How things actually are in the world
The philosopher Miroslav Imbrišević has a post at The Electric Agora on language and the concept of “women.”
Conceptual engineering has been taken up by some feminist philosophers. A central concept in feminist philosophy is ‘woman’. Ordinarily it means “adult human female,” but some feminists would like to include transwomen under the term ‘woman’. This view is now widely accepted in academic feminism. If you dare to question this, you will be considered “transphobic,” as Kathleen Stock, a philosophy professor at the University of Sussex, has experienced.
But the rest of us are still struggling to understand how any feminist can think it’s feminist to include male people in the concept “woman” on the grounds that they are trans women.
By including transwomen under the umbrella ‘woman’, these well-meaning philosophers suggest that there is no real difference between the type of women in expressions like ‘young women’, ‘German women’, ‘married women’, ‘happy women’, ‘single women’, ‘tall women’ and ‘transwomen’ (or ‘trans women’). They are all women. The aim here is to shape reality; to change how we view the world.
The class of women – by which I mean, adult human females – can be understood as a natural kind; that is, as something that is part of nature. There is a material, biological reality to it. The class of transwomen, on the other hand, is a social kind; that is, something we find in society. It is a notion that is socially constructed. We invented it. It relies on the idea that some people have a gender identity which can be in conflict with their sex. Male-bodied persons wish they were female or believe that they are female, and many want to express this through their gender presentation, which might include body modification. The natural kind term ‘woman’ refers to a material reality (sex), the social kind term ‘transwoman’ refers to a psychological reality (attempting to disregard your sexed body).
And the issue here is that wishing you were a something you’re not is not necessarily the same as being that something. It can be, in some cases, where desire and will can make you into the wished-for something. You can wish you were kinder and become kinder by working at it. You can wish you were more educated and get there by buckling down to the studies. But wishing you were a gibbon or Saturn or Chomolungma isn’t going to make you those things.
The social category ‘woman’ has a biological foundation: women, understood as a natural kind. The social kind supervenes upon the natural kind; that is, the social category has an underlying material basis: being of the female sex. There is nothing similar with respect to being a transwoman. In this case, one social kind (transwoman) supervenes on another social kind (woman). Transwomen, in this sense, represent a kind of supervenience squared; a supervenience of supervenience. And because the concept ‘transwoman’ is free-floating, without a tether (a female sexed body), there is a fundamental difference between women and transwomen.
Take the concept of marriage. We now accept that same-sex attracted people can get married. Our linguistic (and legal) practice has changed and with it the concept of marriage. But ‘marriage’ is a social kind term, something we created by agreement, and we can extend/alter its meaning through further agreement. Contrast this with the concepts: ‘tiger’, ‘water’ or ‘woman’. These three are natural kind terms and their concepts are not open to radical revision through our linguistic practice, because they are tied to how things actually are in the world. There are facts about tigers which we cannot alter. For example, we cannot simply decree that it would be good to class lions among the tigers. Admittedly, they have something in common: they are both big cats, but ‘tiger’ and ‘lion’ are distinct concepts, as tigers and lions are distinct species.
Because they are tied to how things actually are in the world.
That.
Good article. The author provides a TRAs attempt to (re)define the word “woman.” I’ll paraphrase:
Woman: “a person who is systematically subordinated in certain respects (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and targeted for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.”
Frankly, it’s hard to find a single thing wrong with this definition. At least 4 or 5 problems jumped out at me right off the bat.
Sastra
Right? For one thing making subordination part of the definition of “woman” makes ending the subordination of women a logical impossibility, since, by definition, that would make them no longer women…
(I guess that makes it transphobic to suggest that trans women should not be subordinated since that would make them not women, hence invalidating their precious gender identity)
By that TRA definition, Queen Elizabeth II is not a woman.
Dr. I. pointed out that
“ Haslanger’s definition of ‘woman’ is metonymical. It focuses on one consequence of being female: experiencing oppression. But it isn’t that one consequence of being a woman that makes you a woman. Being a woman precedes or underlies the consequence of oppression. And Haslanger admits that the discrimination women suffer is based on being perceived to have a certain body. So, it isn’t the oppression that makes you a woman, but rather, the target of that oppression: having a female body.”
It’s still based on the reproductive system.
Also:
“ Under this concept the Queen of England and other women who don’t experience discrimination would not be women.”
“ So, the metonymical understanding of ‘woman’ is limited to those who pass. This means that only some transwomen are women.”
I’d also add in that conservative women who happily embrace their roles in the patriarchy would not be women — or would not agree they’re women — under this definition.
Women who look “mannish” are not women.
A woman who lives alone in an isolated area is not a woman.
You’re more womanly if you’re treated badly.
And of course, if anyone who identifies as a woman is a woman, and being a woman means being subordinated, then being subordinated is also just a matter of self-identification.
And one of the first problems I thought of: transvestites, effeminate gay men, and men who somehow “read” as women are now “women,” regardless of how they identify, as long as they’re systematically oppressed.
I think there’s a good reason why my question “how are you defining ‘woman’?” always seems to go unanswered.
To rephrase that, perhaps it makes it transphobic to suggest that trans women are not in fact subordinated, since being subordinated is part of the “gender identity” they are trying to claim.
If the TIM fetish inherently has to do with subordination, then claiming oppression is part of the kink they seek.
A good bit of thinking there. I do like the part where the terms transwomen and transmen are simply reversed, this clears up a lot of entanglement very nicely! I’m sure they won’t go for it, and there’s the confusion that would follow from all the current entrenched definitions, but it is an elegant solution. :)
This:
Never have I enjoyed a piece of writing with so many “big words” as I have this one.
Beautiful, and saved to savour again. And again.
Sure, “young woman,” “German woman,” “married woman,” “happy (or unhappy) woman,” “single woman,” “tall woman,” and … “man woman.” That’s its real name, and immediately betrays exactly which one does not fit the category.
Pretend woman, fake woman, ersatz woman, would-be woman….
Which is why I’ve stopped using the term “transwoman.” It concedes too much ground in exactly the way it is explained above. Reality isn’t being shaped, only the ways in which we are allowed to talk about it. As much as some philosophers might believe that changing language changes the world, reality is recalcitrant and will continue to be what it is. People’s behaviour might be bullied or coerced, but the underlying structures of the world cannot be no-platformed, harried from places of employment, or threatened with being choked with girl-dick, rape, or murder.
And as for the philosophers in question being “well-meaning,” I don’t know if Imbrišević is being ironic or giving them the benefit of the doubt. Given the pervasiveness of bad faith, transperbolic “arguments,” I have no doubt left to offer the genderist side.
I read the insistence on oppression more as camouflage rather than kink. By claiming to be “the MOST OPPRESSED GROUP EVER!!!” they get to claim “cis” women are privileged, and thereby they garner more sympathy for their cause. And this would not explain the gleeful, enthusiastic wielding of this rhetorical cudgel by straight, male wokebeards against feminists.They’re getting off on righteous anger, not submission to oppression.
“We just want to pee!” is what we’re constantly told, yet solutions that would let these males do just that in privacy, safety, and comfort that don’t involve access to women’s spaces (and the attendant “affirmation” and “validation” that would confer) are rejected out of hand. If one replaces the preferred “transwomen” with the more accurate “trans-identified males,” one is much less likely to agree that they have any legitimate claim on female only spaces and positions. Trans activists cannot permit anyone to ask the Staniland Question: “Do you believe male-sexed people have the right to undress and shower in communal change rooms with teenaged girls?” Using language correctly gives the game away.
But wishing you were a gibbon or Saturn or Chomolungma isn’t going to make you those things.
Ophelia: Bosh. You re an OKERF s well as a TERF! (Other Kin Exclusionary Radical Feminist)
I know I focus too much on the other kin, but their logic is identical. Or illogic, I should say. :)
‘Which is why I’ve stopped using the term “transwoman.” It concedes too much ground in exactly the way it is explained above.’ I have to agree with this, and have come to the same conclusion. It’s confusing (still, to people who (understandably) haven’t been paying much attention to the chaos this fraction of a percentage of this particular demographic has been causing) and it begs the question. The effect is similar to what’s described in this essay:
https://fairplayforwomen.com/pronouns/
I use ‘TIMs’ in conversations like this, in environments where people are aware, and where they are the specific topic; not sure what I’d use in the ‘outside world’ if I felt I had to talk about them.
I followed some of the links in the article to find out how common an intersex condition is: it seems that a commonly used figure in promoting non-dimorphism is 1.7 % and a clinical figure 0.018 %. The article references the source of the higher figure using a definition “intersex person as an individual who deviates from the Platonic ideal of physical dimorphism at the chromosomal, genital, gonadal, or hormonal levels.”
This seems quite different from a definition of woman in the same TWAW-argument.
Conveniente how in one argument you are neither female nor male if you deviate from the Platonic ideal of physical dimorphism, but in another argument being a woman doesn’t require matching a Platonic ideal.
Gay, male outsider to this debate–
I just read the original piece and find it delightful, even hilarious, like
“Some transmen who give birth wish to be recorded as the father of the child on the birth certificate. The meaning of the term ‘father’ would then include: ‘person giving birth to a child’”
and
“Some transwomen claim to experience period pains. They describe their symptoms as being moody and wanting chocolate.”
As for “lady dick.” I prefer “pussy on a stick” any day.
lol
I was referred here once again by infidel753.
Three thoughts.
1) One dictionary definition of species is “a group of organisms that share a genetic heritage, are able to interbreed, and to create offspring that are also fertile.”
Lions and tigers share a genetic heritage. The existence of ligers and tigons show that lions and tigers can interbreed. Both ligers and tigons have created offspring. Therefore, the combined group of lions and tigers form a single species.
Imbrisevic claims ” tigers and lions are distinct species.” Why does Imbrisevic deny basic biological reality? [sarcasm]
Actually, biological reality is messy. Take ring species, for example. If population 1 and population 2 can create fertile offspring, population 2 and population 3 can create fertile offspring, population 3 and population 4 can create fertile offspring, but population 1 and population 4 cannot create fertile offspring, where do we draw the line? (There’s a similar problem with languages and dialects.)
2) Why should the definition of sex be based on genitalia rather than brains?
If my genitals were removed from the rest of my body, I would still survive. If my brain were removed, I would die. Therefore, my brain is more crucial to my existence and identity than my genitals.
We know that XX/XY chimeras exist. Suppose we had someone whose brain was made of XX cells, and whose reproductive system was made of XY cells. Due to cancer, the reproductive system has to be removed. The ony cells left in the body would be XX cells. Would you call this person a man or a woman? I would say woman.
3) The Navajo nation traditionally had five gender categories. The Bugis people of Indonesia also have a five-gender system which corresponds fairly closely to the Navajo system.
Your name’s not Bruce asks, “Do you believe male-sexed people have the right to undress and shower in communal change rooms with teenaged girls?” Ask the Bugis whether calalai can do this with teenaged makkunrai, and they would say yes. (The Bugis did not have the concept of transgender in their system.)
I wonder how many “gender critical” people would accept it if the United States were to adopt the Bugis gender system. (And why would the traditional Western two-gender system be closer to “biological reality” than the Bugis system?)
Shannon @ #20:
Let’s tackle these in reverse order.
3) Multi-gender social orders do not entail what you think they do. Whether we examine the Navajo or the Indian “genders”, what we find is not a system of biological classification, but instead a patriarchal hierarchy of normative worth stinking with misogyny and homophobia. The function of these systems is to exalt the masculine and crush the feminine. In those systems where the additional gender or genders are categories of male people, those genders are for males whose masculinity is perceived as deficient or corrupt in some way. Masculine deficiency can be such things as physical weakness, small genitals, or pacifism. Masculine corruption could be interest in dolls, an effeminate manner, or homosexuality. The “third gender” hijra is not a category of liberation; it is a way for a patriarchal society to protect their honor from the shame of having to admit the existence in their families of gay boys and gentle boys. It’s a way for a father to deny that one of his sons is a failure, because it is preferable to mark a son as a hijra than as a filthy faggot.
This analysis has far more explanatory power than the epistemologically relativist notion that these multi-gender cultures had/have some special insight that the rest of the world failed to grasp. It explains why homosexuality is illegal in Iran while the nation performs the second most transsexual surgeries in the world. It explains why women who resist bear the brunt of the venom from activists. It explains why so much of the justification for knowledge claims about “gender identity” derives from gendered—i.e., sexed—stereotypes regarding acceptable behavior and interests. It explains everything.
2) Complex question hiding false assumption: sex is not defined by genitalia, nor is it defined by brains. Sex is defined by the reproductive functions involved in sexual reproduction. There are two such functions, represented by two types of gamete. A creature’s sex refers to which of those gametes its body is configured to produce. Because such configuration is temporally unstable, we also include in each category (A) those whose bodies are no longer so configured (e.g., due to age, hysterectomy, etc.) and (B) those whose bodies are not yet so configured but eventually will be (e.g., due to youth). We also include (C) those who at any point fit into (B); e.g., a boy castrated at five. Group (C) naturally gives rise to including those whose sexual development goes awry, and so we also include (D) those with DSDs.
The concept is neither uncommon nor controversial. The overwhelming majority of temporally unstable categories behave in the same manner. My hair is black, and I remain black-haired even if I shave my head. Humans are bipedal, and so I remain even if my leg be amputated.
If your brain were removed from your body and placed in a vat where your consciousness survived, we would have to stretch our language in order to describe the situation. Natural language develops to describe situations that speakers encounter. No one has ever encountered the brain-in-a-vat scenario in reality, so we don’t have a way to comfortably describe it. This lack forces us to default to analogy. By analogy, if all that remains of your body is your brain, then you have had your legs amputated, and you are still a bipedal creature. By analogy, if all that remains of your body is your brain, then you have had your gonads removed, and you are still either male or female.
1) A word’s dictionary definition is often—nay, usually—not its complete or technical definition. Dictionaries provide definitions that capture general usage. Crucially, definitions of words for things in the world tend to be satisficing. That is, they are true of the things described. For example, Merriam-Webster provides this as sense 8 for its definition of C: “a structured language for creating computer programs that is designed to be compact and efficient”. This is certainly true of the programming language C. It is a structured language for creating computer programs, and it was designed to be compact and efficient. However, there are many structured languages for creating computer programs that were designed to be compact and efficient. These other languages are not C.
Similarly, “a group of organisms that share a genetic heritage, are able to interbreed, and to create offspring that are also fertile” is true of species, but there are also groups that fit this description that do not qualify as species; e.g., the set of all tigers and lions. Further, by this definition, any infertile organism cannot be a member of a species, because an infertile organism cannot create offspring.
Does this mean this is a bad definition? No! It is a good definition for its purpose: general, non-technical distillation of a complex concept.
What it does mean is that we are dishonest if, knowing how dictionary definitions function, we conclude from their imprecision anything about the things they describe. The plurality programming languages relative to the dictionary definition of C does not entail that computer science categories are fungible or mysterious. Neither does the “messiness” of biology relative to the dictionary definition of species entail that biological categories are fungible or mysterious.
Les sigh. Typo: #3, paragraph 2, omission: Should read “performs the second most“.
I wish there were an edit function.
I knew that, was just about to add it.
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@Shannon #20:
One question.
How then would you define “woman?”
Shannon,
What’s the difference between a liger and a tigon?
No difference. Just like gender, they both default to the male first position.
But how do you distinguish a male lion from a female lion?