\”What Herbert Butterfield called the Whig interpretation of history is legitimate in the history of science in a way that it is not in the history of politics or culture, because science is cumulative, and permits definite judgments of success or failure.\”
The argument made in the article “In Focus: On Science and Religion” is flawed. The flaw comes from conveniently misconstrued choices for the meaning of extremely meaningful words. The author seems to refer to science as demonstrable truth and religion as indemonstrable beliefs. When she does that, it’s no surprise when she deems it worthy to stand up for and evangelize the “truth” before these demoniac falsehoods.
So, given the terminology she chooses, the article isn’t really flawed on logical grounds. It’s flawed because the author frames one problem and answers another. The problem she asks is whether there can be transformative debate defending science against religion, in contrast to what the author believes to be an overriding tradition—that it’s imprudent to do so because no one can be swayed on their beliefs anyway, and only offense is generated in the process. However, the author fails to answer that question—at least what it really entails. Instead, she answered the question of whether truth can be convincingly defended against improvable beliefs. I’m pretty sure that was already a given, though.
Of course one can (and probably should) convince others of demonstrable facts when they are ignorant of them. But the “science vs. religion” debates that people warn us away from aren’t usually about demonstrable facts. The dangerous and futile arguments we should worry about usually occur when science (the synthesis of empirical studies) becomes Science and begins quietly assuming improvable religious beliefs such as humanism, feminism, and environmentalism. This is because in these other kinds of debates, the participants aren’t pitting truth against fiction, but fiction against fiction, and when they do so it changes from a rational debate between intelligent peers to a heated interchange over psychological pillars.
That isn’t too say that your beliefs may not be more valuable to a person than the ones they already hold, or that theirs may be to you. In case that they might be more valuable, it only seems generous for each of you to have the opportunity to learn about the other’s beliefs and compare and synthesize them with your own. So when you are presented with someone who will listen and share, you may as well evangelize your own beliefs however improvable—theistic or not.
However, before you pull out the bull horn, you must accept the price of your evangelicalism. The price is that for each time you argue your ultimately indemonstrable beliefs against someone else’s, you run the risk of angering or even alienating them. If that risk is worth taking, then go ahead and preach on about Science like the author encourages, just be careful not to so carelessly equivocate it with science and assume it will be a trivial argument about facts and truths.
The only philosophical question I have ever encountered which one might plausibly consider to be an issue for \”feminist\” epistemology is this: If a man says something in a forest, and no woman hears him, is he still wrong?
Orlet – In Defence of Whig History
\”What Herbert Butterfield called the Whig interpretation of history is legitimate in the history of science in a way that it is not in the history of politics or culture, because science is cumulative, and permits definite judgments of success or failure.\”
Weinberg on Sokal NYRB 1996
Re: \”In Focus: On Science and Religion\”
The argument made in the article “In Focus: On Science and Religion” is flawed. The flaw comes from conveniently misconstrued choices for the meaning of extremely meaningful words. The author seems to refer to science as demonstrable truth and religion as indemonstrable beliefs. When she does that, it’s no surprise when she deems it worthy to stand up for and evangelize the “truth” before these demoniac falsehoods.
So, given the terminology she chooses, the article isn’t really flawed on logical grounds. It’s flawed because the author frames one problem and answers another. The problem she asks is whether there can be transformative debate defending science against religion, in contrast to what the author believes to be an overriding tradition—that it’s imprudent to do so because no one can be swayed on their beliefs anyway, and only offense is generated in the process. However, the author fails to answer that question—at least what it really entails. Instead, she answered the question of whether truth can be convincingly defended against improvable beliefs. I’m pretty sure that was already a given, though.
Of course one can (and probably should) convince others of demonstrable facts when they are ignorant of them. But the “science vs. religion” debates that people warn us away from aren’t usually about demonstrable facts. The dangerous and futile arguments we should worry about usually occur when science (the synthesis of empirical studies) becomes Science and begins quietly assuming improvable religious beliefs such as humanism, feminism, and environmentalism. This is because in these other kinds of debates, the participants aren’t pitting truth against fiction, but fiction against fiction, and when they do so it changes from a rational debate between intelligent peers to a heated interchange over psychological pillars.
That isn’t too say that your beliefs may not be more valuable to a person than the ones they already hold, or that theirs may be to you. In case that they might be more valuable, it only seems generous for each of you to have the opportunity to learn about the other’s beliefs and compare and synthesize them with your own. So when you are presented with someone who will listen and share, you may as well evangelize your own beliefs however improvable—theistic or not.
However, before you pull out the bull horn, you must accept the price of your evangelicalism. The price is that for each time you argue your ultimately indemonstrable beliefs against someone else’s, you run the risk of angering or even alienating them. If that risk is worth taking, then go ahead and preach on about Science like the author encourages, just be careful not to so carelessly equivocate it with science and assume it will be a trivial argument about facts and truths.
Re: Feminist Epistemology
The only philosophical question I have ever encountered which one might plausibly consider to be an issue for \”feminist\” epistemology is this: If a man says something in a forest, and no woman hears him, is he still wrong?