Faith
So there’s this new show on US public tv, ‘Colonial House,’ another in the series that included ‘Pioneer House,’ ‘1901 House,’ and ‘Manor House’ (though that one was called something else in the UK, wasn’t it…). At least I think it’s all the same series, but I could be wrong. I must say I find them all highly compelling – the combination of interpersonal tensions, acute discomfort and exhaustion, and missing shampoo and hot running water and supermarkets – fascinating.
The conceit of this one is that it’s a group of settlers on the coast of Maine in 1628, and the governor of the colony is (in real life) a Baptist minister from Texas. He seems like a very decent guy in many ways, but he’s also a little scary, in the way that Texas Baptists can be scary.
At one point in the first hour the minister’s college-age daughter addresses the Sabbath meeting and talks about her idea of god – she can’t really understand what it’s like not to believe in god, she says, she wouldn’t know how to get through everyday problems without his support. But that’s not very surprising, is it, for the daughter of a Baptist minister in Texas. One imagines (I could be wrong) she hasn’t been exposed to much in the way of alternatives. She’s probably heard a vast amount, both at home and at church (which she loves, she’s already told us), about the goodness of belief and the goodness of god, and very little if anything about either 1) the badness of belief (i.e. that there could be anything wrong with it, and what that might be) or 2) the goodness of non-belief, of skepticism or secularism let alone atheism. It seems reasonable to think (highly reasonable given the sort of things her father says) she’s never really thought about it, she’s only been urged, encouraged and trained to believe.
Her father gives an interesting muse on the harshness of life in the colony and how it has deepened his admiration for the original 17th century colonists and the strength of their faith. He does seem, as I said, an admirable man in some ways (less so in others), which makes it easier to think one’s way into a kind of imaginative sympathy with such a view. And yet it’s all wrong. It’s wrong because faith itself is wrong – in the sense in which he’s using it, that is. Faith in peace or a friend or art or ideals can be a good thing, if often over-optimistic, but faith in an immaterial supernatural omnipotent benevolent entity that is our Higher Authority – that is not a good thing.
But, as so very often with religion, it doesn’t do to say so. In fact it’s nearly verboten to say so. One can just about get away with avowing one’s own disbelief, but saying faith or belief itself is a bad thing – now that’s going too far. But it is. It’s bad for one’s capacity to think clearly, to judge, to reason, to argue, to follow arguments, to discriminate. Those are all useful capacities. In fact one could argue that in a democracy, they’re essential capacities. The trouble with ‘faith’ is that it’s the exact opposite of all those capacities. That is, in a way, why it is considered a virtue at all. It’s not considered partcularly admirable to believe the obvious, is it – to believe 2 + 2=4. That’s no more admirable than breathing or eating – it’s just what you do. No, the admiration only comes in because the whole matter is in doubt. So thinking faith is a virtue amounts to thinking it is good to believe something there is good reason not to believe, or a lack of reason to believe, or both. This is normally not considered a good thing. Some examples of it are considered a symptom of mental illness; others are considered a symptom of ignorance or stupidity or both; others are considered foolhardy. It’s hard to think of a great many cases where it’s considered either useful or virtuous. Parents believing in the goodness of their children no matter what, possibly, but other than that…not too many. Except in the case of religious belief. And yet we don’t really confront the possibility that this habit of thought can do harm. That’s unfortunate, I think. I even believe it.
“In fact one could argue that in a democracy, they’re essential capacities.”
Who lives in a democracy? certainly not you or I. I accept that the power accorded to the demagogues who govern us is dependant upon the gullibility and irrationality of the majority of voters, but please let us not dignify this execrable state of affairs by labelling it democracy.
I live in the UK, I live in a represantative democracy. The US has a represantative democracy too.
It may not fit my ideal of a democracy, or even my ideal of a representative democracy, but democracy nontheless it is. Because it is imperfect is not to say it is not better than most of what is on offer around the world today, or indeed has ever been on offer.
Julian Baggini wrote (another) very good “Bad Moves” a few weeks ago on “Low Redfinition” (
http://www.butterfliesandwheels.com/badmovesprint.php?num=35), which discusses this type of rhetorical technique.
As for the “gullibility or irrationality of the majority of voters”, I’m sure it has ever been thus. I do not see how this means we can say a country does not have a democracy. I do not see how to solve the problem of gullibility of voters unless you take away the vote from gullible and irrational people; this sounds even further away from democracy than the current state of affairs.
Perhaps the fault is the word “democracy” which is a “horray” word, beutifully vague, just like “freedom”, “justice” and the like. So perhaps its best to say “I live in a system where I am ruled, and have my interests looked after by elected representatives, who I can vote for or against on a regular basis”. This seems to amount to a democracy to me, but I would be interested to know what definition of the word “democracy” it is that rules out the UK or US (amoungst others) as being democracies, and which countries (if any) it would deem to be democracies.
“Democracy came from the Greek words, demos, meaning people, and kratein, meaning to rule. This form of government was used at a meeting place which the Greeks called the Assembly. Here the citizens of Athens met monthly and discussed affairs of state. There were no decisions made by government without first asking the assembly.”
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master — that’s all.”
I agree that democracy is a ‘hooray’ word. I consider the idea that citizenship is a privelege that should be earned, and a responsibility that should be exercised,laudable. That is why I posted the comment above. I accept that I am guilty of using ‘democracy’ in a somewhat Humpty Dumptyish way.
I cannot think of any country in this age that fits my definition of democracy, although the Anglo-Saxon Britains seem to have had something approaching it.
Brian
“Jehovah doesn’t come across very often as much of a loving God, but as a psychopath.”
I once wrote a review of Alexander Waugh’s book God: A biography. It starts with what, I think, is quite an amusing story in this regard (it’s not my story, I hasten to add, I just repeat it).
You can read it here, if you so desire.
It’s a cool book, by the way, well worth reading.
Sounds pretty interesting.
Here is an interesting, lengthy rant, with a much more nasty tone, by a very fervent Gnostic. Its definitely over-the-top, but still a good read for people like me who, at heart, are “Mad at God” :)
http://www.jcnot4me.com/Items/theology/JEHOVAH_UNMASKED/jehovah_unmasked.htm
I suppose that I have always considered ‘faith’ a powerful existence/survival mechanic. Consider it equal parts Julian Jaynes (Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind specifically) and Marx (Opiate of the Masses business). In other words, the surety given, the lack of questioning, the ability to ‘accept’ their God-given situation gives an evolutionary edge.
If religion and faith were without utility (even, or especially, if illogical), why would they be so pervasive?
I think someone with a deeply-rooted Christio-economic faith has a material advantage in getting along in the world versus a questioning atheist or a devout Buddhist. Don’t ever forget to count the number of survivable babies!
Religion is a self-perpetuating system that has worked pretty well for the monkeys involved. The reasons internally may appear illogical, but the results seem pretty clear to me. I could, of course, be horribly, terribly wrong.
We live in a *demockery*.
As to the material advantage of “Christio-economic faith”…aren’t there any poor Christians? Is the infant mortality rate better on average for some faiths than for others [including us agnostics and atheists?]
I had faith in the economy once. It let me down.
Let’s not get carried away with this Christianity and evolution thing. Our brains had pretty much stopped evolving by the time Christianity came along.
Yeah, Mike, I think you are defining democracy as it would be in a perfect world as opposed to what it is in practice.
God as psychopath; just so. That’s part 2 of the whole ‘faith’ question, which I was planning to get to. Okay so you do choose to believe in this god person – but why do you find it consoling? Why do you think it’s a kind and loving god? How do you manage it?
Of course, I suppose I know the answer in a way, but it’s still worth asking.
“If religion and faith were without utility (even, or especially, if illogical), why would they be so pervasive? “
The same could be said of stupidity of course.
And for astrology and many other superstitions.
Indeed. And of course all those are very real questions. The questions don’t necessarily imply the answer ‘because such beliefs are adaptive or useful in some way’ – but they’re still very real (and pressing) questions.
“Democracy came from the Greek words, demos, meaning people, and kratein, meaning to rule. “
And “atom” came from the greek word atomos meaning indivisible. However the articles we now refer to as atoms are divisible. October came from the Greek and meant it was the 8th month of the year (which it was at the time). Words are continually changing in meaning so the important thing is not what they meant when they were first coined, but what they are generally understood to mean in the era in which they are being used. I agree with most of your objections to short comings in our various democracies, but the trouble with using rhetoric (as opposed to a blatent assesment of what specific shortcomings you see) is that it allows people to easyly discount what you may have to say if they are not already sympathetic to your view. I guess rhetoric is OK for preaching to the converted, but not for swaying rational people who have yet to agree with your point of view.
‘Christianity’ was an example (a rather popular one) of a religion or faith. Evolving man arguably had such things before language. Mental adaptations like language and culture influence what we are now… just ask an evolutionary psychologist.
And yes, ‘stupidity’ (which I thought was a lack of intelligence rather than a mental apparatus like faith) is prevalent. It might also be evolutionarily advantageous in a given situation (eg: now)!
My point was that viewed either as a meme or as mental hardwiring, the capacity for ‘faith’ can be a net positive for the genes or a society- and therefore will likely propagate, even if one cannot find a logical reason to adhere to any particular one.
Lastly, christio-economics was a poorly executed personal ax grinding over my contention that (modern) Christianity was largely successful by allowing wealth to not be seen as sin, but as a reward for being good. It had no place here, but the term slipped in.
“Mental adaptations like language and culture influence what we are now… just ask an evolutionary psychologist.”
Eh?
That’s just a truism.
Boy, it sure is difficult to be precise and to say something complex in a few words! This little comment box within a little comment playground forces a sort of vicious editing. I hoped that I didn’t have to argue about the potentials and assumptions of ‘evo psych’, that most of us had at least a passing familiarity with those precepts and agreed they were at least feasible.
I’m not trying to quote truisms, just trying to bring up points that require the field being set.
Now, I cannot tell if you still don’t think that faith/religion extends far back enough to be considered developmental. I think ‘our brains had pretty much evolved by’ the creation of religion (even Christianity) to not be inarguably true. I definitely subscribe to a Jaynesian point of view; the consciousness mutation may be less than 10,000 years old.
“I think ‘our brains had pretty much evolved by’ the creation of religion (even Christianity) to not be inarguably true. I definitely subscribe to a Jaynesian point of view; the consciousness mutation may be less than 10,000 years old. “
This seems extremely unlikely. Evolution works on a much longer timescale than that. Someone from 15 000 years ago would have the same faulties as someone from now.
I don’t know who this Jaynesian character is, but I suspect he is not from the field of biology, or if he is, is some maverick whose opinion is out of step with the mainstream. The evidence is well and truly against such an opinion.
“I hoped that I didn’t have to argue about the potentials and assumptions of ‘evo psych’, that most of us had at least a passing familiarity with those precepts and agreed they were at least feasible.”
It is precisely because I DO have a passing familiarity of evolution and the timescales and mechanisms involved that I do not buy the notion that religion is a product of evolution. Lots of things are at least feasible, upto and including the existance of a god/s I suppose. What is likely is of more interest and use than what is merely feasible.
Julian Jaynes was a psycholgist and wrote ‘The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind’, although its more a work of classics.
It says something like, people were ‘unconscious’ (although more that they had no introspection) in antiquity and instead had bicameral minds (something to do with left and right hemispheres) where ‘gods’ told them to do things (illustratd by the Iliad) – and that this is the origins of things like schizophrenia nowadays. Disasters and social breakdown led to a collapse of this bicameral mind and the origin of subjectivity in ancient Greece (illustrated by the Odyssey).
Its a nice story, totally unbelievable, but clever.
I suppose I cannot argue with ‘it cannot be done here’. By it’s very nature, B&W is not a good place for speculation. The idea occurred and appealed to me after reading the ‘Faith’ post; I wanted to discuss the possibilities…call it peer review if you will. Either I am quite wrong or my arguments need more space and work.
It also appears that the work of Julian Jaynes is sadly unknown, whereas I figured he would be both villain and hero here. He is indeed a ‘maverick whose opinion is out of step with the mainstream’ but I hardly need to add that that does not make him wrong. He might have been ‘fashionable’ in his time, but he is hardly nonsensical.
Thanks for reading and commenting, i’ll keep doing the same until I am drummed out for ‘being a maverick’ as well.
“Faith in peace or a friend or art or ideals can be a good thing, if often over-optimistic, but faith in an immaterial supernatural omnipotent benevolent entity that is our Higher Authority – that is not a good thing.”
In what respect does the latter faith differ from the former? Let’s start with: Is it a difference of degree or of kind? And, even if they differ in important ways, why is the latter bad? I take it you might reply “It’s bad for one’s capacity to think clearly, to judge, to reason, to argue, to follow arguments, to discriminate.” But why should an over-optimistic faith in peace or art impair the capacity to reason less than a faith in God?
“He is indeed a ‘maverick whose opinion is out of step with the mainstream’ but I hardly need to add that that does not make him wrong. “
I agree it does not make him wrong per se, but it does make it all the more likely. Despite the occasional Einstein or Newton, much more often the loan maverick is wrong. Does this guy offer any evidence for his assertion? That is probably more to the point. Afterall, the mavericks who have been proven correct usually had a large body of evidence to back up their claims, and were just waiting for others to catch up. Unsubstantiated claims are not the same as eccentric claims.
“i’ll keep doing the same until I am drummed out for ‘being a maverick’ as well. “
Well its not my blog, but I can’t see any particular reason why you would be drummed out.
“But why should an over-optimistic faith in peace or art impair the capacity to reason less than a faith in God? “
That is just a plain old equivocation fallacy, and not a very subtle one at that.
ChrisM, your post isn’t clear. Are you saying my question is fallacious or that Olivia’s statement at the beginning of my post is fallacious? If it’s the former, you’re mistaken that I’m committing a fallacy.
Olivia’s statement clearly asserts that one sort of faith is ok, while the other is pernicious. However, she doesn’t make it clear how these faiths differ other than stating that the object of faith is different. This distinction is important, but in order to make her point, (i.e. that faith in peace, etc is ok, while faith in God is pernicious) she needs to examine in greater detail the grounds and the effect of such faith. Instead she simply repeats her assertion that faith in in peace is ok, while religious faith is really bad. I’m asking her to explain why and trying to point out ways it can be done.
Presumably, faith in God has the potential to undermine reason more than a faith in art because religious faith makes radical claims about reason, canons of evidence, reality, etc., that a faith in, say art is good, does not.
I was just teasing about the ‘drummed out’ business.
Instead of my defending Jaynes, here’s Dennett commenting:
http://www.julianjaynes.org/pdf/dennett.pdf
“After all, on the face of it, it is
preposterous, and I have found that in talking with other philosophers my main task is to convince them to take it seriously when they are very reluctant to do this.”
ChrisM:
“I agree it does not make him wrong per se, but it does make it all the more likely. Despite the occasional Einstein or Newton, much more often the loan maverick is wrong. Does this guy offer any evidence for his assertion? That is probably more to the point. Afterall, the mavericks who have been proven correct usually had a large body of evidence to back up their claims, and were just waiting for others to catch up. Unsubstantiated claims are not the same as eccentric claims.”
Julian Jaynes’ bicameral mind theory is actually fairly well known, I’ve even seen it mentioned a few times by posters in B&W I think – it is also fairly resoundingly rejected.
If you’re familiar with the Iliad and Odyssey and the differences in style and particularly the approach to the characters’ subjective states in them you’ll have an idea of some of the kinds of arguments Jaynes uses.
Although don’t take my word for it, I’ve never bothered reading it because it all sounds too silly to me.
“ChrisM, your post isn’t clear. Are you saying my question is fallacious or that Olivia’s statement at the beginning of my post is fallacious?”
Well to be honest I am not even sure what a “faith” in art or “faith” in peace is. One thing for sure though is it is NOT the same thing as “faith” in god. Afterall, I can see art and peace, I know they exist, no act of “faith” is required, so clearly they cannot refer to the same concepts even if the same word is used.
“… that a faith in, say art is good, does not.”
And there’s another EF above. To say or think “art is good” is to express or have an opinion about it, not to have faith in it.
I’ve read Jaynes’ book years ago. Its greatest weakness, in my view, is defending the thesis that a schizophrenic-like consciousness was once not only normative, but adaptive, in the face of overwhelming evidence that it’s a crippling pathology. It’s a variation on the “Much madness is divinest sense” theme and a damn good read if you like that sort of thing.
Of course Mark won’t be drummed out. Pianoed out, trumpeted out, possibly, but drummed out, no.
I don’t think B&W is by its nature not a good place for speculation. I speculate quite a bit, it seems to me, though I do try to say that’s what I’m doing when it is – in the discussion on value in art last month, for example. Jerry S got Phil and me to admit that value judgments are not truth-claims about the world, but I maintained that the subject is still worth talking about – in a speculative sort of way.
ChrisM
You’re confused about what a “faith” in art or peace is? Heck I’m confused about what faith in art means! That’s why I wanted to know in what sense Olivia was using “faith”.
I don’t see a formal difficulty in my or Olivia’s comparison of faith in art and faith in God. I’m using “faith” to mean “faith in the redemptive, moral, inspirational value of X”. X could be God or art, peace, etc. I THINK Olivia’s saying that it’s ok to have this sort of faith if it’s faith in art, but it’s not ok to have this sort of faith if it’s faith in God. Why? Because this sort of faith in God impairs reason.
This may or not be the case. What I wanted to know is why such a faith in God impairs reason when, it seems to me, such a faith in art or peace is as bad or worse.
W.T., you’re right, I didn’t express that distinction between kinds of faith very well. I knew it at the time but was in a hurry and was impatient to get to the main point – but in fact I did intend to expand on the point in a later Comment. Still do. Just briefly for now – I was conceding some ground to forestall what I took to be one obvious objection: that whether faith is a good thing or not depends on what kind of faith you mean, and that there is for instance faith in various kinds of potentialities and possibilities that works in a different way from faith in supernatural entities. The kind of faith I mean when I say it is (in some [many] ways) a bad thing, is faith in the real, literal existence of supernatural entities – i.e. entities for which there is by defintion no evidence. If there were evidence the entities wouldn’t be supernatural. That kind of ‘faith’ I take to be a different sort of thing from, say, political faith, or interpersonal faith. Mind you, I don’t use the word myself even in those contexts; I’m allergic to it, especially now, when it’s such a popular euphemism for religion. But I just mention it to eliminate it from our inquiries.
Cross-post.
You may have a point, W.T., even if you do have the wrong play (hint: not Twelfth Night). Take the whole matter as a bracketing. I was for the purposes of this particular discussion bracketing one kind of faith in order to discuss another kind.
OB, thanks for your reply. I’m inclined to think that faith in supernatural entities is misplaced and probably even pernicious when “faith” is taken to mean a practically indubitable conviction based on demonstrable, empirical proofs. And I agree that supernatural entities aren’t susceptible to such proofs. But I don’t think that supernatural entities are necessarily “entities for which there is by definition no evidence”.
For me, the sort of faith I have would fall into your “interpersonal” faith, I think. Of course, if want to avoid the charge that I have imaginary friends, I’d have to say that I believe there’s a real person at the other end of my interpersonal faith. But I can’t prove to you my divine friend is real in the sense that I can give you a demonstrable proof of his existence. The only sort of evidence I can provide is the sort of evidence that I could give if someone asked why I thought a friendship was of value to me. (I don’t mean business contacts, free movie passes, etc., of course. I mean emotionally and morally valuable.)
So, is it possible that the capacity for unquestioning adherence to improvable concepts could be desirable in a natural selection sense, assuming that we allow for mental adaptations as being within the domain of evolutionary thought?
I say yes.
Is it probable(ChrisM)? I say yes again.
Why couldn’t I have written that yesterday? (that is rhetorical, but I’ll consider good replies.)
That was the thought that ran through my head when hearing Ms. Benson’s difficulties communicating; how there seemed to be a gap, like colour-blindness.
So, has the concepts of Gods proven useful to us as a species? If it hasn’t, one will have to use some sort of (shudder) Freudian reasoning to show it as a reaction/denial of the fear of death. Or, one could just ignore the prevalence and power of religionistic thought. It’s just stupidity, right? Anyone bold enough to speculate?
W.T.
“But I don’t think that supernatural entities are necessarily “entities for which there is by definition no evidence”.”
Hmm. But if there is evidence, that evidence has to be part of nature, doesn’t it? Is there some other kind of evidence? Isn’t that part of the very meaning of the word? Or am I wrong. That’s not a faux-naive question; maybe I am wrong. But that’s what I take evidence to be.
I know entire books have been written about this, but here’s my take on this. Think of friendship: From a sociobiological, i.e. naturalistic, point of view, friendship is valuable because it provides the individual with benefits. This view sees the meaning of friendship in ultimately naturalistic, quantitative “cui bono?” terms. However, there’s another view of friendship in which a friendship is valued to the extent that it approaches a standard of pure disinteredness and altruism — a standard that does not exist in nature. Moreover, this standard isn’t reducible to something found in nature since the two standards of interestedness and disinterestedness are contradictory.
So, arguably, a “supernatural” standard can provide meaning to a natural event, at least in this case. I know we’re talking about evidence, not meaning. But what’s considered “evidence” is construed as such within a framework of meaning. Naturalistic evidence is viewed as evidential if it’s quantifiable, demonstrable, repeatable, etc. I’m going to reason backwards, (also known as begging the question) and say that if there’s “meaning” that’s supernatural, then there’s got to be evidence that’s supernatural. Or, at least some standards of evidence that make sense, but only make sense when judging the reality of supernatural things and events.
I don’t have time to make this more intelligible and this will have to be my last post today, sorry.
“But what’s considered “evidence” is construed as such within a framework of meaning.”
Is it? Is that really the right way to characterize it? “Meaning” in the same sense as you use it of friendship?
“Naturalistic evidence is viewed as evidential if it’s quantifiable, demonstrable, repeatable, etc.”
Well, yes, and for good reasons. What would you suggest instead?
I don’t really think your argument works. I think it depends on defining the words you’re using somewhat oddly. “Meaning that’s supernatural” for instance – I’m not sure what that, er, means. I would say that meaning is something that humans attribute to natural entities and occurrences, rather than something that is itself supernatural. But maybe I’m misunderstanding you.
Mark Pitely:
“Or, one could just ignore the prevalence and power of religionistic thought.”
And unless you mean the power to convert unbelievers, which is apparent throughout history, my response to such a claim is to ask for examples of that thought which are exclusively religious and do not draw on secular philosophy or psychology. Astrology has power and prevalence also; are you arguing that it must be useful as well? Superstitions about mirrors and cats have a pretty long shelf life too.
“some sort of (shudder) Freudian reasoning to show it as a reaction/denial of the fear of death.”
IMO belief in gods can be explained by a combination of metaphor and dreams. Metaphor leads us to think in terms of agents acting; thus, I blow on my hands, who is blowing on the trees? I throw a spear, who throws the lightning?
In dreams we see people who have died. They speak to us. Where are they? They must be living somewhere. They are invisible like the spirit of the wind and the hurler of lightning bolts; maybe the dead live with them.
“Is it possible…? Is it probable? I say yes again.”
Well, you can SAY anything you like, but it will take more than mere assertions to convince me.
I really like wmr’s idea of a ‘metaphors gone bad’; a propensity in humans that leads to all sorts of odd things. Superstition, for one, which I find is something even otherwise rational people form for themselves. Anthropomophization is widespread. It’s hard to imagine thinking or consciousness without metaphors. That is, metaphors are critical to thinking, as well as critical to discussing thinking. Ouch. Thanks for derailing my train of thought. Ack!
OB,
I’m using “meaning” to mean a conceptual scheme we use to make events intelligible. Events and entities don’t come prepackaged with a “meaning”. In the absence of some kind of meaning, i.e. a relatively coherent set of presuppositions about the nature of reality, events aren’t intelligible.
I might as well lay my cards on the table here. What I would like to do is argue that there are standards that are not found in nature that give meaning to events and entities in nature. Sound familiar? My point about friendship is that under a naturalistic scheme of meaning, you can say a lot about why people make and keep friends. You can make all kinds of statistical models, construct theories that with years of observation and refinement might approach the cogency of a couple of epigrams by La Rochefoucauld. However, you still aren’t going to say everything there is to say about friendship because as everyone will admit after a few minutes’ honest reflection, (setting realism aside), we also measure friendship by a standard that’s not evident in nature. Namely, pure distinterested affection. Now, someday there may be a unified field theory of social sciences that will allow us reduce our “supernatural” standard of pure disintered affection to the level of an ultimately cynical, naturalistic theory of friendship. Then we can say that the only evidence by which we can judge friendship is the same sort by which we gauge the behavior of a school of fish. However, until the evidence for such a link is, to repeat myself, “quantifiable, demonstrable, repeatable”, then it’s reasonable to conclude that, at least, there’s more to friendship than can be measured and counted. I don’t know if you want to call a scheme of meaning that’s not based on quantification and demonstration “supernatural”. (I know I don’t) But if you do, I suppose you could say there’s “supernatural meaning.”
“Naturalistic evidence is viewed as evidential if it’s quantifiable, demonstrable, repeatable, etc.”
OB: Well, yes, and for good reasons. What would you suggest instead?
I’m not suggesting any other criteria of evidence for judging events and entities in nature. I suggest that are things — or aspects of things — that can’t be profitably judged by those criteria. I hope my preceding discussion of friendship shows you what I mean.
Interesting, W.T. Sure, I know what you mean. Some of my essays at TPM touch on some of these issues. And in fact, come to think of it, I once got myself in trouble on the TPM discussion board by starting a thread on friendship. It was titled, fatuously enough, ‘Is Friendship a Philosophical Subject?’ An irritated poster who preferred more strictly technical types of discussion chastised me for being so woolly and girly and tedious. Not actually in those words, but that was his purport.
And my colleague asks a question similar to yours in the book he’s working on. I won’t say any more since it’s his book not mine and it’s in progress.
But. I’m not sure I agree with all of what you say.
“we also measure friendship by a standard that’s not evident in nature. Namely, pure distinterested affection.”
But that’s not really true, at least I don’t think it is. There is affection in nature, or at least what looks very like it, even pure disinterested affection. Mind you, it’s always limited in certain ways. Even the best friends don’t share food, for example, not unless there’s way more than enough to go around. (No doubt there are exceptions, but at least gratuitous food-sharing is much rarer than it is in human life.) But animals do make friends, for no ‘interested’ reason that one can see. (Have you ever seen the National Geographic show ‘The Urban Elephant’? There’s an example of pure friendship on there that’s one of the most stunning things I’ve ever seen.)
Anyway. Humans attach meaning to things, humans love, humans have friendship and affection that can’t be quantified. But…I’m not sure I see why that has to be incompatible with naturalistic explanations? I mean, you can talk about oxytocin, or security, or pheromones, or whatever you like, but phenomenologically that doesn’t really make much difference, does it? Affection still feels like affection, surely? As Montaigne said about his great friend, ‘Par ce que c’était lui, par ce que c’était moi.’
“Humans attach meaning to things, humans love, humans have friendship and affection that can’t be quantified. But…I’m not sure I see why that has to be incompatible with naturalistic explanations?”
I don’t think it’s necessarily incompatible with naturalistic explanations. But of course, it all depends on what you means by naturalistic explanations. If you exclude what can’t be quantified from naturalistic explanations, then aspects of things like friendship and much of the language we use to talk about friendship don’t make sense in a naturalistic setting.
I’m glad you brought up the ph-word. No, not pheromones, but phenomenologically. I was using a Platonist view of friendship to illustrate my point that to make sense of our experience we need to look to both naturalistic and “supernatural” standards. However, simply pointing to this as a phenomenological fact is helpful since I want to avoid a strong platonic claim that there are ideal forms of friendship by which we judge our paltry temporal friendship. Rather I want to say that our phenomenological experience of friendship includes naturalistic elements – sadly we do tend measure the worth of friends by what they’ve done for us – as well “ideal” elements that while they seem to be, qua experience, seamless with our experience of friendship as a quid pro quo arrangement, are in fact incommensurable with it.
P.S. ‘Is Friendship a Philosophical Subject?’There are excellent Classical precedents for answering yes. If you’re “woolly and girly and tedious” then so was Plato.
“If you exclude what can’t be quantified from naturalistic explanations”
Well, I don’t. Maybe that’s just because I’m an ignorant fool, but I don’t. Mind you, I certainly do sort the non-quantifiable items in soft science as opposed to hard science, but surely soft science includes naturalistic explanations, doesn’t it? The explanations in question are much more uncertain than those in physics, but that’s not to say they’re just made up. So I don’t think it’s true that the language we use to talk about friendship doesn’t make sense in a naturalistic setting.
“to make sense of our experience we need to look to both naturalistic and “supernatural” standards”
Hmm. But do we? Is ‘supernatural’ really the right word there? I don’t take the realm of value judgments, subjectivity, opinion, imagination, dreams, stories, etc, to be supernatural – in fact I think it’s all the more interesting to think of it as thoroughly natural. Not quantifiable, but natural.
P.S.
“P.S. ‘Is Friendship a Philosophical Subject?’There are excellent Classical precedents for answering yes. If you’re “woolly and girly and tedious” then so was Plato.”
I know. The moderator of the discussion told the irritated poster that, of course. But as I said, the I.P. preferred a more technical kind of discussion. Ah well.