All the Appropriate Emotions
I read something this morning in Frank Cioffi’s essay* ‘Was Freud a Liar?’ that grabbed my attention. It reminded me of something. I knew what, too.
Freud did not fall into the seduction error through believing his patients’ stories; he did not fall into it through ignorance of the fact that persons sexually molested in infancy may, nevertheless, not succumb to neurosis; he did not fall into it through underestimating the frequency of seduction in the general population. Freud fell into the seduction error through the use of a procedure which to this day remains the basis of the psychoanalytic reconstruction of infantile life: the attribution to patients of certain infantile experiences because they appear to the analyst to be living “through them with all the appropriate emotions.”
What did that remind me of? John Mack. You know John Mack? I’ve talked about him a little, but not enough, not yet. I’ve had it in mind to talk about him more though. He’s the Harvard psychologist who thought there was something to the whole alien abduction thing – not ‘something to’ it in the sense of as cultural phenomenon or symptom of mass lunacy, but in the sense of maybe real aliens really abducting real people and taking them onto real alienships and really impregnating them and doing medical exams on them. For real. And why did he think this? His main reason was that they had such strong emotions when they talked about it. They seemed (they appeared to the analyst) really really really frightened, upset, disturbed, traumatized.
And what is so interesting about that – or one thing, at least, that is so interesting about it – is that it seems so obvious that people having very strong emotions about something isn’t necessarily a reason to think that something refers to a real event. It seems so obvious 1) that there are other possible explanations and 2) that the other possible explanations are a great deal less unlikely than the alien abduction [of just a few people who can produce no physical evidence] scenario is. It’s interesting that such a bizarrely faulty bit of reasoning could be perpetrated by a Harvard psychologist. (Harvard thought so too. Harvard blushed. Harvard was not altogether pleased.) Credulity on that scale is surprising in an academic. Well, maybe it’s not. I know several people who would immediately tell me that that’s just the kind of person it’s not surprising in. They could have a point.
*Originally a radio talk for BBC 3 in 1973, published in The Listener, and in 1998 in the Frederick Crews edited collection Unauthorized Freud.
Isn’t all this related to religious conversion? – if we don’t keep our wits about us, emotion persuades.
_
Yes it is. It’s also related to the idea that strong conviction is a sign of truth (see Jon Pike’s review of Ted Honderich’s book) and the idea that a strong sense of grievance is automatically a justified sense of grievance. I was going to talk about that later! But now you’ve gone and given away the end.
(joke)
Your last comment will make an interesting thought essay, OB. Is a sense of grievance always justified?
If I feel so strongly about something, there must be a reason why – and this reason must be based in how I am really being treated or what is really happening. That reality outside of me causing such a strong feeling within me is what must be addressed. If I choose to blow myself up and kill lots of innocent people, you must realize it is because I was driven to it by some oppressive reality, and it is that reality which must be addressed rather than my own choices or desires or pathology. I am never accountable for what I experience – neither morally nor epistemically. I am not part of reality and I am totally irresponsible for what reality causes me to believe or do.
When a child cries out “but it isn’t fair!”, is this always a universal moral claim or possibly self-serving?
_
I think the positivists had the right view of ethical and aesthetic claims, they are what one wants and what one likes. With regard to commitment I am reminded of this item on Fake Barn Country –
http://blogs.brown.edu/other/philosophy/2005/11/commitments_and_epistemic_norm.html#more
The contention is that the strength of somebody’s verbal commitment to a proposition is, or can be taken to be, indicative of the strength of their evidence. I think this is seldom the case. People exaggerate or understate their commitment to propositions all the time, often for those slippery ethical or aesthetic reasons. Ayer has been accused of giving a vastly oversimplified account of ethics and aesthetics. I don’t think this is fair!
Ethical and aesthetic claims obviously have a kind of meaning, just not the kind of meaning that is usually attrubuted to them.
This is not relevant to the points being made above, but in the case of Freud one also has to distrust the source of the claim. Did the patients in question have a conviction that they had been sexually abused in early childhood? Contrary to what he was to claim in his later accounts, at the time (1896) Freud wrote that the patients “assure me emphatically of their unbelief” in the so-called “sexual scenes” he sought to impose on them. (Their rejection of Freud’s assertions were, of course, considered by him to be “resistance” to the emergence of the inferred unconscious memories he was convinced lay beyond normal recall.)
Brian – No, of course not.
Perhaps I’m overstating your point Angelo; but millions of civilian Germans who held civil service and other government and administration jobs had – according themselves at the time – ‘justifiable grievances’ against the Jews during the 1930s, hence they were so ready and able to assist in Hitler’s pogroms and later ‘final solution’…
I think (and hope) Angelo was being ironic. Surely…
“I think (and hope) Angelo was being ironic. Surely…”
Yes, I am sure you are correct, OB, tho he had me going for a bit.
Perhaps we should ask contributors to use those little emoticons that indicate their state of mind as they write.
Er, no, I guess not…
falling about
Yeah, kind of ruins the irony if you have to say – [blares] Irony! Irony!
yeah, but irony doesn’t seem to travel well. i often get into trouble in the US because i keep a straight face when being ironic, or even downright sarcastic (a habit i am trying to break)
Oh, gawd – I’ve had that problem my entire life – and I’m from the dang US.
OB. Oops I got it and I’m a Brit; I decided my pomposity was too important to keep from everyone though..
Apologies Angelo
now, c’mon Angelo, what did you really mean?