutter]
Like a lot of cutting-edge work, theory has always had a strongly smug narcissistic quality about it, and to suggest that in the 90s “the institutional effects of Theory displaced its intellectual nature” ignores that theory has always been strongly institutional — else it would never have gained the slightest foothold in the Academy. The very nature of universities prevents them from ever studying (or observing) anything that is not institutionally oriented. French theorists gained prominence not because they were saying particularly smart or interesting things (though of course some were), but because academe happened to be institutionally headed by francophiles, in the same way that 19th-century German philologists ruled before two world wars made German politically suspect.
Eh? Academe happened to be institutionally headed by francophiles? That’s a bit question-begging, isn’t it? Why did it? Why wasn’t it institutionally headed by slavophiles or magyarophiles?
But no matter. I’m just quibbling (I need a break from plugging). Then there’s this site called, catchily, C8H10N4HO2O2.
Without literature, I’d put myself firmly in the camp of those (Ms. Benson, maybe? I don’t want to put words in her mouth) who mostly think that post-modern ideas about the significance of context to observations might be useful things to keep around, but anyone taking this so far as to suggest this implies there is either (a) no tractably knowable objective reality or (b) actually no objective reality is probably either (1) incredibly silly, (2) sadly deluded, (3) grinding an axe for a pseudoscience, or (4) all of the above…Beyond these goobs, of course, there’s the out and out apologists for unreason, hiding behind postmodernism’s flag. You can’t live long as an atheist without encountering at least one slackjawed evangelical preacher who insists his firm belief in an invisible sky fairy is somehow ‘post-modern’… or justified because post-modernism sez there’s no reality anyway, so he can believe whatever he durn well wants, thank you very much… Or somesuch rot. True story: one of these I met, attempting to answer my ridicule of his rhetoric, responded to me with the line: “You’re such an Enlightenment thinker”… as though, apparently, I was gonna take this as an insult or something.
Yup, I’ve encountered some of them too.
And there’s Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast who finds B&W helpful for dissertation writing.
I do, however, have a new weapon in my battle against such propensities for skillfully written perpetuation of nonsense: It’s my newest favorite blogrolled site, Butterflies and Wheels…The site’s entire mission appears to be an innoculation against poor academic writing, faulty scholarly thinking and reasoning, and ideological monarchs clothed in scientific clothes. It’s a good companion, in my mind, to the book Fashionable Nonsense by Sokal and Bricmont. One gradstudent-relevant point to take from these resources is the importance of not copying the mistakes of our elders in order to be accepted into the academic fold. It is possible to think clearly. It is possible to write well. It is possible to communicate complex scholarly ideas with clarity, honesty, and flair.
Yes – that is indeed our entire mission. And a dang good mission it is, too. (And not as small as it may sound – look how full it’s made these pages in the last almost three years.)
The sun is setting in its usual decorative fashion, and I must scamper off to admire its descent over the silvery waters of Puget Sound. Good night.
OB are you going to comment on that assinine article about H.L. Hart and Lacey that was recently posted in the news section?
One amongst many bones to pick with it is that it implies that ALL analytic philosophy is ahistorical. However, it is continental textual criticism that is often ahistorical. Roland Barthes “Death of the Author” comes to mind. Derrida thinks that not only the author has died but the reader too. Talk about ahistorical approaches to biography and texts, sheesh. Just read Derrida’s essay “Otobiography” from the collection “The Ear of the Other.”
I’m confused by what you find objectionable, ChrisJ. The article doesn’t declare or imply that all analytic philosophy is ahistorical: The emphasis is clearly and always on analytic philosophers’ pretentions to being a-personal – conducted through pure reason by pure reasoners, not conducted by people with beliefs and personalities and agendas. Nagel serves as a clear illustration, as do all the philosophers who whined and carried on over any hint that Wittgenstein ever had a personal life or a psychology. Are all analytic philosophers committed to such delusions? Of course not. But it is certainly a common sort of attitude amongst them – and I’ve seen plenty of evidence of that myself.
Here is a quote from the article.
“Lacey simply doesn’t share Nagel’s typical analyst view that AHISTORICAL, nonsociological, fact-free reasoning is the end-all and be-all of philosophy. While expressing great respect and affection for Hart, she indicates early on that her feminist and Foucauldian appreciation of power’s role in shaping institutions makes her more critical of Hart and his facts-lite analytic jurisprudence than she once was.”
This constant reference to “facts free” or “facts-lite” is irritating as well. We have seen devastating critiques of Foucault on this site before, so i won’t comment on that. This sort of stereotyping is what perpetuates the so-called analytic vs continental debate and I for one am tired of it. You can’t give one example (Nagel) in this case and infer that his style of philosophy is “typical.” This is a hasty generalization.
I don’t even need the word ahistorical for my point. You may replace it with a-personal in my original post and the point still holds.
Well, you pin-pointed the use of the word, but I still think you misapprehend the sentiment. The target here is the all-too-common notion among analytic philosophers that REASONING ALONE – somehow carried out independently by these fascinating mythical pure reasoners without histories, social contexts, etc. – is what philosophy properly is and does. Is this view universal? No. Is it fairly typical? In my long experience as a student and teacher of philosophy, yes.
To use specific examples to illustrate a general claim is not a hasty generalization, because the general claim isn’t being deduced from the examples as if they were data points. The general claim is supported on other grounds – in this case, the tendency of analytic philosophers to react (rather, to over-react) to biographies of their intellectual heroes as if they were somehow pernicious and underhanded assaults on philosophy itself. The general claim about many philosophers’ attachment to this non-contextual model of philosophy (philosophy without actual philosophers) explains this recurring reaction to biography pretty well, seems to me.
That said, I agree with your irritation at the “fact-free” aspect of the article. That might be a valid criticism of Wittgenstein, which is where it was (sneakily) introduced, but there is no support for generalization of it to analytic philosophy – nor even for its application to Nagel. Various kinds of naturalism, for just one very large category of examples, are very respectable and influential fact-focused philosophical inquiries. In contrast, a profound aversion to facts, both concretely and conceptually, is a hallmark of continental philosophy of recent vintage.
The claim that it is “typical” or “all too common” that analytical philosophers rely on “reasoning alone” remains unsupported other than by anecdote.